FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. I DECEMBER 15, 1922 No. 2

THE EVOLUTION OF THE UNIFIED COMMAND

By Tasker H. Bliss

SHORTLY after April 6, 1917, there began to arrive and to establish themselves in Washington military, naval and financial missions from the Allied governments in Europe with whom we had, from that date, associated ourselves in the war against the Central Powers. It was at the beginning of the campaign in the fourth year of the war. The campaigns of the third year had resulted in no decision. Events on the Western Front were marked by the magnificent defense of Verdun, but it had left the victors too exhausted to follow their negative success with an important offensive. The battle of the Somme paralleled the weary, bloody months of the battle of Verdun. At its close the Allies had gained, over a few miles front in the hundreds of miles of line from the North Sea to the Alps, a depth of not much more than half the width of the District of Columbia. They had not broken the enemy line and, perhaps, the most that can be said of it is that it led to the withdrawal of the Germans in the following spring to a stronger position than they had held before. The Italian campaign had come to an end on the Isonzo, with the Austrian main defense still intact. By October of that year the last Russian efforts had worn themselves out, with no fruitful results unless that country could remain in the war for another campaign—which was not to be. At the beginning of the year ended the disastrous adventure of Gallipoli; while the end of it found Rumania, which had entered the war in August, with her army destroyed, with her territory and all its resources in the hands of the Central Powers.

On the cry that it was necessary to save the war, the government of Mr. Asquith in England had fallen, succeeded by that of Mr. Lloyd George. In France, Marshal Joffre had been relieved from the command of her armies and General Foch had been

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

retired in unmerited disgrace to an insignificant duty. The time had not yet come when a radical and anti-clericalist government was to appoint generals not for their boastful republicanism and ardent anti-clericalism but solely for their ability to win battles. All these campaigns had cost the Allies enormous sacrifices in money, material and men, against adversaries who, in spite of their admitted mistakes, were far more unified in their purpose and efforts. The German dream of a Mittel-Europa seemed about to be realized.

In a nutshell, the cause of this failure—for failure it was—was the manifest absence of unity of purpose on the part of the Entente Powers. They were allied little more than in the sense that each found itself fighting, at the same time with the others, its own war against one enemy, and too largely for separate ultimate ends. The governments apparently had no conception that a war of such magnitude required political as well as military strategy. Otherwise, instead of basing all their hopes for three years on consistent, continuous efforts of Russia—made impossible by the inertness of her mass, her lack of industrial organization, her inconceivable corruption—they might have saved that country from collapse; they might have prevented the entry of Rumania into the war just in time to help the enemy at his crisis; nor is it inconceivable that they might, later, have pushed the Italians through the Alps and thrown Austria out of the central combination. The main efforts of the governments were individual, meeting the insatiable requirements of their commanders for munitions and men. Their attitude was reflected in that of the commanders in the field. These sometimes met together and thought that they had formed broad, comprehensive plans. But their real responsibility was limited to their own front. Naturally, their perspective of the war was largely limited by that front. There, it was hoped, the war would be won. On that front lay the essential objective of the nation behind it. It was like a battle line held by twenty independent division commanders trying to work to a general result in unison, but none having any responsibility for anything but what is in front of him. During the entire war no Allied plan was ever attempted under such conditions that did not result in dismal failure.

But the situation in the late spring of 1917 was even worse. The Germans had completed, without appreciable loss, the withdrawal of part of their line from a dangerous salient to a new and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stronger position. To the illusion that they were on a disorderly retreat that might end only at the Rhine had succeeded the conviction that the old process was to be resumed—fighting for days and weeks and months to gain at great sacrifices a few yards of ground at isolated points. Then followed the attempt of Nivelle to break this line between Reims and Soissons, resulting in disastrous failure, demoralization of the armies, loss of all confidence in their command, and in some parts of it a state of sullen mutiny. Nor did it thoroughly "come back" until the days of unified command in 1918.

Unfortunately for ultimate unified command, an abortive attempt had been made at just this time to secure it. For the purposes of the Nivelle campaign, and by agreement between the governments and despite military unwillingness, the command of the British armies had been placed, with some limitation, under the French High Command. The main result was mutual recrimination and the belief of British troops that they had been sacrificed in a hopeless attempt to secure success for their ally.

Thus, when the Allied missions arrived in Washington, they had left very dark clouds of despondency lowering over their armies in the field and their peoples at home. A ray of hope originated in the fact that they were coming to a new ally of boundless resources. They found a people not yet recovered from its amazement at finding itself at war, eager to do anything that would help but not certain what was best to do. Then, if ever, what was needed was not Allied missions but a mission of the Allies; not missions representing the discredited, disjointed political strategy of governments not working in harmony with each other, nor the dominant national military parties with their equally discredited and disjointed military strategy, but one harmonious mission with a definite plan of the military assistance that we could best and most quickly give. Surely they had ample time to learn just what they wanted this new ally for, and ample lessons to teach it. They brought with them the old, despairing cry out of Macedonia, "Come over and help us"—a spur to energy but not a guide to direct it.

It became painfully evident that these missions represented the continued lack of unity that had been the costly bane of Allied efforts from the beginning. There was no common plan. There was no definite plan in any mission. Some individuals urged that what was wanted from the United States was not men, not an

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

army, but money, food, munitions, supplies of all kinds; others said, send men, trained or untrained, and send them quickly; still others, send one small division to France to show the flag and inspire the hope that others will follow quickly, but then take a year, if need be, to train those others. And underneath it all was a quiet, guarded insistence that we direct our effort to reinforce the front of this or that particular ally. It is no wonder that the young giant began to buckle on his armor and prepare to "fight for his own hand," just as the others were doing.

Mid-autumn of 1917 came, with America sending millions of youths into the training camps, diverting her industries to the manufacture of their supplies and equipment, and with an initial plan for the dispatch of a small number of divisions to France by about the beginning of the summer of 1918. Even these would have to go unprovided with important elements of their fighting equipment. The force was small compared with what was actually sent. But, small as the effort seemed to be, there were many contingencies, any one of which might delay the execution of the plan indefinitely.

It was at this time that the United States, faced with uncertainty on every side, sent a mission of its own to Europe. It was composed of representatives of every agency of our Government, military, naval and civilian. It carried with it plans of cooperation for discussion. Its purpose was to ascertain as exactly as possible the existing conditions in the Allied nations and to learn, in conference on the spot, the most efficient way in which all the resources of our country—military, naval, industrial, commercial, financial—could be brought to bear in order to bring the war to the most prompt and successful conclusion.

The mission landed in Devonport in the night of November 7, 1917. On that same day a momentous event had occurred at the little village of Rapallo on the northwest coast of Italy. It was the first attempt to secure, not unity of command, but unity of control and a general direction of effort.

The full extent of the Caporetto disaster was then known—a disaster which had completely disorganized the Italian army and, for a short time, made its escape doubtful. The British and French Governments rushed to Italy's assistance the troops which they had refused before, and General Foch, the French Chief of Staff, visited the Italian General Headquarters and arranged for a complete rehabilitation of that army. The heads

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the British, French and Italian Governments, the ones who had participated in stemming the flood of invasion, met in conference at Rapallo and considered ways and means of ensuring closer co-ordination and unity of action in waging the war. The formation of the Supreme War Council was decided upon, and the session of the Rapallo Conference on 7th November, 1917, became the first session of the new body.

The Supreme War Council came into being in accordance with the following joint resolution of the governments concerned:

DECISIONS OF A CONFERENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BRITISH, FRENCH, AND ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS

I

The representatives of the British, French and Italian Governments assembled at Rapallo on the 7th November, 1917, have agreed on the scheme for the organization of a Supreme War Council with a Permanent Military Representative from each Power, contained in the following paragraph.

SCHEME OF ORGANIZATION OF A SUPREME WAR COUNCIL

II

(1) With a view to the better co-ordination of military action on the Western Front a Supreme War Council is created, composed of the Prime Minister and a Member of the Government of each of the Great Powers whose armies are fighting on that front. The extension of the scope of the Council to other fronts is reserved for discussion with the other Great Powers.

(2) The Supreme War Council has for its mission to watch over the general conduct of the war. . . .

(3) The General Staffs and Military Commands of the armies of each Power charged with the conduct of military operations remain responsible to their respective Governments.

(4) The General war plans drawn up by the competent Military authorities are submitted to the Supreme War Council, which, under the high authority of the Governments, insures their concordance.

(5) Each Power delegates to the Supreme War Council one Permanent Military Representative whose exclusive function is to act as technical adviser to the Council.

(6) The Military Representatives receive from the Government and the competent military authorities of their country all the proposals, information, and documents relating to the conduct of the war.

(7) The Military Representatives watch day by day the situation of the forces, and of the means of all kinds of which the Allied armies and the enemy armies dispose.

(8) The Supreme War Council meets normally at Versailles, where the Permanent Military Representatives and their Staffs are established. . .

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

III

The Permanent Military Representatives will be as follows:

For France, *General Foch*
For Great Britain, *General Wilson*
For Italy, *General Cadorna*

Rapallo,
November 7, 1917.

It will be noted that while chiefly concerned with watching over the "conduct of the war" the Supreme War Council was nevertheless a *political* body. The decision to give it a political character was sound, in accord with the military principle that war is but a continuation of political policy in a new form and affording reasonable assurance that it would not be an organization "which should either supersede or interfere with the unfettered activity and independent position *vis-à-vis* the several governments and staffs, or, again, which would in any way derogate from the authority or ultimate responsibility of each of the Allied governments over its own forces and to its own people."[1] This political body had the wisdom not to attempt to direct military operations in the field, but to limit itself to reaching decisions as to: (a) questions of policy affecting the military situation; (b) distribution of available man-power, equipment, supplies and shipping among the various theatres of operations; (c) the character that military operations should assume, in view of the forces available, in each theatre of operations.

It will be seen that these are all questions of a general character, which could have been decided only by the political heads of the governments. The Supreme War Council did not supersede the Commanders-in-Chief but gave them for their guidance an expression of the definite policy of the Allied governments. It was not to act as a Commander-in-Chief, but as an agency for the adoption and maintenance of a general policy for the Allies in the prosecution of the war, consistent with the total resources available and the most effective distribution of those resources among the various theatres of operations.

While paragraph 1 of the resolution quoted above shows that the immediate problem was "coordination of military effort on the Western[2] Front," paragraph 2 extends "its mission to watch

[1]Speech of Mr. Asquith before the House of Commons 19th November, 1917.

[2]Defined by resolution passed 2nd May, 1918, at the Fifth Session of the S. W. C. as extending "from the North Sea to the Adriatic," but not such prior to that resolution.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

over the general conduct of the war," and it was found from the outset that the general military situation had to be considered in reaching a decision in any particular case. Indeed, at the first session it was agreed, as suggested by Mr. Lloyd George, that "the Supreme War Council should concern itself with all the fronts where the Allied armies were fighting *in common*."

Nevertheless, there was a certain vagueness in the Resolution creating and defining the functions of the Supreme War Council (although in its preparation the principal military men of the countries concerned took part), and this was accentuated in the speeches formally announcing it at a diplomatic breakfast in Paris on November 12, 1917. This resulted in a misunderstanding of its purpose—a misunderstanding maliciously fomented in certain quarters—with a resulting outburst of disapproval in the French and British press and among military and many political men. Strange to say—in the light of recent experience—the thing which carried most weight with the public was the allegation that a deliberate attempt was being made to surrender national for inter-Allied control. This is of no consequence now except as showing how little ripe was either the civilian or military sentiment for a unified command in the field.

This outburst was promptly followed by the downfall of the Painlevé government in France. A good result was the accession to power of Mr. Clemenceau. He and Mr. Lloyd George were twin-thunderbolts of war—the two men who, working in harmony and in their own spheres, did more than any other two in Europe to win the war. In England the government had a fight for its life over the same issue and there is reason to believe that the adhesion of the United States to the Supreme War Council, just before Mr. Lloyd George had to defend in the Commons his action at Rapallo, had much to do with the maintenance of that government, whose fall then would have been disastrous.

Had the Supreme War Council been functioning at the time of its arrival, the American mission would have found its work easier. As it was, the members had to obtain their information piecemeal from various representatives of the different governments, put it together and reconcile conflicting views as best they could. The task of the military member was probably the easiest. He made known the plan for the American military effort to be made late in the following spring. In reply he heard described the gravity of the situation, due to the, by then, complete

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

defection of Russia and the disaster at Caporetto. This situation, he was told, required the doubling of the proposed American effort, notwithstanding what seemed insuperable difficulties in equipment and in securing shipping for transportation. All this was reinforced at a conference of the mission with the War Cabinet at 10 Downing Street, on November 20th.

Among other things the Prime Minister said:

"Take first of all the question of sending men over into the battle-line as soon as you can possibly train and equip them. I will give you the reasons why that is extremely urgent, and I do so after consultation with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (Sir William Robertson) who supplied me with the necessary information."

After reviewing the situation on the different fronts he said:

"The Germans may be able to put 600,000 more men on to the French and Flanders fronts next year, and we might have 600,000 fewer men . . . That shows that it is a matter of the most urgent and immediate importance that you should send to Europe next year, *and as early next year as possible*, as many men as you can spare, to enable us to withstand any possible German attack, *apart altogether from the possibility of inflicting any defeat upon them*."

And again, he said that the first and most important thing for the United States to do to help France and her Allies on the battle line was to send as many men as possible and

"at the earliest possible moment, *so as to be able to sustain the brunt of any German attack in the course of next year . . .*"

These views were confirmed and strengthened by French authorities after the mission arrived in Paris.

Looking back at the situation of that moment it is difficult to understand the apparent attitude of mind towards it of all those charged with the gravest responsibility. It was only a little less evident then than now that the situation had resulted from the lack of a general, unified direction. As a result, it was the conviction of every one that a grave military crisis was impending which would develop in the early spring. The British and French had recently been obliged to send a number of good divisions to Italy, nor could they venture to bring them back. Against the depleted line in France the Germans were beginning to mass the divisions no longer necessary on the Russian front. When they thought they had enough the blow would fall. But no one knew where it would fall. To the last moment each commander

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

believed the drive would be made against his own front. Each did what he could to make his front secure, but knowing that in the last resort he must have help from his ally. Their point of junction was vital. If that were crushed through completely the British almost certainly (their people would have forced it) would swing back to protect the Channel ports; the French would swing back to protect Paris. It is true that, much earlier in the war, General Foch had declared that this must not be. But no one but General Foch *as Commander-in-Chief* could have prevented it. And he could have prevented it only by doing what he would instantly have done—by creating an Allied General Reserve which we know from his own map he would have stationed so as to prevent the possibility of the enemy's crushing the point of junction of the British and French armies. Yet, in all the conferences of that time, and up to the great disaster four months later, any suggestion as to a Commander-in-Chief only developed the belief that it was quite impossible.

Nevertheless, when the members of the American mission submitted their reports for the information of the President, the military member, under date of December 17, 1917, stated the following as the first conclusion formed from his observations:

"A military crisis is to be apprehended, culminating not later than the end of the next spring, in which, without great assistance from the United States, the advantage will probably lie with the Central Powers.

"This crisis is largely due to lack of military coordination, lack of unity of control on the part of the Allied forces in the field.

"The lack of unity of control results from military jealousy and suspicion as to ultimate national aims.

"Our Allies urge us to profit by their experience, in three and a half years of war; to adopt the organization, the types of artillery, tanks, etc., that the test of war has proved to be satisfactory. We should go further. In making the great military effort now demanded of us we should demand as a prior condition that our Allies also profit by the experience of three and a half years of war in the matter of absolute unity of military control. National jealousies and suspicions and susceptibilities of national temperament must be put aside in favor of this unified control; *even going if necessary (as I believe it is) to the limit of unified command.* Otherwise, our dead and theirs may have died in vain."

And he added the specific recommendation

"that the Government of the United States represent to the other governments concerned the great interest which it has in securing

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

absolute unity of military control even if this should demand unity of command."

It was held, however, that the time was not yet ripe for making such a representation to the Allied governments. For a reason given later, it is not unlikely that the governing political heads would even then have cordially united upon General Foch. But behind the governments were powerful military parties not yet ready for this step. Its success depended on general harmony, without which it was a foregone conclusion that sufficient power could neither be given to a Commander-in-Chief nor exercised by him. The attempt made a few months before to secure, for a limited purpose, unification of command had discredited it among the very men who would have to accept it cordially if it were to be successful. And the fact that at that time the American military effort was still small, with great uncertainty as to whether it could be increased in time to meet the demands of the Allies, made it seem ungracious to couple our promises with any limitation. Therefore, up to the moment of the crisis, the only attempt at unified control—not command—had to be made by the Supreme War Council.

This attempt was the one which was made to create an Allied General Reserve. The connection of such a Reserve with unified command is obvious. The first suggestion as to its necessity that the writer heard came from General Foch in November of 1917, when the American mission was in Paris. But, while not otherwise expressed, the urgency of it stood out in every interview with military men. It was evident, and admitted, that if the great enemy offensive should fall on either one of the national Allied fronts the maintenance of a national reserve of sufficient strength to make the position of that army perfectly safe was impossible, and that assistance would have to come from the other army. But the danger was (as subsequently proved to be the case) that, with the fortunes of two nations at stake and the possibility of two nearly simultaneous drives, neither commander would realize in time that he was relatively safe while his ally was in mortal peril, and his assistance might go too late.

But how could there be an Allied Reserve without an Allied Commander-in-Chief? The control of a General Reserve, the ability to order it hither and yon without let or hindrance from anyone, is the supreme function of a Commander-in-Chief. It is for him to decide the point of danger, to meet it, if he can, by first

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stripping his line of disposable local reserves; to decide when and to what extent to send in his general reserve; and, if he can defeat the enemy while still leaving his own general reserve intact, it is for him to decide whether with it he can change his defense into an offensive that may win ultimate and supreme victory.

Thus is seen the intimate connection between the creation of an Allied General Reserve and the question of unified command. Its commander would become, for one all important purpose, an *ipso facto* Commander-in-Chief. And the failure to create this reserve resulted from an inherent inability of a political council of governmental heads to meet sudden emergencies on the battle-field. It could, and did, with the full support of the commanders in the field, establish a general policy for the opening of the campaign of 1918; it could bring coordination into such matters as the supply of munitions and material of all kinds, transportation by land and sea, etc. In all matters in which civil and military unanimity could be arrived at it was effective. But when an irreconcilable difference arose between the military men of two nations the inevitable tendency, despite honest efforts to pull together, was for the head of each government to side with his own military party.

The most important session of the Supreme War Council was held at Versailles, January 30–February 2, 1918. Some fourteen Joint Notes submitted by the military representatives were to be considered. Two of them—Nos. 1 and 12, relating to military policy—were the subject of discussion until into the third day. One of them contained the provision

"that the whole Allied front in France be treated as *a single strategic* field of action, and that the *disposition of the reserves*, the periodic rearrangement of the point of junction between the various Allied forces on the actual front, and all other arrangements should be dominated by this consideration."

The other contained the provision:

"A definite and *coordinated* system of defense from the North Sea to the Adriatic must be adopted by the Allies," to include among other things, "the use to the utmost of all possible mechanical means [for defense] in order to provide the *maximum mobile reserve*."

Both of the notes were accepted, after a discussion between the representatives of the governments then principally concerned which revealed the almost insuperable difficulty in securing

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

military coordination but which made no suggestion as to the only way to meet it. But in accepting them the Supreme Council had also accepted, in principle and probably without fully realizing it, a General Reserve and some sort of military control that would effect a coordinated strategy on the principal fronts.

Besides the general reference to the "maximum mobile reserve" made in the note on military policy, Joint Note No. 14 was specifically directed to this subject. It read:

"The Military Representatives are of opinion that the formation of a General Reserve for the whole of the Allied forces on the Western front, both in France and Italy, is imperative. The Military Representatives recommend that in view of its urgency the creation of this Reserve should be decided at the next meeting of the Supreme War Council."

In the discussions of the preceding two days the significant suggestion had been made that this note was "highly contentious" in character, and it was decided to withhold its consideration until the "Supreme Council should dispose of their non-contentious business."

Mr. Clemenceau opened the discussion of it by propounding four questions:

1. Shall we constitute a General Reserve?
2. Will it be a Reserve for the whole front from the North Sea to the Adriatic?
3. How shall it be composed?
4. Who will command it?

It may be said at once that in the discussion which followed the answer to Mr. Clemenceau's third question was, by common consent, left to be decided by the answer to the fourth question. But, while there developed a general agreement, in principle, on the first and second questions, there were radical differences of opinion on the fourth. In regard to the first question, General Foch, Chief of Staff of France, held that "the necessity of having a Reserve was indisputable; and that there was no doubt that the Reserve should be constituted for the whole front from the North Sea to the Adriatic, and consequently it should be drawn from the British, French and Italian armies." And his general view was that the matter was one of urgency, admitting of no delay.

General Robertson, Imperial British Chief of Staff, was "in general agreement with General Foch in regard to the necessity

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of creating a General Reserve;" but he doubted "the need of the General Reserve at the moment, because most of the Allied troops are needed where they are;" and he added, "any day, however, it might be necessary to form the proposed Reserve, and, therefore, the question of the organization should be studied in detail." There was no difference of view, expressed from any quarter, as to the necessity in principle of organizing a General Reserve; nor as to its being a reserve for the entire front from the North Sea to the Adriatic. Nor was there any doubt as to its being quite independent of local reserves. In reply to the statement of Mr. Orlando that he understood that each army would "continue to have its own reserves in addition to those under the inter-Allied central body," General Pétain replied that the idea was "to constitute an inter-Allied Reserve in addition to the local reserves of the armies." And General Foch had previously stated the condition that "this Reserve must be additional to the divisions which each army has behind its own front."

With reference to Mr. Clemenceau's fourth question, General Foch said:

"There must be one authority, able to constitute, conserve, and prepare for the employment of the General Reserve by the various armies, in agreement with the commanders. When the moment arrives to make use of the Reserve the same authority must decide on its use, must arrange for its transport, and feed the battle-line in which the Reserve was to be engaged. As the Reserve might be used to support any of the Allies, the central authority must be inter-Allied in character. It must be able and entitled to make all the necessary preparations. Moreover, this inter-Allied organ must be required to make decisions if the Governments are not in session at Versailles. In fact, it must be an inter-Allied organ of execution. I would suggest to bring together the Chiefs of the Staff who advise their Governments on the different questions, in order that they may carry out their duties in agreement. To these principal members of the central organ there should be added representatives of the American army and of the Belgian army."

The British Imperial Chief of Staff agreed with General Foch that the best persons to control the Reserve would be the Chiefs of Staff. This arrangement would perfectly well suit Great Britain and France. He foresaw some difficulty in the case of Italy which had, he said, no Chief of Staff except with the army in the field; as well as in the case of the American army whose

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

government had very wisely given its Commander-in-Chief absolute control of all operations in the field in France without any interference from it directly or through a Chief of Staff in Washington. But he believed that this difficulty could be surmounted and he concluded that "whoever commands the Reserve must be in a position to issue orders immediately the emergency arises."

The evident tendency of the discussion was towards the creation of an Allied body of several men to control the Reserve, notwithstanding an earlier remark of Mr. Clemenceau's that "when the question of creating an inter-Allied Reserve was raised it was with the idea that, *as we could not have a single Commander-in-Chief*, we might at least have a Commander of Reserves." The American military representative said that there was absolute unanimity of opinion on the creation of a reserve if sufficient troops could be found; that it seemed generally admitted that the latter point would be promptly settled as soon as there was agreement on the matter of command; and that the question of command, as thus raised, must be decided now. He said that "if the Commanders-in-Chief could agree on a single man to command the reserves that would be by far the best plan." If that were not possible, then the Allied body that exercised this function must represent the various Commanders-in-Chief and have their confidence.

The British Prime Minister then said that the exact terms of the resolution to be moved with respect to a General Reserve were of great importance and proposed that General Foch be asked to prepare a draft. This was done during a brief recess and, on reassembling, the following resolution was considered:

1. A Superior War Board is created to secure the coordination of military operations, in accordance with the general instruction of the Governments, over the whole front from the North Sea to the Adriatic.

2. The members of this Board are the French and British Chiefs of the General Staffs, and also Generals representing Italy, America and Belgium. It sits in Paris.

3. This Board draws up, in agreement with the Commanders-in-Chief, the general plans of operations. These plans can be proposed either by the Board or the Commanders-in-Chief.

4. The powers and duties of the Board include—
   a. *The constitution of General Reserves.* . . .
   b. *The maintenance and movement of the General Reserves.* . . .
   c. *The use of the General Reserves.* . . .

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It soon became evident that it would not be accepted. The first three paragraphs of the text went beyond the terms of any definite proposition that had been discussed. It is true that the Council had already accepted the principle of "one front" and of coordinated strategy along it. And, in the absence of an Allied Commander-in-Chief, General Foch's plan offered perhaps the only hope of coordinating strategy. But some governments were not ready to divest themselves of the real power of intervention in this matter. They doubtless knew and were guided by the temper of their own peoples at that moment. The British Government found the same objection as before to this assignment for their Chief of Staff who, as was said a few hours later when another plan was adopted, had the duty of advising the War Cabinet in London and they would not be willing for considerable periods to put up with some officer of lower status. And the Italians, who had no Chief of Staff, did not see how they could put any other officer in a position where, as they assumed, he might have to give orders to his own Commander-in-Chief. They modified this view when the final plan was proposed.

Thus a long day's discussion closed with no decision, but with the way to a decision clearly marked. The reader will have noted that the question was not solely "Who shall command the General Reserve?" but "Who shall control its commander?" Every proposition had been eliminated that seemed to deprive the heads of governments of this power; there was nothing left to exercise it but the Supreme War Council which was composed of those heads. It was decided that each of the four national sections of the Council should prepare that night, independently of each other, its own solution, and that these should be presented at the session of the following morning. Naturally, as they could not wander very far from the line that had been fixed, it was found that the solutions were in substantial unanimity. A common draft was quickly prepared.

At this stage an announcement was made that ought to have carried conclusive weight—though it did not—in the minds of those who had any doubt as to the character of the control and command of the Reserve. The final draft created an executive body. The British Prime Minister stated that he and his colleagues had agreed that its President should be named by the heads of government. He said:

"The President of the Committee must necessarily have special

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

qualifications, and the members of the Supreme War Council have agreed —that is to say, the three heads of Governments attending that meeting have agreed, and in the absence of the President of the United States have ventured to assume the latter's concurrence—that the right man to be President is General Foch on account of his experience, his record and his energy, his accomplishments and his reputation."

The American military representative then said that the three Prime Ministers were right in assuming that President Wilson would acquiesce because the name alone of General Foch justified his designation.

Continuing with the reasons for this action, Mr. Lloyd George said:

"General Foch is loyal not only to France but also to the Allies. When the British Army in Flanders was in difficulties he threw all his weight into rendering it assistance. So prompt and generous was that assistance that General Foch might almost have been an Englishman himself. Again, when Italy was in trouble, General Foch, without any hesitation and on his own responsibility, decided to send troops to her aid. General Foch therefore commands the confidence not only of the French but also of the British and Italians, and, I am glad to hear, the Americans. We can be quite sure that as President of the Committee General Foch would be quite unbiased. I have, therefore, great pleasure in announcing this decision of the Supreme War Council."

In the light of this action and of these remarks it is difficult now to understand how anyone could have believed that the executive body to control the Reserve would have been anything but a "one-man" body, that there would be anything but a "one-man" command of the Reserve, and that the "one man" would be anyone but General Foch. The members of the Committee would have been his staff. But this proved impossible. The fact remained that it was not merely the Chairman of an Allied Committee but the Chief of Staff of the French armies who was to give certain all important orders to the other armies.

Just before the resolution was read for adoption, the British Commander-in-Chief said that he desired to be informed "by what channel I will receive my orders from the new body;" that "I am responsible for the forces under my command to the British Government, and I receive orders from the latter through the Chief of the Imperial General Staff;" that "a con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stitutional question of great importance is involved, and I want to be quite clear about the matter." In reply to this Mr. Lloyd George stated that "I wish to inform the Supreme War Council that before Lord Milner and I left England to attend this session the War Cabinet, *which is the British Government*, gave us full powers to act on behalf of that Government. As regards the question of the communication of orders, these would be issued by the member of the body nominated by the Supreme War Council." Nevertheless, the Field Marshal asked "that the exact position shall be made clear to me in writing, as it involves a change in constitutional procedure."

An American is not competent to discuss the point thus raised. But looking back at it in the light of such knowledge as we then had, it seems as though whatever "change in constitutional procedure" was involved was at that moment, actually and constitutionally, being made by the government concerned. Moreover, at that very time the French Commander-in-Chief in the field, while still urging the necessity of the proposed General Reserve, had announced the steps that he and the British commander had taken to meet the coming crisis as well as they could without such a reserve. He said that "the whole of the plans, both for the defensive and for the preparation of sectors for local attacks, have been completed between Sir Douglas Haig and myself. I will have an army ready to support Sir Douglas Haig in an emergency, and I know Sir Douglas Haig will be ready to assist me in the same manner." This meant nothing if it did not mean that when the crisis should come, either, by mutual agreement, on the demand of the other, would send assistance. Surely, otherwise, the agreement was a mere form of words, a broken reed for either to lean his weight upon. In making it they gave no thought to constitutional procedure. In carrying it out they would not wait for permission or orders from governments in distant capitals. But it was only too likely that, when a crisis came that seemed to threaten both, either commander might hesitate, perhaps just for the fatal moment, to strip his own line and send the assistance the other demanded. And the action of the government on the 2nd of February, 1918, was only to give to a third man—General Foch, who could survey the events on both fronts as neither commander could do—the decision as to when and where the real crisis occurred and, above all, *to be ready for it in time*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But it was evident that if this constitutional objection were maintained—as it was—it would nullify—as it did—this gravely important matter. It was to prove that while Mr. Clemenceau was right in assuming (until the great disaster came) that "we could not have a single Commander-in-Chief," he was wrong in his hope that "we might at least have a Commander of Reserves."

The first two Resolutions adopted by the Supreme War Council on February 2, 1918, were the following:

RESOLUTION NO. 13

1. The Supreme War Council decides on the creation of a General Reserve for the whole of the Armies on the Western, Italian, and Balkan fronts.

2. The Supreme War Council delegates to an Executive composed of the Permanent Military Representatives of Great Britain, Italy, and the United States of America, with General Foch for France, the following powers to be exercised in consultation with the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armies concerned:

(a) To determine the strength in all arms and the contribution of each national army [to the Reserve]. (b) To select the localities in which to be stationed. (c) To make arrangements for transportation and concentration. (d) To decide and issue orders as to the time, place, and period of employment of the General Reserve. . . . (e) To determine the time, place, and strength of the counter-offensive, and then to hand over to one or more of the Commanders-in-Chief the necessary troops for the operation. . . .

3. In case of irreconcilable differences of opinion on a point of importance connected with the General Reserve, any Military Representative has the right to appeal to the Supreme War Council.

4. . . .

5. The Supreme War Council will nominate the President of the Executive Committee from among the Members of the Committee.

RESOLUTION NO. 14

The Supreme War Council designate General Foch as President of the Executive Committee for the General Reserve.

The Executive Committee immediately organized and began the examination of the four essential points indicated by General Foch: 1, the strength of the General Reserve and the contribution of troops from each army; 2, its initial points of concentration; 3, its transportation, north and south, to any points on the line from the North Sea to the Adriatic; and, 4, the terrains prepared for counter-offensive in the different armies.

On February 6th a letter was addressed the Commanders-in-Chief of the British, French and Italian armies analyzing the situation, giving the reasons why a General Reserve should

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

consist, at a minimum, of about thirty divisions taken from all three armies, and suggesting, as contributions from the national armies, nine or ten British divisions[3] (including three temporarily in Italy), thirteen or fourteen French divisions (including four temporarily in Italy), and seven Italian divisions. It was proposed that the divisions allotted from each army should be held in the zone of that army—that is, behind its own front—and not removed to any other front unless the crisis of the battle de-



Distribution Proposed by Gen. Foch of an Allied Reserve in Anticipation of the Campaign Beginning March 21, 1918

manded it. But they were to be so stationed at the outset that when the crisis did demand it either could go to the assistance of another with the minimum delay. The proposed distribution was shown upon a map which accompanied the letter. Finally, with a statement as to the urgency of prompt action, the special views of each Commander-in-Chief as to the initial distribution were invited, as well as certain information as to additional air craft and heavy artillery units for the Reserve.

Correspondence and personal interviews followed. By February 19th, a definite agreement was made with General Pétain allowing a reduction of two divisions from the ten (exclusive of

[3]Depending on whether the reconstituted Belgian Army could extend its front.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

his divisions temporarily in Italy) originally requested of him. By March 1st, a similar agreement with General Diaz was made, with a reduction from seven divisions to six. The reply from British headquarters was dated March 2nd and received the following day. It read as follows:

"An enemy offensive appears to be imminent on both the English and French fronts. To meet this attack I have already disposed of all the troops at present under my command, and if I were to earmark six or seven divisions from these troops, the whole of my plans and dispositions would have to be remodeled. This is clearly impossible, and I therefore regret that I am unable to comply with the suggestion conveyed in the Joint Note.

"I would also point out that I foresee a wider employment, etc., of Allied Reserves than that foreshadowed in the Joint Note.

"In the event of the enemy making a sustained attack in great force on any of the Allied Armies on the Western front, it might be necessary to dispatch a considerable force to the assistance of the Army attacked, and to maintain that force by a rotation of divisions. But this force could not be earmarked or located in any particular areas prior to the delivery of the German offensive or the development of the enemy's intentions, for the situation might well demand the ultimate employment of the whole of the resources of any one army.

"For such a purpose or to meet any emergency on the Franco-British front, I have arranged as a preliminary measure with the Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies for all preparations to be made for the rapid dispatch of a force of from six to eight British divisions with a proportionate amount of artillery and subsidiary services to his assistance.

"General Pétain has made similar arrangements for relief or intervention of French troops on the British front. These arrangements, both French and British, are now being completed, and zones of concentration opposite those fronts which are most vulnerable and likely to be attacked are being provided.

"As regards the extension of the Belgian front, as suggested in the note to para. 2 of the Joint Note, I am of opinion that it is inadvisable to carry out such an extension at the present time before the enemy's intentions are sufficiently known. I agree, however, that the extension should be studied by the Belgian Army with a view to its execution should the necessity arise and the situation permit, and I will discuss the matter with the Belgian authorities."

Brief comment, only, is necessary. It was admitted that in case of "a sustained attack in great force on any of the Allied armies on the Western Front, it might be necessary to dispatch a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

considerable force to the assistance of the army attacked." But that was admitted and emphasized over and over again by every one, military and civilian, present at the session of the Supreme War Council January 30th–February 2nd. It was admitted that to meet the danger an *assured* means of inter-Allied assistance must be provided. For that sole reason the creation of an inter-Allied General Reserve was decreed without protest from anyone.

But, it was also declared in the letter from British headquarters, "this force could not be located in any particular areas prior to the delivery of the German offensive." Each army had its own general reserve. What was it for? And where was it to be stationed? Each commander knew that an attack "in great force" could not be made and "sustained" against his entire front. In the absence of an Allied Commander-in-Chief to take the responsibility, each national commander assumed that the sustained attack in force would come against him. He had to assume, in the light of his information, the most probable line of this attack and locate his own general reserve accordingly. Otherwise he left everything to chance. General Foch's proposition was that each army should place its general reserve so as to cover that part of its own front most likely to be attacked, if the enemy struck that front at all; in a position where it could be rapidly moved to any other part of its front if necessary; to have certain of its divisions "earmarked" as belonging to the Allied General Reserve and not to be fed into the battle until he gave the word; and even those latter divisions not to be moved to any other front until the crisis of the battle became so evident that no one could hesitate as to where they ought to go. No one can now deny, nor could anyone have denied after midnight of March 21, 1918, that General Foch's plan was the only one that could have assured prompt assistance the moment the crisis developed.

The British Commander stated that to meet just such an emergency he and General Pétain had arranged "for the rapid dispatch of a force of from six to eight British divisions" in case the attack came on the French front, and that the latter had arranged to send similar assistance to the British. In other words, they were making a futile attempt to provide, as between themselves, an Allied Reserve. For this purpose the British Commander agreed to use very nearly the same force that General Foch requested for a real reserve, for which it was said to be impossible to "earmark" or locate these very divisions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Without such earmarking and location, how could either commander assure the other of the "rapid dispatch" of assistance when needed?

The sketch map on p. 19 is taken from the detailed one which accompanied the letter of February 6th sent by General Foch to the British, French and Italian Commanders-in-Chief. It shows the proposed initial location of the British and French contributions to the Allied Reserve. At that time the Germans, by a skilful massing of their newly arriving troops, by the location of their great ammunition dumps and artillery reserves, threatened attack at widely different points. But also there were not many men who at that time, had they been obliged to stake their fortunes on a single bet, would have wagered that the main attack would come in any other general direction than proved to be the case—either on the British right or the French left, somewhere near their point of junction. That is the probability that General Foch, were he Allied Commander-in-Chief, must have assumed. Had he then been such a Commander, he would have had an Allied Reserve and that is where he would have located it. March 21st and subsequent days would have been "another story."

Events from this time moved rapidly. On March 4th, General Foch's Committee drew up a statement of facts, concluding:

"Under the circumstances the Executive War Board finds itself unable to continue its work and, therefore, unable to organize the inter-Allied General Reserve, as the Supreme War Council at its sitting of February 2nd had instructed it to do, and the Executive War Board decides that each Military Representative shall so inform his own government and ask for instructions."

Action was suspended for twenty-four hours to enable the British member, General Sir Henry Rawlinson, to have a personal interview with his chief. The interview produced no result, and on March 5th the members of the Committee notified its action to their respective governments. In his cable message the American member recommended that his government should suggest to that of Great Britain that

"while admitting the possibility that the military situation on the British Front may make it impracticable to assign British divisions to the inter-Allied General Reserve, nevertheless the principle of such a General Reserve should not be abandoned and that the other Allies who are able to contribute to it should promptly do so. My personal opinion is that there is danger that the Italian and French commanders

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

may hold aloof when they learn the attitude of the British commander, although they may not have the same reason for doing so."

This seemed to be the view of the British War Cabinet as evidenced by their following telegram of March 7th to their representative on the Executive Committee:

"The War Cabinet . . . are strongly of the opinion that hitch which has occurred in regard to composition of British Section of General Reserve should not bring work Executive Board to a standstill. They do not regard Haig's inability to comply with request of Executive Board as necessarily final but rather as due to immediate situation on his front. . . ."

The American member of the Committee then addressed to it a letter stating it as his view

"that the Supreme War Council in its Resolution of February 2nd decreed the creation of an inter-Allied General Reserve and charged the Executive Committee with certain duties as to its composition and use. This decree and these instructions of the Supreme War Council are mandatory, and the Executive Committee can not abdicate the duties and responsibilities with which it is charged, merely because a Commander-in-Chief has stated that he can not agree with it as to one point, which point is a question of method rather than principle."

He gave in detail his reasons for insisting that a Reserve was none the less Allied in character merely because at the time of its creation some one army was not represented on it. Thus, for example, it was not proposed to call on the then relatively small American force for any contribution to the Reserve, which would be none the less an inter-Allied one. But he went further than this. He proposed that the Executive Committee should include in its organization of the General Reserve the fair proportion of British troops and then put the whole matter up to the Supreme War Council to decide in the light of any protests that it might receive from any of the Commanders-in-Chief in the field. He recommended

"that the Executive Committee report to the Supreme War Council that, in compliance with the latter's instructions: a. It has constituted an inter-Allied General Reserve consisting of twenty-six divisions, of which for the present ten are to remain in the Italian theatre of war; eight in the French theatre of war; and eight in the British theatre. b. That all of the correspondence, or a résumé of it, between the Executive Committee and the respective Commanders-in-Chief, on the subject of the inter-Allied General Reserve, be submitted to the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Supreme Council in order that it may pass upon the validity of any protest made against the proposed composition of the General Reserve."

But the opinion prevailed that such action departed so far from the original instructions of the Supreme War Council that a new mandate must be received from it that would ensure compliance. And, whatever they might do, and did do, when the crisis came, it had become evident that there was no disposition to guarantee in advance assistance to any quarter that would give no similar guarantee in return. No further action could be taken until the next session of the Supreme War Council, scheduled for March 14–15 in London.

When this session opened the presiding officer, Mr. Lloyd George, said that "the first question related to the formation of a General Reserve." He referred to the note received in London from Washington on March 11th, to which he gave great importance and which read:

"The Government of the United States admits the possibility that it may be found impracticable to furnish British divisions for the Reserve, because of the military situation in front of the British lines, but nevertheless it desires to express the hope that there will be no abandonment of the principle established for the creation of the General Reserve, and that the Allied Powers who find themselves able to assist in creating the Reserve will act promptly in the matter."

He then outlined the situation in front of the British line. He said that

"though myself a warm advocate of the scheme of a General Reserve, I have come to the conclusion, in view of the exceptional concentration against us, that it would be very difficult for Field-Marshal Haig to spare the necessary reserves."

Mr. Clemenceau, while of the opinion that there "can be no question of abandoning the principle of the General Reserve," said that, "for the moment it is impossible to withdraw divisions from the command of Field-Marshal Haig and General Pétain, in view of the threatened attack."

The facts that General Foch's plan did not contemplate taking any British or French divisions that might be assigned to an Allied Reserve away from their own fronts until the crisis was evident; that if the attack came, as was then supposed most likely, against the British front it would find the British divisions of the General Reserve behind their own line; that the French

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

divisions, also, would have been "earmarked" (to use the British Commander's term) for immediate dispatch to assist their ally and with their organizations absolutely complete, with no missing artillery or ammunition; that this was equally true if the attack came against the French front; all these counted for nothing.

Having decided as it did, there was but one thing that the Supreme Council could do. Assuming that the Italians (who themselves insisted that a serious attack was coming against them) would cheerfully do what the British and French had declined to do, it directed:

"The British and French divisions now on the Italian front, together with the British division which has just left that front, and a quota of Italian divisions to be determined by the Executive War Board, shall form the nucleus of the General Reserve."

The Supreme Council foresaw that what the Italians could do had to be learned on the spot. It therefore directed a committee of four general officers to proceed to Italy and confer with the authorities there. But it was too late. On the night of March 20th, the committee reached Paris on its return from Turin and made its report. But there could be no satisfactory result. The proposition of the American representative, made to the Supreme War Council on February 2nd, that the decisions of the Executive Committee should be made by a majority vote, had been rejected. Decisions, therefore, must be unanimous. It had been three to one on the proposition for a British contribution to the Reserve. It was now three to one on the Italian contribution. Had it been all the world to one, the one vote was a majority.

The great battle commenced on the following morning. And now, because there was no commander of an Allied Reserve there was to be a Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies. And, after all, the supreme necessity for an Allied Commander-in-Chief was to enable him to create and handle reserves at his will.

Even then he did not come until the black spectre of irretrievable ruin was brooding over the battlefield. By the 26th of March the situation had become gravely critical. The Germans had expected, about this date, to inflict the final blow. They were opening a breach between the two armies, the very thing that General Foch's plan for the Allied Reserve—had he been permitted to organize it and prepare it in time for orderly movement—was intended to prevent. It began to appear that British troops might have to be withdrawn on a line that would have

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

completed the separation of the armies. The way was almost opened for an advance on Paris by the valley of the Oise or to the Channel by that of the Somme.

Everything depended upon the arrival in sufficient numbers of the French reserves—and at the right spot. These gallant troops, picked up wherever they could be found, with or without their artillery, were beginning to arrive.

The confusion that reigned is indicated in Lord Milner's report to the British War Cabinet. He had been hastily sent from London to report on the position of affairs. He reached British headquarters on the night of March 24th. He found that the Fifth Army was shattered. He says that

"owing to this Army being so much broken and communications cut in all directions, it is difficult to make out exactly what has happened, and it would take time to place together the reports. Broadly speaking, however, there is no doubt that this Army is shattered and a breach effected in the Allied line between the right flank of the Third (British) Army and the French."

On the morning of the 25th he had an interview with Mr. Clemenceau in Paris:

"He told me that he thought important decisions must be taken at once. His view was that it was necessary at all costs to maintain the connection between the French and British Armies, and that *both Haig and Pétain must at once throw in their reserves*, to stop the breach which was in course of being effected."

These "important decisions" were the ones that General Foch had wanted to make two months earlier; these reserves were the ones that two months earlier he wanted to prepare so that they could be "thrown in at once" when this very crisis came.

Furthermore, "Mr. Clemenceau said that it would be necessary to bring pressure upon Pétain to do more in that direction. He evidently hoped that Haig would be able to bring down more reserves from the north."

Where was now the agreement between the two Commanders-in-Chief that each would help the other when the crisis came? The thing had happened which had so often been prophesied. Rightly or wrongly, it was believed that Haig still had disposable reserves "in the north" that he was not using. The decision to help being left with either Commander-in-Chief he was not likely to believe that the crisis had come so long as he thought the other had reserves of his own. Nevertheless, the French were doing all

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that could be expected of them. On the afternoon of the 25th, Gen. Pétain informed Lord Milner that he already had six divisions very heavily engaged, and he was trying to bring up nine more "mostly from the south . . . This is all I can possibly spare at the moment. . . . I can not neglect either the danger of the Germans pushing down the Oise from about Noyon, nor a threatened attack in the region of Reims." In other words, the rupture of the armies at the point of junction taking place, each commander had to think of his own defensive objective—the one Paris, the other the Channel ports.

That night after conference at Versailles with the British Chief of Staff, Lord Milner wrote that

"the greatest promptitude in bringing up reserves and complete cooperation between the armies are necessary. We discussed the personal difficulties of effecting such cooperation, and Wilson made the suggestion—which seemed a good one—that both countries might agree to leave it to Clemenceau, in whom the British Generals had confidence as well as the French, to take any decisions necessary to bring about the better cooperation of the armies and the best use of all available reserves."

Late that night Wilson went to Paris to see Foch who, it was assumed, would be Clemenceau's military adviser if this action were taken. But General Foch was too wise. The next day, when Lord Milner "asked Wilson what Foch had said to his idea of making Clemenceau nominally the 'generalissimo' with Foch to advise him, he said that Foch had objected to this on the ground that Clemenceau, placed in that position, might be drawn in opposite directions by Pétain and himself, and if he agreed now with one and now with the other there would be no unity of control."

Everything had been tried or suggested except one. Under these circumstances the British and French civil and military authorities met at 12 o'clock noon, March 26th, in conference at Doullens. The British commander explained his situation and—still quoting from Lord Milner's report—added, "I can do no more. What can the French do?" The French commander explained his situation and what he could do. "None of his listeners seemed very happy or convinced. . . . Foch, who had been so eloquent the day before, said not a word. But, looking at his face—he sat just opposite me—I could see that he

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was still dissatisfied, very impatient, and evidently thinking that things could and must be done more quickly."

It was then that Lord Milner, in private conversation with Mr. Clemenceau, asked whether Foch "could not be placed by both governments in a position of general control."

Then followed brief exchanges of views between the political men of the two governments and their military men. The approximation to a solution had been found and all agreed. A resolution was drawn up and signed, as follows:

"General Foch is charged by the British and French Governments with coordinating the action of the Allied Armies on the Western Front. For this purpose he will come to an understanding with the Generals-in-Chief, who are invited to furnish him with all necessary information.—Doullens, March 26, 1918."

Many persons think that this action made General Foch the Allied Commander-in-Chief. It did not. His functions were limited to the British and French armies. They did not extend to the American army. No American was summoned to the conference at Doullens. No control was given over the Belgian nor Italian armies. Moreover, there was given him no power of command. He could only consult and advise. The result was what might have been expected. He had to waste precious time in traveling to one headquarters and the other, persuading commanders to do what he should have been empowered to order.

After just one week's experience all this was made clear at the conference of Beauvais. This conference was called to remedy the situation resulting from the one at Doullens. It resulted in the nearest approximation to giving General Foch supreme command that was ever attained.

The new conference met at the Hôtel de Ville of Beauvais on the afternoon of April 3, 1918. With the British and French the Americans had also been summoned. Those present were Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Clemenceau, and Generals Haig, Pétain, Foch, Wilson, Pershing and Bliss. The situation was tersely stated by General Foch. In a few moments the following agreement was drawn up and signed by all:

"General Foch is charged by the British, French and American Governments with the duty of coordinating the action of the Allied armies on the Western Front; and with this object in view there is conferred upon him all the powers necessary for its effective accomplishment. For this purpose the British, French and American Govern-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ments entrust to General Foch the strategic direction of military operations. The Commanders-in-Chief of the British, French and American Armies shall exercise in full the tactical conduct of their armies. Each Commander-in-Chief shall have the right to appeal to his Government if, in his opinion, his army finds itself placed in danger by any instructions received from General Foch."

This was the nearest approach to unified command that, in expressed terms, was ever made. The document carefully refrained from giving General Foch the title of Allied Commander-in-Chief. It gave him no control of any kind over the Italian army. Subsequently, at the session of the Supreme War Council held at Abbeville on May 1–2, it was decided to extend the definition of the "Western Front" so as to include "from the North Sea to the Adriatic." This seemed of itself to extend General Foch's powers to include, under the Beauvais agreement, "the strategic direction of military operations" of the Italian army. The Italian representatives were at first disposed to accept this. But when it was pointed out that this gave General Foch the power to remove troops from the Italian Front as well as to send them there, they said that they could not consent to the exercise of such a power. All that could be agreed upon was that

"the powers of coordination conferred on General Foch by the agreement of Doullens are extended to the Italian front."

These powers were ineffective and illusory. And when, in the crisis of the campaign of 1918, General Foch wanted the Italians to make a move that might relieve some of the pressure against the Western Front, he could only beg—and beg in vain. But they should not be criticised too much. The provision in the agreement of Beauvais, permitting army commanders to appeal to their own governments should they think that an order from General Foch imperiled the safety of their armies, showed that opposition to absolute unity of command was dying hard.

The statement of the case carries its own criticism. Yet, no harsh criticism can justly lie against the inevitable result of the limitations of human nature. Americans may say what they please as to what ought to have been done and what they think they would have done had they had supreme power. But if the situation were to be re-enacted on American soil the same wearisome, bloody process would probably be followed. We would not yield supreme command to an ally who, we knew, had his own

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ultimate objective in the war, nor would the ally, for the same reason, accept our supreme command until it had become a matter of life or death for both. Unified command came in 1918 at the first moment that it could possibly come. Opposition gave way only when it was manifest that every other course had been tried—and had failed. Unified command was then accepted, not for the purpose of winning victory but to prevent irretrievable defeat.

As it happened, the mere prevention of defeat, the foiling of the last supreme German effort which could not be repeated, opened the path to victory. The failure to create the General Reserve under General Foch, the creation of which he had so earnestly urged, made necessary his appointment as, in everything except the title, Commander-in-Chief. But a great price had to be paid for it, the larger part of which might have been saved. Had the heads of governments been able to exercise their full power, guided solely by their individual judgments, it is possible that the position of Commander-in-Chief, in some form, might have been created at the meeting of the Supreme War Council, January 30–February 2, 1918. They knew its importance. They knew that it had to be a Frenchman. And they knew General Foch. He had been in constant attendance at their meetings. He had impressed them all by his indomitable energy, and the rapidity and accuracy of his decisions. But the heads of governments were not free. They had behind them peoples who had already overturned governments on lesser questions than this. There was no unity of view among the military men—neither as to the need of a Commander-in-Chief nor as to who he should be. And all of these—civilians and military—had first to eat the bitter bread of despair before their governments could act.

And when they acted, putting upon his power the limitation which they imposed both at the conference of Doullens and at the one of Beauvais, nothing less than the good sense, kindly tact, personal magnetism and supreme professional qualifications of General Foch could have secured the degree of cooperation necessary for success and made him in fact, if not in name, the inter-Allied Commander-in-Chief on the Western Front.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ECONOMICS AND POLITICS IN EUROPE

By Joseph Caillaux

THE famous saying of La Bruyere: "Everything has been said; and it is too late . . ." haunts my mind when I consider the sad plight of Europe. So many remarkable works have been written on this subject that one is discouraged at the thought of undertaking a further explanation. However, I must make the attempt, not only because I am not content to restrict myself to existing authorities, but also because the cinematographic vicissitudes of contemporary economic policy require constant modifications of detail in the pictures drawn but yesterday by the most intelligent observers. A constant succession of new facts enables us day by day to coordinate our scattered ideas a little better, and leads us to comprehend with more certainty the meaning of the tremors which are shaking the universe.

I use the word universe advisedly. Do not be deceived; the center of the cyclone is in the Old World, but its waves spread far and wide. White and yellow, all races are suffering from the turmoil of Europe. They suffer from not finding the same markets in our hemisphere as in the past and from not receiving the same manufactured products they were wont to expect from it. They are suffering from the influx of gold, the reign of real or apparent wealth which has fallen upon them from the clouds. Above all, they are suffering from the general disturbance engendered in the mind of Europe by war, revolution, scandalous profiteering and famine—the seed of all of which is borne across the ocean.

But, as I have written elsewhere,[1] these are passing troubles. The great new countries will conquer this disease. They have youth on their side. They will digest the glut of wealth which has suddenly been thrust upon them, just as they will escape from the contamination of Europe's poverty, even if the latter persists. The danger to the general welfare of humanity is that if the depression of the Old World is unduly prolonged the New World may seek to escape by breaking all ties. Nobody who understands economics can mistake the indications that the great nations of America, Australia and Asia are putting out

[1] "Ou va la France? Ou va l'Europe?" Paris: La Sirène, 1922.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

feelers towards one another, that there is gradually being built up around America, towards which the axis of the world has moved, an economic organization similar to the European organization of a few years ago.

Perhaps this change is inevitable. Prior to 1914, and without a thought of the Great War, there were many who held that Europe would one day be obliged to abdicate the dominant position she had taken in the world in succession to old Asia. But the essential thing was, and is still, that the transformation of the universe should take place with that merciful slowness peculiar to the forces of nature. Should events unduly hasten the evolution, should America prematurely take the sceptre from the hand of Europe, it is to be feared that civilization, thus torn from its cradle and suddenly transplanted, might undergo complete eclipse.

I will, of course, be told that my apprehensions are ridiculous, that Europe is a long way from becoming the little appendage of Asia of which some writers talk.

Europe has not yet reached that point, but she is on the down grade, and her fall will come quickly if she is not steadied. Let us consider the facts.

First of all, let us get the following fact firmly fixed in our minds. Prior to the World War Europe formed a whole; it lived by that unity, that cohesion which had been established in spite of all appearance to the contrary and despite all racial divisions.

Today Europe is dismembered.

Let us begin by considering the most enormous fragment, the East. It is impossible to deny that the eastern provinces of the old continent are getting far away; they are taking on an appearance of their own; for the moment at least they are in a state of regression. Sufficient proof of this will be found in turning over some of the volumes written on Russia and the new states which have emerged from the hurricane. An agricultural revolution of enormous significance has taken place all over Eastern Europe, with the exception of Austria and what was formerly Serbia, and this revolution has completely transformed the system of land-ownership, the relations of the different social classes, the conditions of cultivating the soil. All this has profoundly reacted upon commerce and industry.

The sixth instalment of the admirable supplement which the *Manchester Guardian* is devoting to reconstruction in Europe

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

contains some particularly striking articles upon the subject, showing that in Poland, Rumania, the Baltic States, Bulgaria and Jugoslavia, as well as in Russia, the reign of the peasant has begun. "The immense tide of the peasantry will finally submerge everything," said Maxim Gorky sadly to a French politician. It is not only in the ancient Empire of the Tsars that the peasant tide has spread its waters. In the majority of the countries just mentioned the rural population has obtained possession of the land, they have exacted laws limiting the right of ownership, fixing strict geometrical maxima. In one place it is forbidden to own more than seventy-five acres, in another more than one hundred. Everywhere the land-slicing machine is at work.

What are the implications of this movement, which is of the same nature, though of a very different character and of much greater extent, than that which gave rise to the French Revolution in Western Europe?

The most striking result is a remarkable diminution of agricultural production. The emancipated countryman of Eastern Europe cannot be compared to the semi-educated French peasant of the eighteenth century, surrounded as he was by a middle class. He is ignorant of the methods of modern cultivation, and he cannot learn them from the large and small landowners whom he has entirely crowded out. All the writers who have discussed the agricultural revolution unanimously recognize these facts.

The most optimistic content themselves with an expression of hope that things may change under the spur of necessity. No doubt it is probable that in the long run the peasant democracies will succeed in intensifying cultivation. But though it is possible that this may be effected fairly rapidly in certain parts of Central Europe, it will take long to reach Russia and the adjoining countries, where the Muzhiks are condemned to dwell in solitude and, consequently, in a state of ignorance even greater than before the war.

Whatever the future may hold, at the present moment we are confronted with the phenomenon that countries which formerly exported large quantities of produce are in a position to send abroad only reduced quantities, and that they are sometimes compelled to import. Thus the purchasing power of more than a hundred million people is vastly diminished, if not completely destroyed, to the great detriment of industry in Central and Western Europe.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"The green movement," as the rising of the peasants has been called in contradistinction to the "red movement" of the urban workers, has another characteristic—a savage agrarian nationalism, a pronounced animosity against foreign industries, even against local industry. This animosity is translated into action. In the countries of the Danube the peasants are making tentative efforts to become independent of the large centers. The agricultural cooperative societies are founding here tool factories and there chemical manure works. The rural army is marching, with a great waste of effort, towards forms of industrial organization which had been rendered obsolete by the advance of civilization.

M. Zagorsky, professor of political economy at the University of Petrograd, gives details in his book, "The Republic of the Soviets: Economic Results." "In Russia," he writes, "is noticeable a return to economic conditions existing anterior to the capitalistic régime." And he adds, "small handicrafts and industries are increasing rapidly in the country districts." Districts which had been carried along by the evolution of Russian national economy in the course of the last thirty or forty years, which had become economic units and which had thus identified themselves with the capitalist movement of Russia,—even with the world market outside,—are now taking on more and more the character of the old economic order, with restricted and merely self-sufficient production.

In the circumstances is it astonishing that Central Europe, shaken to its foundations by the rising of the peasantry, divided into states which have been allowed—foolishly, as I will show—to hedge themselves in with tariff walls and to prohibit import and export of merchandises at their own sweet will, should be a heap of ruins in which Germany almost alone represents a vigorous economic unit?

What is the state of Germany? Bursting with prosperity, some say. On the point of plunging into the abyss where Austria lies, others say. Let us try to see things clearly by concentrating on certain definite points.

There is no doubt that Germany is in a state of complete financial and monetary collapse. The condition of its budgets, the amount of its debts, above all the depreciation of the mark, attest it. There are psychological reasons for this state of affairs which by a strange contradiction are neglected by the very men who are constantly protesting against economic materialism,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and who hold that the world is governed only by politics. These people prove themselves strangely lacking in a sense of logic, for they do not perceive that in economics as in politics there are imponderables. A conquered country, weighed down by a colossal debt out of all proportion to its actual wealth, which everybody admits it cannot pay except by the work of more than one generation, loses confidence—that is to say credit—and the disappearance of credit is expressed by the depreciation of monetary values. This is a partial explanation, I grant. I admit that Germany, or rather the German upper-middle class, has succeeded in keeping its tangible wealth out of reach. I admit that the state and the plutocracy on the other side of the Rhine have sold marks abroad wholesale, while the printing presses groaned under the issues of notes to meet the most trifling of sumptuary expenses. All this is undisputable, but it is matter of secondary importance to determine the origin of the monetary chaos. Of far more importance is to measure its consequences, which cannot be realized without the knowledge that, under the capitalistic régime, wealth can not exist apart from a common system expressed by the circulation of money. Countries where the circulation of money, even if it does not cease, is constantly disturbed, become closed to all others, and in spite of themselves they set up within their own borders a complete system of economic particularism. An instance quoted from the writings of an authoritative economist will make this idea clearer.

When financiers obtain a security in a new country their first care is to get some sort of control over its monetary laws. So long as that is not done their mortgages have no actual transferable value in the outside world. Such securities cannot be financed and classed as what is called "wealth"—that is to say, in the universal and mobile form without which the most beautiful forests will merely rot where they stand—unless there is access to the monetary power.

Germany, because of her depreciated currency, is enclosed in a sort of prison where foreign goods rarely penetrate and from which the national products sometimes succeed in escaping, though much less often than is commonly supposed. A favorable situation, it is alleged, because in this manner Germany is protected from imports but succeeds none the less in exporting by means of the depreciation of her currency. Those who argue in this manner try to justify their thesis by pointing to the humming

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

factories on the further bank of the Rhine, to the German industries swamped with orders, to the negligible amount of unemployment.

That is how things look, or rather how they looked until recently, for everybody now knows that a great crisis is imminent. What is not so evident is that however well equipped a country may be it cannot do without imports and that it is almost impossible for a country to get them when the machinery of exchange has ceased functioning. Germany's prosperity is only temporary and fictitious. It cannot long survive the depreciated currency. And the factor which is ignored is that if there is a change, if marks rise, the big German manufacturers will be no better off. They will be obliged to slow down production at the very time that they are loaded with stocks which will become more difficult to dispose of as the currency goes up in value. What is not noticed, above all, is that this alleged economic prosperity is based upon dreadful poverty: the poverty of the working classes, whose wages do not rise proportionately with the decline in the mark.

How long can such a chaotic situation last before a disaster occurs? Certainly not indefinitely. If it is not quickly remedied, either Germany will fall to the level of Austria, whose distress it seems hardly necessary to describe, or the gravest political and social upheavals will take place.

Let us turn now to the third fragment of Europe, the West. Germany's retirement to hospital and the prostration of the rest of Central and Eastern Europe react, it goes without saying, upon the western powers, particularly England. It has been said many times that "trade is the life blood of Great Britain." Now she is practically excluded from a continental market which formerly absorbed thirty-four per cent of her exports. Her politicians and publicists unanimously argue that "without reconstruction in Europe we cannot sell enough manufactured products to feed our population." Mark the word "feed." It is significant.

The situation is much better in France, people say, because in the first place France is predominantly an agricultural country and in the second because French trade finds a market in the liberated regions. Let us not congratulate ourselves prematurely! France is running grave peril.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

France is to some extent finding a substitute for the foreign markets she has lost in the liberated regions, which form a sort of new colony. But who defrays the expenses? Who pays the accounts of the contractors? Who but the taxpayer? It is by repeatedly calling upon credit (which dries up the resources of the country,) that our national industry is fed. Of course, it is always said that Germany must repay—that she will repay—the amount of these loans. But every well informed person knows what that means. Everyone knows that, even if things go as well as possible, the reduction already granted on the German debt, the reductions which are about to be conceded so that the inter-allied debts may be redeemed, will burden the public with sums which one scarcely dares to put into figures: perhaps some hundred milliards. How, on the one hand, will the country support a burden so enormous, added to the weight of an already colossal debt? What, on the other hand, will be the predicament of her industry when its present artificial markets disappear? What formidable queries! Disorder reigns everywhere. Some of the countries, and they not the least important, are already hanging over an abyss. They are leaning against those which the storm has spared and they threaten to involve everything in the same ruin. To put things in order, that is a task which, tremendous though it be, does not seem to be beyond our power, provided we undertake it immediately and in a sensible manner.

In order to realize the problem, let us begin by examining the causes of the disorder.

Professor Cassel, the Swedish delegate at the Genoa Conference, writes: "By pretending that the present world-wide distress is the inevitable result of the war we prevent people from thinking and discovering the origins of the present state of affairs. I, on the contrary, am of the opinion that eighty per cent of our difficulties are due to the policy which has been followed since the war, and which has been pursued up to this very moment, either in the domain of pure politics or in that of national economy and finance."

In the article in the *Manchester Guardian* from which these lines are quoted the eminent economist adds that the entire European policy today is absolutely fictitious. Europe is living on illusions, "which politicians have created and surrounded with a kind of halo." This is all very true in substance. But

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

what are these illusions about which Professor Cassel speaks? Did the politicians really create them? Were they not imposed upon them, or rather did they not create them and then impose them upon themselves?

All thoughtful persons are agreed that between the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth a change took place which is unique in the history of the world. Industrialism was born. Simultaneously science created the factory and revolutionized means of communication. The small factory, which formerly sufficed for the needs of people almost exclusively rural, disappeared to make way for large industries destined not only to supply the neighboring consumer but to supply the needs of the whole world. From that moment Europe could exist only in so far as equilibrium was maintained, that is to say, on condition that the various nations practiced mutual aid and that at the outset they lived in a state of complete peace. That was well understood by the great liberals who held the political stage at the dawn of the industrial movement. For some years, between 1850 and 1870, they were in a position to believe that they had achieved their purpose. But public opinion, which they had won for a moment, soon gave them only lukewarm support and at last abandoned them to return to its old habits. Economic war between the nations was restored and then intensified. This led to political nationalism.

Then the most extraordinary contradiction became apparent.

Under the whip of science industrial and commercial activity went on increasing in intensity, bringing the nations together. Yet these nations who were collaborators nevertheless waged war upon each other. They endeavored to injure each other by aggressive tariffs. They tried to prevent, or at least to reduce, the mutual exchange of those products which the railways and harbors they were building were intended to facilitate.

There was a divergence between the regulated movement of economics and the unruly feelings and appetites which were dragging the nations backward. Science, which by creating industry transformed the conditions of life in Europe, had not produced a corresponding evolution in the human mind. Quite the contrary. As comfort increased, as the facilities of existence multiplied, the general mentality degenerated.

Why? No doubt because the price demanded by material progress was scientific specialization, the division of labor pushed

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to an extreme. The mind of man when bent to a limited task diminished in scope. Even those upon whom had devolved the mission of leading the crowd were carried along. They had lost that desire to raise mankind which magnificently inspired the encyclopedists of the eighteenth century and their disciples of the nineteenth.

A catastrophe was imminent and it occurred.

While the catastrophe was being enacted there were few indeed who, preserving high traditions and recognizing the frailty of modern society, brooded upon the problem of how to cut hostilities short and tried to devise ways of bringing the warring nations together. They were lost in the yelling mob of politicians who, ignorant of the constructive plans of science and contemptuous of all great problems, thought only of exploiting the blind passions of the mob. They looked, if not complacently at least with resignation, at the prolongation of hostilities. Having conducted the war to the bitter end they were entrusted with the conclusion of the peace. Limited by their ignorance, their prejudices and their pride, they made the peace.

Remote from political economy and finance, despising questions of currency, industry and commerce—the exchange of "disgusting produce" as Voltaire's financier said in *L'homme aux quarante écus*—their only idea was to play the part of Metternichs and Mazarins, to remake the Treaty of Westphalia or the Viennese treaties. They were haunted by two principal ideas. One was the idea of loot. The other was the idea of nationality.

An old tradition has it that every war necessarily ends in a victory and that victory means loot. Nobody dreamed that there could be no comparison between former wars, of brief duration and limited destruction, and the dreadful cataclysm of 1914–1918, in which, using scientific instruments of destruction, the belligerents had in a few years achieved the most astounding destruction of wealth. Nor did any one reflect that as the vanquished were all but ruined the loot could not be extensive. Armed with diplomatic precedents, responsible statesmen announced their intention of making the "Hun" pay all the costs of the war. Mr. Lloyd George gave a pledge to that effect to the electorate in 1914. The Governor of the Bank of England, Lord Cunliffe, gravely announced at that time that Germany would pay over twenty-eight billions of gold marks annually, while M. Klotz, more moderate, guaranteed only the annual payment

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of eighteen billions. These gentlemen had made such a good start that they would certainly have put down on paper, and forced the Germans to sign, a pledge that the conquered should pay the eight or nine billions of expense incurred by the Allies, if a political obstacle—a fig for economic considerations!—had not arisen. This obstacle was the Fourteen Points of President Wilson, one of which provided that only reparation for actual damage done could be charged to the enemy. They therefore had to restrain themselves, though they succeeded in effecting breaches in the wall. By appealing to the most subtle exegesis they argued, and had their claim admitted, that the pensions due to the victims of the war should be charged the Central Powers. They took good care, however, not to specify that the material losses should be estimated by organizations in which neutrals would be largely represented, so that the figures reached might be beyond dispute. On the contrary, they arranged that each nation should proceed as it liked, and that the totals fixed should simply be submitted for the approval of a body known as the Commission on Reparations, made up entirely of representatives of the victorious countries, that is to say, of the people interested.

The inevitable happened. They came into harsh conflict with reality. By degrees it was seen that it was madness to imagine that payments on such a scale were possible. They implied the transfer of one nation's revenue to other nations. They could not be effected otherwise than by means of fantastic exports of goods. Not only were the debtor countries in no position to deliver such exports—that goes without saying—but the creditor countries would not have them. The latter were legitimately anxious not to see their industry swamped by floods of Teutonic products. Then an attempt was made to call a halt. The Reparations Commission began by reducing the total German debt to 132 billions of gold marks. The next step was to demand simply a moderate annuity to cover this amount, so moderate, in fact, that the final payment is scarcely discernable. Yet hardly a few months had passed before it became necessary to grant Germany a reduction, and very soon a moratorium. That is the point which has now been reached.

The men who remain faithful to the policy of the Versailles Treaty are loud in their denunciations. What! they say, documents have been signed, agreements written, and we do not see that they are carried out! France is made a laughing-stock by

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Germany and, what is worse, she is abandoned and betrayed by her Allies. That is all the more abominable, continue the admirers of Messieurs Clemenceau and Co., because we ask only what is just: reparation for the monstrous ruin piled up by Germany.

It is undeniable that the brief for the plaintiffs is excellent, that they have a right to demand what they ask, since they are armed with a treaty duly signed and sealed. Unfortunately this treaty is unworkable because there is no power in the world which can give substance to chimeras.

I do not deny that Germany is not playing straight. I have already written, and I repeat here, that Germany is evading in a thousand ways the burden she could support. But whose fault is that? What steps had been taken to prevent the removal to foreign countries of international securities held by German citizens? What trustee had been appointed for the Reich to prevent budgetary extravagance? Such considerations are too contemptible, I suppose, for diplomats and politicians who love to walk with their heads in the clouds.

The worshippers of the fallen idols reply that the financial situation of France will be terrible. She will not only have to pay the pensions of the victims of the war, which is allowable,—they acknowledged it in whispers,—she will also have definitely to meet the greater part of the cost of reconstruction in the devastated regions, which has not yet been put into figures, and this colossal expense will break her. Is this fair?

Certainly not. But if we would only ascertain the exact damage done! I shall not argue, as does Mr. Keynes, that the damage has been estimated at three times its real value. Such a proportion seems to me quite excessive. But I have been informed that the large industrial victims and the large landowners have "drawn the long bow" considerably. Such events might have been avoided if an international check upon reparations had been organized.

My opponents will reply that if the system I suggest had been adopted the cost of reparations might perhaps have been reduced, but that nevertheless it would have been considerable. They will ask if I think it right that this considerable sum should be paid by France, which was attacked and was victorious, instead of by Germany, which was the aggressor and was beaten?

I can only say that I no more think it right than they do, but

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that their diplomatico-military methods have failed. Oh! yes, I know . . . The most sinister plots have been hatched by our Allies and by all the French statesmen who have succeeded the supermen of the Treaty of Versailles. Can not people who talk this nonsense understand that in denouncing these imaginary conspiracies they are pronouncing sentence upon themselves? Need I remind you of the old French saying: "*Monsieur de Voltaire n'a pas plus d'esprit que tout le monde?*" When statesmen belonging to different countries, and drawn from every political horizon, cannot succeed in making a treaty work it is because that treaty is unworkable.

The second idea which obsessed the politicians assembled in Paris, the idea of nationality, has caused more damage to the economic system of Europe, however extraordinary that may seem, than the idea of plunder. You may ask if it is not very just and very simple that people of the same origin should be allowed to govern themselves freely. Without doubt it is admirable in theory, but in practice, where the old continent is concerned, it is singularly difficult to realize. The stumbling block is the difficulty of separating racial groups in Europe. Apart from the large countries where war, often prolonged for centuries, has cemented the nations, the races which fought for the possession of the continent—Latin, Teuton and Slav—have remained in conflict. They are still encamped upon the ground, always in a state of hostility, yet subject to interpenetration. It is a defiance of common sense to pretend to separate homogeneous groups from this muddle. Yet that is what the idea of nationality involves.

Consequently, when as a result of the war came the collapse of empires which like Austria-Hungary were undoubtedly nothing more than geographical expressions, but which kept order, held races together and somehow or other quelled their animosities, it was pompously announced that nations were being freed. But as there were no nations in the real sense of the word, the map was arbitrarily carved up and certain racial groups were given predominance over others. The number of dissatisfied minorities were merely increased in number instead of being abolished. And economic chaos was produced.

At the same time that political independence was distributed the new states were granted the right of closing or opening their markets as they pleased. The fact was overlooked that in order to restore the European factory, which before the war adapted

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

itself as best as it could to the old customs barriers because they had been long established, former obstacles should not be set up again and no new ones should be created. The fact was overlooked that under a system of free trade territorial divisions, even though artificially decreed, present no particular economic disadvantages, but that it is very different under a system of protection. It does not matter whether a Czechoslovak Republic or a Jugoslav Kingdom be established on the ruins of what was formerly Austria, provided products can circulate as freely as in the past between Vienna and Prague, between Budapest and Sarajevo. But everything is upset if the new states are empowered to establish whatever protective tariffs they please; if, when given possession of mining deposits which in 1914 fed furnaces now cut off by a frontier, they are allowed to tax minerals or coal or to prohibit their import or their export as they like.

If the politicians had spent a few moments in the school of economics they would have learned that the idea of nationality, which they had picked up amongst the dusty rubbish of nineteenth century diplomacy, was obsolete. It was suitable to an agricultural type of civilization, but in the form in which they proposed to grant it, it could not be adapted to an industrialized continent. They would have understood that it was necessary to find a new way of regrouping the diverse peoples which the old monarchies had collected beneath their sceptres.

The problem was not insoluble. All that was necessary was to draw a distinction between politics, administration and economics. Complete freedom of administration and political independence subject to the rights of minorities might have been granted to racial sections empirically determined. The existence of the latter, then, would not have involved very serious disadvantages, for a superior authority—it little matters under what name—would have prevented oppression. Under no circumstances, however, should freedom to fix tariffs have been granted. The liberation of peoples should not have been permitted to upset the exchange of goods. What, indeed, could have been more proper than to preserve the economic federations represented by the fallen empires, to have imposed simultaneously upon all the nations of Europe a set of rules and guarantees, chief among which would be the prohibition of taxes upon the import and export of raw material and produce indispensable to life? In that way reconstruction would have been facilitated,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

unified and coordinated. As it is, a muddle has been caused which paralyzes life, revolutionizes exchange, and exposes the whole continent to new disasters.

How can we believe that peace can be maintained between countries of which some (such as Austria, which is about to receive a morphia injection in the shape of a loan) are downright economic monstrosities? If the flame of war bursts out again in Central Europe, where will it stop? Will it not touch Germany, quivering with a desire for revenge? In that event, what dangers will arise for France, deprived of the guarantee she was to get from England and America in case of unprovoked aggression?

It was stated publicly in the Chamber of Deputies that "this guarantee is the life of the treaty."

The treaty is dead, fallen into dust. Nothing has been devised as a substitute. Out of sheer infatuation, of a mere enslavement to system, the leaders of Europe have clung to ideas whose baneful effect becomes daily more obvious. Even today only the clumsiest efforts are being made to extricate us from the confusion.

As I reach the end of this schematic study there only remains for me to postulate a dilemma from which I can see no escape. Either we shall continue obstinately with the policies of plunder and nationality, in which case the gradual extinction of Europe will be hastened. Or we shall turn in the opposite direction, moving towards internationalism, bravely developing the ideas timidly outlined in the middle of the nineteenth century. The bringing together into collaboration of peoples of all races,—the abolition of national debts by expunging those owing by the Allies of yesterday to each other, by wiping out the obligations of the enemy through reparations in kind, and by floating an international loan, guaranteed by all the powers, covering only material damage fairly estimated,—the drawing up of a monetary, economic and financial code applicable to the whole of Europe, reestablishing its equilibrium by degrees and setting it in the direction of unity,—these are the only formulae of European solidarity which have any value. To cling obstinately to treaties dictated by thoughtless passion and to repeat the ravings of nationalists is simply to keep Europe in the mire and to let it sink in more deeply every day.

Will the politicians of all countries one day understand that it is as useless to shake one's fist at economics as it was for Xerxes

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to flog the sea—that it is far better to set to work to study this new science, born within the last fifty years, which they have been foolish enough to ignore or never to learn? This science consists in seeking means to put varying sentiments and political aspirations and idealistic forces in harmony with the Economic Imperative. For there is an Economic Imperative.

That great thinker, Taine, defined it when he wrote: "The economic world, like the physical world, has its laws. We may misunderstand them, but we cannot escape them. Sometimes they act with us, sometimes against us. They please us, but they never consider us. It is for us to consider them." These words of great wisdom must be constantly in the minds of those who tomorrow will assume the crushing task of restoring Europe.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE SAAR TERRITORY AS IT IS TODAY

By Charles H. Haskins

AMONG the many controverted chapters of the Treaty of Versailles that disposing of the Saar Basin is one of the least generally understood. Like the rest of the treaty, this has been rarely read by the general public, and from the outset there has been a large amount of misunderstanding and misrepresentation, whether deliberate or unconscious, with respect to the meaning and the actual operation of these provisions. The matter is of interest in relation to the work of the League of Nations, which is charged with the administration of the Saar, as well as to the age-long problem of the Franco-German borderland, which the treaty in effect declared a matter of international concern; and, now that the new régime has had three years of trial, it may be worth while to summarize its problems and its achievements, on the basis of the documentary material supplemented by personal observation and conference.

Fortunately, materials for an independent judgment are no longer lacking. Besides its local *Amtsblatt*, the Governing Commission, since April, 1920, makes periodical reports, at first monthly but now quarterly, which are published in the *Official Journal* of the League of Nations.[1] These are remarkably full and satisfactory, and while matters are naturally presented from the point of view of the administration, the principal questions are explained as they arise with full appreciation of the difficulties involved. The opponents of the Commission have free run of the local newspapers as well as the press of the Reich, and a selection of documents and *ex parte* statements was issued as an official White Book of the German Government in 1921.[2] Since July, 1922, the proceedings of the Saar Assembly should be consulted. There is also becoming available a certain amount of less interested observation, notably the articles of its Berlin correspondent, J. Halperin, in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, January 10–29, 1922; the correspondence of H. Wilson Harris for the London *Daily News*, July 11–13, 1922; and, still fresher, the experiences of Whiting Williams as a miner in the Saar published in *Scribner's Magazine* last April.

[1]The latest published periodical Report, the twelfth, is that for April-June, 1922. See also the last general report of the Secretary-General of the League, 26 September, 1922.

[2]*Das Saargebiet unter der Herrschaft des Waffenstillstandsabkommens und des Vertrags von Versailles* (Berlin, 1921).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Territory of the Saar, as created by the Treaty of Versailles, has an area of about 700 square miles and a population of nearly 700,000. Lying along the new French frontier in Lorraine, it was made up partly from a strip of the Bavarian Palatinate but chiefly from land which had been Prussian since 1815. About one-third of the district falls between the Franco-German frontier of 1814 and that of 1815.[3] It is a pleasant region on either side of the River Saar, with field and forest running to the edge of mine and city in agreeable contrast to most industrial districts of Europe and America. The chief natural resource is the coal mines, which yielded in 1913 an annual output of seventeen and one-half million tons, or eight per cent of the total coal production of the German Empire. About the mines there has grown up an important group of iron and steel plants and other manufactures, the whole constituting a densely populated industrial district closely connected with the iron mines of Lorraine. The population is predominately Catholic, as in the neighboring Rhineland, and almost wholly German-speaking.

The primary purpose of the Saar clauses of the treaty was to give France a secure and much needed means of reparation in the coal mines of this district, which lie within a dozen miles of the French frontier, without permitting the annexation of the inhabitants. The Peace Conference took the view that France was entitled to the mines of the Saar in compensation for the deliberate destruction of her mines in the north and as an item on the general account of reparation, and that she should have every facility for their exploitation. The mines, chiefly the property of the Prussian and Bavarian Governments, were accordingly transferred to the French state in full ownership; while the administration of the territory was handed over to a commission of the League of Nations for fifteen years, at the end of which period a plebiscite should decide the future status of the district, whether for union with France or Germany, or for a continuation, with necessary adjustments, of local autonomy under the League. In the meantime the inhabitants "retain their local assemblies, their religious liberties, their schools and their language," and are exempt from military service, while the Governing Commission has "all the powers of government hitherto belonging to the German Empire, Prussia, or Bavaria."

[3]See the accompanying map. For a summary of the history of the region and the negotiations at Paris, see Haskins and Lord, "Some Problems of the Peace Conference," pp. 132–150; House and Seymour, "What Really Happened at Paris," pp. 56–65.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The framers of the treaty had in mind a strong Governing Commission, free from local obstruction on the one hand and secure on the other from interference in current matters by the Council of the League. The ultimate control of the League was secured by the appointment of the five members of the Commission for annual terms only, but it was anticipated that reappointment would be denied only in case of inefficiency or abuse of power, and that normally members would serve for a number of years. Moreover, the Commission was made the interpreter of its own powers, without any superior court or administrative body to restrain it. It was agreed that the highly concentrated economic life of the territory and the conflicting interests demanded a strong executive of this type.

In appointing the Commission the Council named as French representative and chairman M. Victor Rault, an administrator of long experience as préfêt and member of the Conseil d'Etat; as local member Herr Alfred von Boch, who resigned in August, 1920, and was succeeded by Dr. Hector; and for the three other members, a Belgian, Major Lambert, a Dane long resident in Paris, Count von Moltke-Huitfeld, and a Canadian, Mr. R. D. Waugh, formerly mayor of Winnipeg. The Commission established itself in the government buildings at Saarbrücken and distributed the various departments among its members. Much criticism has been directed at M. Rault because of his lack of familiarity with the German language, but mention should be made of the able assistance which he receives from the Secretary of the Commission, M. Jean Morize, well acquainted with Germany and German problems. Certain other assistants were appointed, chiefly French, but for the most part the personnel of the Prussian and Bavarian bureaucracy was taken over *en bloc*. Their status involved long negotiations with the German Government, complicated by an abortive strike of the officials, including the police, in August, 1920. The local opposition objects to the French element, while the Commission complains of German interference with its subordinates.

In actual practice the problems of the Governing Commission were rendered more difficult by the delay in putting the treaty into effect. From the armistice of November 11, 1918, until February, 1920, the country remained under French military administration, in a state of agitation and friction, drifting away from Germany in legislative and social policy, but without any

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

means of permanent organization. Several months likewise passed before the final delimitation of such portions of the boundary as were not actually drawn in the treaty. In economic matters the steady decline in value of the mark created one of the main difficulties of the new régime, while the loose collection of taxes which has prevailed in Germany since the armistice also embarrassed the finances of the region. At the outset the Commission faced a considerable task of administrative organization and, according to all unprejudiced judgments, has performed these duties well. It took over, for example, the railroads of the territory, and, in spite of the predictions of both French and German authorities, has succeeded in managing them successfully as a separate system and with favorable financial returns.[4] The traveler gets a distinct impression of abundant rolling stock and other facilities, and efficient working, and cars marked "Saar" are a not uncommon sight at some distance from the territory. Another success was achieved in the field of finance by the Canadian member, Mr. Waugh.

Turning to economic conditions, we should note that the principal resource of the Saar, the coal mines, lies quite beyond the control of the Commission, being owned and operated directly by the French state. It is generally agreed that the management of the mines has been a decided success. Production has steadily increased; sales have been well handled in spite of the special difficulties of the international coal market; and Saar coal is sold in Germany as well as in France. The mining authorities have shown more than mere technical efficiency. Mr. Whiting Williams, who himself worked as a miner, found very little evidence of shirking and sabotage, but instead a general feeling that the miners were well treated by the French engineers, trained to keep in close and friendly relations with the workers. "Every day," he says, "the French engineer visits his pits underground. As we worked they would come along and enter into conversation with the workers, discussing with them, among other things, the necessity of increased coal production—with its increased wage to the worker—as a means of lowering the whole country's high cost of living. Such contacts made a good impression as compared with those of their predecessors, the German engineers. These went underground comparatively seldom. It was in marked contrast also with the almost military

[4] See the special report of Major Lambert annexed to the eighth report of the Commission (May-July, 1921).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

strictness and discipline with which the present German underforemen still act with their fellow Germans." As one-third of the population of the Saar is directly dependent on the mines, the prosperity of this industry is of the first importance.

The economic status of the territory in general has been affected by the industrial depression throughout Europe, as complicated by the special position of a border territory in close relation to both French and German markets. Matters are less prosperous than before the war, and local agitators have made the most of such comparisons. But business is everywhere less prosperous than before the war, and the Saar appears to have suffered less than adjacent regions. The elaborate economic report issued by the Commission in December, 1921,[5] makes a distinctly favorable showing as regards production and non-employment, although such conclusions may need frequent revision as industry and markets fluctuate. Certainly in 1922 visitors are impressed by the prosperity of the Saar basin and the well-being of its inhabitants, especially as reflected in that excellent mirror, the appearance of the children.

The monetary problem is one of special difficulty in the Saar, owing to the steady depreciation of the mark in relation to the franc. By the terms of the treaty "no prohibition or restriction shall be imposed upon the circulation of French money in the territory," and the mining administration from the start took advantage of its right to pay its employees in francs. The effect was to forestall strikes by raising considerably the real wages of the miners and maintaining contentment and efficiency in this basic industry, while it accentuated the disadvantages of the rest of the population, who continued to be paid in marks. The Commission in course of time introduced payment in francs into the public services, partly upon petition of those interested, partly because it considered a wide circulation of the franc an essential preliminary to the closing of the German customs barriers provided by the treaty for 1925. The further decline in the mark has worked to the disadvantage of such workmen as are still paid in marks as well as of those with fixed incomes, and the double circulating medium has brought a rich harvest to the money-changers. Unfortunately, a difficult economic question has taken on a political color. A paper like the *Saarbrücker Zeitung*, which in 1919 declared the maintenance of the mark an

[5]Published by the League of Nations as a "Special Report from the Governing Commission on the Economic Situation in the Territory."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

impossibility, suddenly changed its views, and accusations were hurled at the Commission on the ground that its real purpose was the de-Germanizing of the territory. Yet in October, 1922, the local shops voluntarily put up signs, often in French, that they



would receive francs at the current rate. To an outsider the trouble seems to lie, not with the Commission, but with the mark. It is the Commission's duty to do what it can to stabilize the currency. If it had worked in a vacuum it might have issued a unit of its own, or chosen Swiss francs or pounds or dollars, but so

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

long as the French franc circulated in the territory independently of its authority it had naturally to make the best use it could of this relatively stable currency rather than introduce a third monetary unit. As even Halperin admits, the Commission's motives were economic, not political. It would seem that the territory will be better off when it comes, as it must sooner or later, to a single system of currency, although the further decline of the mark will injure its German markets. It is the employer, rather than the workman, who now benefits by payment in marks.

A principal grievance of the local population has been the presence of French troops, numbering 7,000 at first but now only about 2,000, none of them African. The number is not large, and their good conduct is well attested, but the civilian population considers them a survival of military rule and an infringement of the treaty. The Commission believes such a garrison necessary for the protection of the mines and factories in case of disorder, and points out that the considerable expense is borne by the French Government, at no cost to the territory, which would be heavily burdened by the maintenance of the necessary local police. The treaty (Saar Annex, §30) provides that there shall be no military service but only a local gendarmerie for the maintenance of order, but it goes on to charge the Commission with the responsibility for the protection of persons and property, without further specifying the means it may employ. It would seem that further effort should be made to organize the local gendarmerie, and it has been suggested that the French troops might be kept on call over the Lorraine border.

In still other ways the Commission has been accused of being French rather than international in its policy. To a certain extent this is inevitable, owing to the major interest of the French Government in the mines and the close relations created by the treaty in monetary and customs arrangements, while the appointment of a French president of the Commission necessitated a certain number of French assistants. The Commission, however, though well within its rights, was hardly wise in handing over to France the protection of inhabitants of the Saar abroad, a protection which is annoying to many of the inhabitants and which the German Government refuses to recognize in Germany. The force of the protests against French influence would be stronger if the protestants always urged local interests rather than those of distant parts of Germany. As in the imperial

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

administration of Alsace-Lorraine, it was a well-understood policy of the Prussian administration of the Saar to send in officials from other parts of Prussia, with the result, as stated in the memorandum of the local parties, April 6, 1922, urging the eligibility of such to the new assembly, that "the majority of the teaching corps and the clergy, of the officials, of the staff of industry and commerce, of the leaders of labor, in short of the directing forces of the Saar Basin, were born, not here, but elsewhere in Germany." This plainly means that a docile population was subjected by Prussia to what in America would be called a "carpet-bag" régime. It should hardly be a matter for local pride that the leaders should have been imported in this fashion, and the Commission is moving in the right direction in seeking to train teachers and civil servants from the population of the region.

Between the German Government and the Saar Commission there have been persistent difficulties. Some of these were temporary, affecting the intricate problems of transfer of jurisdiction and property, while others arise out of the somewhat anomalous legal position of the Saar territory. The German Government has sought not only to preserve as many as possible of the attributes of sovereignty over the territory, but also to retain a control over officials, as, for example, through a railroad commission at Saarbrücken. The Governing Commission, on the other hand, in stepping into the place of its German predecessors, has asserted its exclusive authority over officials, and has sought to represent the territory in such international matters as posts and telegraphs, railroads, etc. Germany has formally protested against the admission of the Saar territory to the international conventions affecting these matters, and the question still remains open. Unfortunately, the German Government has not confined its activity to forms of obstruction to which a color of legal right might be given. The Commission was obliged to call its attention officially to the efforts of various imperial and local officials to interfere in the affairs of the Saar. The Commission further maintains that the strike of officials in August, 1920, was ordered from without, and it could point to the arrest and condemnation of a leading member of the German secret police (*Heimatsdienst*) found in the territory with incriminating documents in his possession.[6]

[6]See the special Report of the Commission, August 18, 1920; the fifth Report, pp. 11–13; the sixth Report, pp. 10–12; and the German White Book, pp. 152–244.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A major subject of discussion in the Saar has been the creation of an elective assembly. According to the treaty, new legislation can be framed and new taxes other than customs can be imposed only after consulting the elected representatives of the people, but the Commission is expressly left free to decide how such consultations shall be held. It should be noted that the treaty speaks of the "consultation" of the representatives, not their consent. At first the Commission limited itself to asking the advice of the separate local bodies, such as the Kreistage, which it found already in existence, and was subjected to much criticism for its delay in providing for a general assembly, finally established by decree of March 24, 1922. The new Advisory Council, as it is called, consists of thirty members elected on a general ticket, with proportional representation, by all inhabitants of twenty years or over. Much criticism was called forth by a provision limiting membership to native inhabitants of the territory, and by the merely consultative functions assigned the assembly. Local demand was for a "parliament" of at least seventy members. In spite of threats to abstain, all parties finally participated, though with a reduced vote, in the first election, held June 25, 1922, in which the Centrum secured sixteen seats, or a bare majority, the Social Democrats coming next with five seats. The opening sessions in July called forth vigorous declarations from the several groups, which besides repeating certain usual grievances made specific demands for enlarging the importance of the assembly: Interpellation, initiative, formulation of grievances, control over its procedure and the choice of its president, and freedom from arrest, as well as the eligibility of non-natives. In direct opposition to the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, the Social Democrats demanded "not a merely consultative organ but a parliament with full control of legislation and finance."[7] In case of difficulties between assembly and Commission, the Democrats demanded an appeal to the Council of the League, a division of authority which would of course paralyze the activity of the Commission. The latter proposal is open to much the same objection as the proposal for a legislative assembly, respecting which the Council of the League decided last March, on the report of Mr. Wellington Koo: "The Governing Commission could not be permitted, therefore, to set

[7]Local newspapers, July 20, 1922; published in French and English versions by the League of Nations, August 22, 1922 (C. 543. M. 328).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

up, in contradiction to the Treaty, a Saar Parliament to which the Commission would be responsible and which could prevent the Commission appointed by the Council of the League from carrying out its duties."

Even with its limited functions, the new assembly opens another chapter in the history of conflicts between local legislatures and independent executives, a history which has run much the same course for three hundred years. The Commission will doubtless take its stand on the treaty, which did not contemplate local parliamentary control of the League's organ of government, while the assembly will make its meetings the occasion of appeals to public sentiment and will doubtless work to enlarge its functions to the point of demanding a change in the treaty. The assembly has it in its power to perform an important function in expressing local opinion, provided it will work constructively and avoid the temptation to mere opposition. Differences are inevitable, but if the interests of the territory are the primary consideration there is a large field for collaboration between the Commission and the assembly. The most hopeful evidence of a disposition to accept the treaty as an accomplished fact and work with the Commission for local betterment was seen in a memorandum addressed to the League January 2, 1922, by the Independent Socialist and Communist parties, in opposition to a merely negative protest from the nationalist parties; but this more objective and constructive attitude, which earned them at the time the obloquy of "Französlinge," is abandoned in the Communist declaration read at the opening of the assembly, which is full of denunciation of the Commission's "capitalism."

In general, in the criticisms of the Commission's policy it is not easy to distinguish the valid from the merely partisan. Much has been made of the Commission's decree defining the term "inhabitant of the Saar," on the ground that this was an attempt to separate the people from their German nationality; but the recurrence of this term in the treaty certainly called for a definition and the qualifications were stated in a liberal spirit. Similarly the introduction of French as an optional study in the elementary schools was attacked as a dangerous move toward Frenchification. Whatever the Commission's reasons may have been, there is everything to be said for the teaching of French in a region lying permanently on the border of France and having necessarily within it a body of French engineers and customs

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

officials, provided always that the subject is not made compulsory. Indeed failure to provide such instruction would be a legitimate reproach against the Commission quite irrespective of politics. Any progress that the French language may make in the current speech of the Saar is more likely to come from the French schools for their workmen maintained by the mining authorities, in accordance with a specific clause of the treaty. It is inevitable that the progress of the Commission's government will result in increasing divergence of the Saar from Germany, in legislative policy as well as in local autonomy, and that all such divergencies will be attacked by German nationalists within the territory and without. Yet the region has economic and social characteristics which distinguish it in many ways from distant parts of Prussia and Bavaria, and it ought to be more sympathetically ruled from Saarbrücken than from Munich and Berlin. Nevertheless, the social problems of the Saar and the Reich are much the same, and there will be a continuing demand from certain local elements for the introduction into the Saar of the more recent social legislation of Germany, such as the creation of industrial councils. On such questions legitimate differences of opinion may arise which, in a region left to itself, might produce local political parties instead of mere appendages to the established German groups.

In France the Saar Commission has been the object of criticism by nationalist elements on the ground that it has not pursued a more vigorous pro-French policy—in short, that it has been more interested in administration than in playing politics. Those who desired the annexation of the whole Left Bank were naturally dissatisfied with the new régime in the Saar and accepted it, if at all, only as a means of preparing a vote for annexation in 1935, and many who wished only the frontier of 1814 have the same attitude toward the compromise of Versailles. The chairman of the Finance Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, M. Adrien Dariac, in a report presented May 23, 1922, attacks the creation of the Saar assembly, elected by universal suffrage, as the virtual holding of a plebiscite before the ground had been suitably prepared, a vote sure at the moment to result unfavorably for the French cause and to be misinterpreted as an expression of the ultimate sentiment of the region. Most Frenchmen who are familiar with conditions in the Saar cherish no illusions as to a pro-French vote in 1935, but believe that the plebiscite might

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

result in a vote for autonomy if the local population were given a fair opportunity to judge of its best interests without interference from German nationalists. It is important to remember that the only voters in the plebiscite will be those who resided in the territory at the date of signature of the Treaty of Versailles, so that there is no temptation to colonize or disfranchise on either side, and the local conditions of the moment may well prove decisive. In the meantime liberal French opinion accepts the Saar régime as an indispensable element in reparation which amply guarantees the welfare of the laboring population of the district.

That autonomy might be the outcome in 1935, no German or pro-German is at all ready to admit. Indivisible German nationalism was the key-note of the declarations of the local parties at the opening of the Saar assembly, and these take no account of the economic and social reasons working for differentiation. Nevertheless, the possibility of permanent autonomy is contemplated by the treaty, and an intelligent vote on the question requires that the present régime be given a fair trial and that its results be free from misrepresentation. This, however, is precisely what German nationalists, within and without the Saar, do not wish to see. The better the government of the Commission, the greater the possibility of a vote against Germany. The more mistakes the Commission makes, or can be made to appear to make, the better for the German cause. To all such elements the predominant interest is not the welfare of the Saar population, but the cause of German nationalism.

Under such conditions it is inevitable that such local agitators should do all they can to hamper the Commission, and that their ideas should receive wide publicity abroad through the well-financed news service of German propaganda. Thanks to money whose sources it would be interesting to know, this group has "a good press," which is hostile to the work of the League of Nations, and as the Commission and the League have no such means of publicity the world is much more likely to hear the hostile side. Thus more has been heard of the complaints brought before the League than of their rejection by the Council, more of the local campaign of calumny and less of the stinging rebuke of its methods administered by Lord Balfour at Geneva last September. If there has been as much misrepresentation of local conditions as there has been distortion of the clauses of the treaty, even by high German officials, still stronger language would be warranted.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Three main conclusions seem justified by the history of the territory of the Saar up to the present. The first is that as a measure of reparation the mines of the Saar have proved an unqualified success. The French have got the coal they needed, and the mining population has thrived. Moreover, the mines of the Saar constitute the only significant asset of reparation which France has so far received, and the hope of other forms of payment has steadily diminished, as regards both certainty and promptness. Those who are opposed to effective reparation are naturally opponents of the Saar settlement.

The second conclusion is that the Governing Commission is a serious, hard-working body, which, while apparently guilty of occasional mistakes, has labored earnestly for what it considers the good of the population. In all its fundamental decisions it has been sustained by the Council of the League of Nations, and it is indirect testimony to its honest execution of the Treaty of Versailles that its critics are beginning to direct their efforts toward revision of the instrument under which it acts. Outside of the field of political agitation, there is evidence of friendly relations between the central bureaus of the Commission and the population, who seek advice and help on a variety of matters which under previous administrations they kept to themselves.

In the third place, whatever good work the Commission has done and may do is likely to receive scant recognition from German nationalist elements. Indeed the better the Commission succeeds, the louder is likely to be the expression of their discontent. Such protestors plainly protest too much. They would be more effective if they were animated less by future German interests and more by the present welfare of the population of the Saar Basin. As things stand, whatever they say must be discounted as part of an electioneering campaign for 1935, if not for immediate revision of the treaty. Meanwhile, the Commission, in spite of attacks from French imperialists and German nationalists, goes steadily on with its job.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AN ENGLISH VIEW OF ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

By V.

NOT the least disappointing feature of the disappointing aftermath of the war has been the failure of the Anglo-American relationship to develop according to promise. America's entry into the war, it had been proclaimed at the time, would end the era of her isolation: henceforward the Democracy of the New World would work hand in hand with the Democracies of the Old World for the regeneration of mankind. Especially was there to be the closest cooperation between the English-speaking nations. For a few fleeting months before and after the armistice it looked as though this vision of the reversal of Canning's famous phrase was about to be realized. But now four years after the end of the war the United States and Great Britain, despite joint sacrifices, joint promises, and, if their people would only realize it, joint interests, seem nearly as far apart as ever they were. On both sides of the Atlantic there is disillusionment; in the United States it has produced aloofness, in England a sort of weary impatience.

The British are and always will be intensely grateful for American partnership during the war. They realize that they could not have carried on during the last two years of the struggle without the generous financial aid of the American Government and people; they appreciate and admire all that was done in the United States in the way of food-saving and ship-building; they know that Marshal Foch would have lacked the man-power to press victory home in the autumn of 1918 had it not been for the American armies so triumphantly extemporized.

To those great achievements American policy since the peace has proved a disconcerting contrast. It began with such a splendid promise. At the Peace Conference it seemed that the United States and the British Empire had reached a final and constructive understanding. Europe was assured by President Wilson, with an authority and solemnity which it never occurred to the average man could be the product of anything but a firm knowledge that he was morally and constitutionally the plenipotentiary of his country, that it might henceforward count without reserve upon the United States. Upon that assurance

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more than upon any other single fact the fabric of the main peace settlement was based. Shattered and shocked by war, acutely conscious of the difficulty of recapturing and holding to the paths of peace, Europe acclaimed the assistance of the one country which had emerged from the furnace with enhanced authority and virtually unimpaired vitality and strength.

The two main keys of the peace arrangements were the League of Nations and the treaty whereby the United States and Great Britain undertook to help to defend the frontiers of France from unprovoked aggression. The treaty was to reassure France that Germany was powerless to hurt her and might therefore be allowed with impunity to grow strong enough to play her all-important part in European economic reconstruction. The chief function of the League of Nations was, firstly, to restrain the interplay of racial and national animosities, ambitions, fears and suspicions by which it was all too plain that Europe was still torn; secondly, to apportion among the powers most competent to bear it responsibility for the tutelage of the orphan colonies and infant states left by the collapse of the German colonial system and the disintegration of Turkey. To both treaty and League America was to bring the authority which Great Britain alone was not strong enough to wield. She was to help to reassure France; she was, according to President Wilson's undertakings, to take a hand in the Near Eastern question by accepting a mandate for Armenia, that is to say, by establishing her authority in Asia Minor in such a way as would have obviated the ill-fated Greek venture in that country and might well have reduced the Near Eastern question to manageable proportions.

After four years, what seems to the average British mind to have happened? The Near Eastern question is still in a state of most troublesome flux and Great Britain has just been forced to a single-handed stand to prevent the armed irruption of the Turk into Europe, with all its incalculable consequences. The League of Nations, lacking American support, is little more than a receptacle for minor problems which the governments of Europe from time to time almost contemptuously cast to it. It has been powerless to press its plans for land disarmament and economic reconstruction.

The French frontier treaty has been rejected by the American Senate and has come to nothing. France has condemned as a failure what may be called the new Anglo-Saxon doctrine of pre-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ventative international cooperation. She has returned to the old practice of European diplomacy. Her aim is not to build up Europe but to keep her old enemy under, even if it means the disintegration of the Continent.

The French position is one which neither Englishmen nor Americans ought to criticise too roughly, much as they may deplore it. When the armistice came France felt, rightly or wrongly, that Germany had not been effectively defeated. She feared a war of revenge. She noted that Germany still had a far larger population than hers, reinforced by a much more rapid birth rate. Her natural impulse was to get the Rhine as a strategic frontier. Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George imposed a veto upon that idea. They refused to allow the incorporation in France of a large German population. After some argument they got France to give up the idea of the left bank of the Rhine. They persuaded her with the promise of the support of the League of Nations and of the treaty guaranteeing her frontier. Neither promise has materialized. France feels that she is left alone in Europe. Small wonder if, after such a disillusionment, she should be trying to keep Germany in the dust, hedge her round with military alliances and invoke against her the old European doctrine of the balance of power. Small wonder that she should make difficulties about the reduction of German reparations to an economic level. It is not merely that being more nearly self-supporting than England she feels less acutely the need for European stability; her sense of logic is outraged. Why, she asks, should she be expected to remit part of a debt justly owed her by her enemy before her friends have told her how much of her debt they are willing to eschew?

To blame the United States for all this is of course manifestly unfair. Even the most energetic American support might well have failed, in the present dispensation of things, to make the Treaty of Versailles work. But it is perhaps fair to remind those American observers who, like Mr. Hoover, inveigh against the militarism of European countries, against their unbalanced budgets and against their intrigues and quarrels, that American cooperation with Great Britain was regarded by the peacemakers in Paris as perhaps the most important ingredient of the sedative which they had prepared for the post-bellum fever of the Old World. Great Britain has so far failed, single handed, to hold the patient down. It may have been, as critics of Mr. Lloyd

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

George aver, to no small extent her own fault that she has failed; but Englishmen would be more than human if in surveying the lost opportunities of the peace and the precarious future of Europe they did not at times feel a certain impatience at the American attitude towards themselves and their problems. They might have been able to understand and sympathize with the causes of the failure of the United States to live up to President Wilson's promises. They have suffered themselves from the recklessness of wayward statesmen; especially in recent years they have been not unfamiliar with the spectacle of foreign policy being used as a football on the field of domestic politics. What they find difficult to understand is the apparent failure of the American people to sympathize with the countries which for reasons of national policy they have been forced to leave in the lurch and to realize, first, that the United States has in the long run as great an interest as Great Britain in getting Europe on to her feet; second, that Europe can only be got on to her feet by positive action.

The British nation, more heavily taxed already than any of the Allies, is the only one of America's European debtors who is paying interest on its American debt. Though the sum of this interest equals the proceeds of an extra ten per cent upon an income tax which now starts from twenty-five per cent on small incomes, there is no Englishman who does not wish it to be paid so long as the state and he can do it. Nor is there any resentment that the United States should expect to be paid. But it is found difficult to understand the intimation that the United States will not join with Great Britain in overhauling the general question of inter-governmental indebtedness and that, because she thinks that Europe needs disciplining, it would be wrong to let her off any of her obligations while she continues in her present anarchic ways. It is felt that Americans who talk like that have got hold of the wrong end of the stick. It is held to be clear beyond all peradventure that France, Italy and Germany and the other debtor nations will never pay anything unless a start is made in the process of reconstruction by reducing indebtedness to a tolerable figure all round. France for the moment is the key to the situation. Her attitude reduced to its simplest terms is, as explained above, that it is unfair to expect her to play the generous creditor to her enemy until she knows how much her creditors, who are her allies, are prepared to let her off. Surely,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

it is argued, people like Mr. Hoover must see that unless the United States cooperates with Great Britain to render possible the scaling down of inter-governmental indebtedness to a practical, as opposed to an ethically justifiable figure, things may come to such a pass that she will never get a cent of interest or capital from any of her continental debtors.

Englishmen, in fact, are inclined to be puzzled that a nation which has acquired a reputation for the highest business acumen should stand critically and suspiciously aloof from a situation which must be put right if the world is ever to get comfortable again and which can only be put right if all the nations, and especially the United States and Great Britain, pull together, each making allowances for the special difficulties, problems and points of view of the rest.

Nor, unfortunately, is this aloofness the only thing in the present American attitude towards the Old World which clouds the British vision. Judging from what one hears in clubs, counting houses, newspaper offices and other places where foreign affairs are discussed—the man in the street, here as in the United States, lifts his eyes across the seas only so long as some dramatic external crisis is in progress—there is a feeling that while refusing the responsibilities of her share in the peace treaty America has perhaps been disproportionately avid in retaining the advantages which she would have obtained had she ratified it. Her arrangement with Germany to keep privileges which Germany would have given her under the Treaty of Versailles has been the subject of a good deal of rather ill-informed but none the less mischievous criticism. The same must be said of her request, which incidentally the British Government has been only too glad to grant, that in British mandated territories her citizens should be given the same privileges as the citizens of countries which are members of the League. There is, however, a vague idea that Americans are trying to avail themselves of the troubles of Europe in general and of the British Empire in particular to establish an hegemony over the trade and finance of the world. The idea has been inspired by such things as the propaganda activities of the American shipping board, the discovery that American Consuls abroad have been rather impetuously patriotic in drumming up trade for American ships, and until lately the supposed anti-British attitude of certain American oil interests in Europe and elsewhere.

Add all this and other similar journalistic tittle-tattle to what

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has been said above and some notion will have been attained of the spirit of disillusionment which for the moment marks the British popular purview of Anglo-American relations. Even American praise for certain aspects of British policy almost fails to arouse appreciation, for to a person in pretty desperate difficulties kind words from a comfortable distance often do little more than irritate frayed nerves with impatient regrets that they are not accompanied by something more substantial.

American readers must not misunderstand what has just been said. No Englishman has in reality any right to cavil at the aloofness of the United States. The British plenipotentiaries at the Peace Conference had only themselves to blame if they were taken in by Mr. Wilson's claims to infallibility. A cursory study of the American Constitution would have shown them that an American President has full power to sign a treaty only when he is absolutely sure of his Senate; a scrutiny of American newspapers or periodicals would have told them that President Wilson had lost his control over the Senate as the result of a Congressional election just before he sailed for France.

Nor have we the right to criticise America's refusal to be drawn into the resultant mess. Her aloofness from Europe is *mutatis mutandis* precisely the attitude adopted by England after the Napoleonic wars. England, a hundred years ago, did not like the undemocratic attitude of the autocrats who in the name of the so-called Holy Alliance took it upon themselves to mismanage Europe. She had her own urgent problems of reconstruction. She therefore isolated herself behind the barrier of the Channel and only reached out again into continental affairs when it became her practical interest to do so. Until then she merely preached and criticised when illiberal things were done in Europe, refusing to sit in at the conferences which then, as now, were held at frequent intervals, sending to them, on one occasion at least, an unconsidered functionary whom she called "an unofficial observer." The Atlantic today is still as broad as the Channel was a century ago; the state of Europe is certainly as chaotically alarming as it was then; and America's problems of reconstruction have certainly been as absorbing as were those of England in the days of the Peterloo Massacre or the Cato Street Conspiracy.

The modern American has, however, the spirit of isolation more deeply inculcated into him than the Englishman of even a hundred years ago. England all through her history has had to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

make periodical forays, diplomatic or military, into European affairs. For America the necessity arose for the first time five years ago. Before that time geography, commercial and economic expediency, the tradition of her older stock and the prejudices of the majority of her younger stock, all made for an aloofness such as England has often tried to attain but has never been able to enjoy for more than brief periods.

But if America's repudiation of Wilsonism and all that word has meant for Europe is perfectly intelligible to the small number of people who have tried to think things out, there can be little doubt that the misconception and prejudice which have been sketched above are in danger of taking root among the British electorate as a whole.

So far as the long-distance observer can judge, a complementary set of misconceptions have at the same time grown up in America. Allusion has already been made to the apparently current suspicion that we are being unfair about American trade and especially about American shipping. There would seem also to be an idea that we are trying to drag America into our difficulties and to involve her in the entanglements of the European tragedy. The suspicion that we are trying to "down" American commerce has no foundation in fact. Neither our government nor our traders, so far as anybody knows, are doing anything save encourage legitimate competition. For the idea that we are trying to "entangle" the United States there is unfortunately some justification. That justification lies in the apparently congenital inability of many British statesmen and journalists to realize that America really means it when she announces that for the present she proposes to keep out of Europe. Whenever any crisis comes along, whether it concerns the stability of European finance or the security of the Bosphorus, somebody in authority is almost sure to say something which gives Americans good excuse for believing that we are trying to drag them in. The Balfour note was perhaps the crowning example of this type of ineptitude, as is now recognized by the whole British press and by the majority of British politicians.

The truth is that we are paying for the fact that ever since it existed the Anglo-American relationship has been based upon misconceptions and mutual ignorance. In the old days it did not much matter. Neither country needed the other. The United States was prosperously immersed in the exploitation of a virgin

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

continent. Great Britain, having stolen a march on the rest of the world in intensive industrialism, was engaged in the development of markets for her wares in Europe, India and the East. Great Britain, as the Lancashire cotton crisis proved during the Civil War, depended upon American cotton; the United States depended to some extent upon British capital for her tumultuously expanding railways and industries; but the contact was not such as to make for real political or economic inter-dependence. Indeed the fact that the United States was a debtor nation rendered possible those high tariff walls wherewith for fifty years the Republican party reinforced the American instinct of isolation. A generation or even less ago the average American was inclined to think that economic insularity, freedom from the competition of the "pauper labor" of Europe, was the welcome corollary of the doctrine of political isolation under which his country had reached adolescence. To Great Britain the United States was almost incredibly remote, cut off physically and mentally from the Old World, occupied with the assimilation of immigrants, with the taming of deserts in the West, with problems of municipal government in the East, the parent, it is true, of wonderful inventions like the telephone and the Pullman car, the home of charming people who on their visits to Europe proved to be surprisingly cosmopolitan in education and outlook, but nevertheless outside of the work-a-day sphere of British diplomacy and commerce.

This aloofness was in the minds of British observers reinforced by more positive features. The Irish-American, and later the German-American, were forever ready to misrepresent and vilify the country which they respectively regarded as the oppressor and the rival of their kinsmen across the Atlantic. Even over the Anglo-Saxon element of the population there still seemed to brood at times the shadow of the Revolutionary War and of the other bickerings which marred Anglo-American relations during the early days of the American commonwealth. School books magnified into calculated malignity the ignorant ineptitude of England's Georgian Ministers. Waves of distrust for some aspect of British policy were sometimes seen to pass inexplicably over the land. Patriotic orators within Congress and without were heard to sneer at the effete institutions of the Older World.

The Spanish War established the United States as a world power with over-seas responsibilities. Germany began to take

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

her into her calculations, trying to win her by the visits of princes and the intrigues of propagandists. Great Britain welcomed her appearance as the sharer of the "white man's burden." A movement was instituted for the promotion of Anglo-American understanding. It produced much pleasant post-prandial eloquence and stimulating pilgrimages to and fro across the Atlantic. But so far as the public opinions of the countries were concerned, after-events incline one to the judgment that it all did really more harm than good. It got things on to the wrong basis. The argument that blood is thicker than water was not a very intelligent one in the case of two countries in one of which two out of the three largest of its racial elements were congenitally and professionally hostile to the other country. Nor could the argument of community of ideals make much way. Behind a veil of polite platitude and fraudulent flattery the American and British peoples were really as far apart as ever, mainly because the exponents of Anglo-American friendship had not found the real argument.

The real argument is that the United States and the British Empire have a very practical community of interests. To put the case in its crudest terms, they are both of them too large to fear the law-abiding prosperity of any other country and together are strong enough to see that any country or group of countries keeps the law.

What the writer means is best illustrated by much that happened, or rather did not happen, during the fateful days before the outbreak of the war. It is argued by many, whether with justice or not we shall probably never know, that war would have been averted had the British Government been in a position to declare that, if Germany attacked her, France would be joined off-hand by the whole might of the British Empire. The British Government could not commit itself, mainly because the strength of the British peace party in the Cabinet (whose leader it is interesting to remember was Mr. Lloyd George) hopelessly hampered the freedom of action of Lord—then Sir Edward—Grey, Mr. Asquith and the other clearer sighted members. Had not only the British Empire been ready to stand armed at the outset on the side of peace, but had the United States stood with the Empire, who can doubt that war would have been avoided not only then but probably indefinitely? Germany would never have dared challenge the imminent might of the whole English-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

speaking world. This is said in no spirit of reproach. When England hesitated, with her whole future patently at stake, to throw herself once more into her accustomed rôle of the champion of European freedom, it would have been absurd to have expected the United States to apprehend the issue. Even the most virile of modern American statesmen congratulated his country on its neutrality in an article published, if the writer recollects correctly, some weeks after the rape of Belgium. To any Englishman familiar with all the United States and not with her deceptively unrepresentative Eastern seaboard alone the wonder is not that the United States took so long to come into the war but rather that when she did come in it was with such an impetus of splendid and self-sacrificing unanimity.

It is reasonable to suppose that President Wilson and those Americans who favored America's participation in the Treaty of Versailles thought that the war had brought to everybody the realization of this fundamental community of interests. Events prove that they were sadly led astray by their enthusiasms. And that, in the writer's estimation, gives yet another key to the present disappointing plight of Anglo-American relationship. The relationship has been the victim of extremes of suspicion and sentimentalism, of carelessness and effusiveness, of Utopianism and pessimism. Wilsonism has been the last of those fatal extremes—Wilsonism encouraged by Great Britain's impetuous desire for a partner in the work of reconstruction. We are suffering now from the inevitable reaction and we shall continue to suffer until on both sides of the Atlantic we recognize facts as they are. The American people should make allowances for the disappointment of the British peoples and the discomfiture of the European peoples at the way in which Mr. Wilson's promises have been brought to nought; they must realize that while still reeling under the shock of the war, while still taxed as no people has even been taxed before and hag-ridden by unemployment, we, a nation dependent for our life upon our external trade, are threatened with the permanent loss of our best markets should Europe go under. The British people on their side must take the United States as she is; they should realize that she is behaving as England would probably have behaved had their positions been reversed, that it is unfair to expect a country to jettison overnight the tradition of its whole life-time.

As for those who in both countries believe that the future of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

world may best be assured by close Anglo-American cooperation, theirs is perhaps the hardest task of all. They must abandon their over-generous enthusiasms. They must bring their feet down from the clouds of sentimentalism of the blood-is-thicker-than-water variety and plant them firmly upon the earth of realities; they must eschew visions of an Anglo-American alliance and other short-cuts to Utopia and concentrate upon duller but more practical aims. They must work for understanding and cooperation only when and in so far as understanding and co-operation are immediately feasible. They must teach their peoples by slow degrees to understand one another. They must expect their countries to work together only when the advantage of so doing is easily demonstrated to the popular mind. American initiative and imagination have already given them a signal example of the sort of thing that can be done in that respect. Nothing better shows the possibilities of a healthy Anglo-American understanding than the masterly way in which President Harding conceived and Mr. Hughes handled the Washington Conference for the Limitation of Armament. Mr. Harding and Mr. Hughes saw clearly just how far Britain would go in translating into diplomatic facts the doctrine of community of interest upon which the future Anglo-American relationship must rest. Aided by Lord Balfour, they brought about a practical demonstration of Anglo-American solidarity in the pursuit of limited but nevertheless very important objectives which startled the Foreign Offices of Europe and, one likes to think, marks out that course of common sense and piece-meal cooperation which, if only the public opinions in the two countries are patient and public men tactful, may still enable the English-speaking nations to pull the world together, making it a safe and profitable place for their financiers and their traders, and reduce to a minimum the danger of another great war.

For if Europe now fails to pull itself together the United States will suffer almost as severely in the long run as Great Britain would suffer immediately. The market for American cotton and copper and other exports would be shot to pieces; American shipping would lack freight; American investors in European loans, commercial, municipal and government, would be in the same hopeless position as French investors in the loans of the Russian Tsarist Government. The deeps of civilization would, in fact, be broken up, to the immeasurable disadvantage of all

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

civilized powers and to the great advantage of all the forces of disorder within and without their gates. There is sufficient scope in an orderly world for the full activities of both our countries. There will be plenty of opportunities, when once the buying power of Europe is reestablished, for the mercantile marine of both; there will be plenty of room for the surplus financial and commercial energy of both. There will also be plenty of opportunity for profitable team work.

One is seeing that already in the oil industry. Two years ago the press of both countries was full of complaints and prophecies concerning bitter rivalry between the British and American interests. Great Britain, it was proclaimed in the United States, was planning to keep the American interests out of many of the most important fields of the world; the American interests, it was proclaimed in Great Britain, were preparing to wage bitter warfare in return. What has happened? The interests most concerned have been talking things over under the informal auspices of their governments. In the Near East the British have given or promised the United States a share in virtually all their oil fields and oil concessions; in regard to Russia, after many rumors of bitter competition there is now talk of an amicable arrangement between one of the greatest American companies and one of its chief British and European competitors. Into the counsels of one of the most important of modern industries, an industry which happens to be mainly in American and British hands, Mr. Hughes' inspiration of common sense cooperation has thus already spread.

That it will spread further, despite the present rather unsatisfactory state of Anglo-American sentiment, can hardly be doubted if only the peoples of both countries will try to see things as they are and not as they are depicted by pessimists on the one hand and enthusiasts on the other, if they will make due allowance for the inevitable differences between their points of view upon many subjects. Then it may be possible slowly to realize those generous visions of the consummation of a working understanding between the English-speaking nations,—in their own interests and in the interest of the decent conduct of the world,—which at the time of the armistice seemed to many observers to present the best guarantee for the establishment and perpetuation of a better civilization.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE UNITED STATES AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL COURT

By Manley O. Hudson

IF THERE is one feature of American foreign policy that has remained constant during the last half-century it would seem to be our support of the idea of a permanent international court of justice. When Secretary John Hay directed our delegates to the first Hague Conference to propose the establishment of such a tribunal, he traced the growth of an "almost continuous movement of thought in this direction since 1832," when the Senate of Massachusetts had adopted a resolution on the subject; and it was in no small measure due to the efforts of the American delegates that the panel known as the Permanent Court of Arbitration was set up in 1899. Eight years later President Roosevelt wanted "to see the Hague Court greatly increased in power and permanency," and Secretary Root instructed our delegates to the second Hague Conference to endeavor "to bring about a development of the Hague tribunal into a permanent tribunal." But no agreement could be reached as to the method of selecting the judges, and it has remained for the Permanent Court of International Justice, established during the last two years, to achieve that result. This new Court is quite obviously in line with what our government has been standing for during the administrations of Presidents McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft and Wilson, and the all but universally favorable comment on its organization seems sufficient indication of its fulfilment of American hopes.

But the Government of the United States has had no part in setting up the new Court, and we are now confronted with the necessity of deciding what share we shall have in maintaining it. The problem is not without its difficulties, and these must be clearly understood if the administration is to have the assistance of an informed opinion in meeting them.

Secretary Hughes has called attention to the fact that under the present constitution of the Permanent Court of International Justice the United States has no voice in the election of the judges. In a statement on July 13, 1922, he declared that he saw "no prospect for any treaty or convention by which we should share in the maintenance of the Court until some provision

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is made by which, without membership in the League, this Government would be able to have an appropriate voice in the election of the judges." In his address at Boston on October 30 he was more hopeful, for he stated his belief "that suitable arrangements can be made for the participation by this Government in the election of judges of the International Court which has been set up, so that this Government may give its formal support to that Court as an independent tribunal of international justice."

If these statements may be taken as a considered formulation of the policy of the Government of the United States with reference to the new international Court, they are significant for two reasons. They seem to admit the general acceptability of the plan and organization of the Court, as well as the desirability of American cooperation in maintaining it; while they set a condition precedent to such cooperation which most of the Americans who are interested in the subject at once recognize to be proper and requisite. It is no longer necessary, therefore, to argue the general question of American acceptance of the new Court as being in line with the policy which our government has consistently followed for the last quarter of a century. The Secretary of State has invited the discussion to be shifted to the precise measures by which American cooperation in maintaining the existing Court can be effected; and the condition which he sets formulates a concrete and immediate problem, toward the solution of which it may be hoped that discussion will contribute.

The establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice is one of the triumphs of international cooperation since the war. The Peace Conference had made no attempt to satisfy the demand so often heard during the war for a "real" international court. The task was too delicate for a post-war Paris. So the Covenant of the League of Nations stopped with providing that the Council should "formulate and submit to the members of the League for adoption, plans for the establishment" of a court competent to deal with "any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it." At its first meeting for the transaction of business the Council of the League proceeded to set up a committee of jurists, which included Mr. Elihu Root, to draft a project for the Court. The deliberations of this committee continued through the summer of 1920, and before the end of that year its project had been approved, with

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

some amendments, by both the Assembly and the Council. The final plan was then embodied in a statute which was adjoined to a formal "protocol of signature."

This protocol establishing the statute of the Court has now been signed by forty-six states, of which thirty-five have deposited their formal ratifications. It is a distinct instrument, resting on its own independent basis, and deriving its operative force neither from the Covenant nor from any action by the Assembly and Council of the League but from the formalities of its own execution and ratification. It even goes beyond the terms of Article 14 of the Covenant, both in its provisions for the Court's jurisdiction and in its provision for the participation of states not members of the League of Nations. As it exists, therefore, the Court is a quite independent body, though it is in many respects dependent on the continued existence of the machinery of the League, and indeed is itself a part of that machinery. Being set up by an independent treaty, its functioning cannot be controlled by the organs of the League, and it would seem to be entirely free from the objections made to the League itself.

The record of the Court already affords some basis for an estimate of its value. The first election of the judges was held in September, 1921, and the foremost American authority on international law, Mr. John Bassett Moore, was made one of the judges. In January, 1922, the Court held its first organization meeting, followed in June by the beginning of its sessions for the hearing of cases. In July and August, 1922, it handed down three advisory opinions on questions submitted to it by the Council, all having to do with controversies relating to the International Labor Organization. On October 2, 1922, a dispute between France and Great Britain over the nationality laws of Tunis and Morocco was submitted to it. And a dispute between various signatories of the Treaty of Versailles relating to the Kiel Canal now seems to be on its way to the Court. So that it has already begun to lay the foundations of a new jurisprudence in international law.

The new Court is not merely a private court of the members of the League of Nations, as one critic has suggested. From the beginning it has been open to certain states not members of the League. In May, 1922, the Council of the League, acting under power conferred by Article 35 of the statute of the Court, opened

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

it to all nations of the world, regardless of membership in the League, on condition of the deposit of a declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the Court. As it exists today, therefore, it is a world court open to all the states of the world on terms of equality. It constitutes an important addition to the Permanent Court of Arbitration and other existing agencies for the pacific settlement of international disputes.

Though the Government of the United States has had no part in its establishment, the Court has a distinct relation to the United States; and an understanding of this relation must precede any attempt to consider the methods by which the Government of the United States might cooperate in maintaining it. Why is there a need for any formal action by our government such as that referred to by Mr. Hughes? What advantages would it bring to the United States, and to the Court itself? And how may such action be taken speedily and effectively?

In the first place, the Court is open to the United States on the same terms as to states which have signed and ratified the protocol. Article 35 of the statute provides that the Court shall be open to states mentioned in the annex to the Covenant. It is by virtue of falling within this description that the United States may take a dispute to the Court if the other party consents, or may consent to be sued in it by some other power. In this respect the situation would probably not be changed after formal adoption of the statute by the American Government. For it seems improbable that the United States would adopt the optional clause, annexed to the protocol, for accepting "as compulsory *ipso facto* and without special convention the jurisdiction of the Court in conformity with Article 36" of the statute. In ratifying the Hague Convention of 1907 relating to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the United States made a reservation protecting its freedom of action; and recent history has probably brought us no nearer to agreeing to "compulsory jurisdiction." Though fourteen of the thirty-five ratifying states have adopted the optional clause, it has not had the approval of any of the so-called principal powers. Action by the American Government which did not include the acceptance of this optional clause, then, would in no way change the existing situation so far as the use of the Court is concerned. The United States would remain free, as it is now, to decide at the time an issue arises whether it will invoke the new Court.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In the second place, although we enjoy with other peoples of the world the privilege of carrying our disputes before the Court and the common advantage of the world's having at hand such machinery for the pacific settlement of international disputes, no part of the expense of maintaining the Court is borne by the Government of the United States. For instance, we pay no part of the salary of Judge John Bassett Moore. It is true that the expense is not great. The total expense for 1923, including the salaries of the judges and the rental of the Court's headquarters in the Peace Palace at The Hague, will be somewhat under $400,000. The statute provides that this expense is to be borne by the League of Nations "in such manner as shall be decided by the Assembly on the proposal of the Council," and the Assembly has decided that for the present the expense "shall be incorporated in the general budget of the League and paid out of the ordinary funds of the League." But the adoption of the statute alone would not have the effect of fixing the quota of the United States, for it contains no provision requiring states not members of the League to share in bearing the expense, except with respect to the expenses of particular adjudications in which such states are parties. The quota of the United States would then have to be fixed by a special arrangement between the United States and the Council. This arrangement might provide that our annual contribution could be paid directly to the registrar of the Court, without passing into the general funds of the League. This would follow a precedent set with reference to Germany's contributions to the expenses of the International Labor Organization, which are paid directly to the Director of the International Labor office though the expenses of the Organization are met out of the general funds of the League. The adoption of the Court statute, followed by such an arrangement, would occasion no embarassment to the United States, therefore, and would not create any appearance of American support of the League itself. On the other hand, it would relieve the richest nation in the world of the present embarassment of making no contribution to the support of the world tribunal.

Thirdly, though the United States may now participate in a limited way in the preliminaries of the election of the judges of the Court, we have no voice in their final election, as the Secretary of State has pointed out. This is not so important with reference to the present incumbents, all of whom are out-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

standing men in the field of international law. The present personnel would seem entirely satisfactory, and it is difficult to believe that Secretary Hughes' statement about American participation in electing the judges was intended to apply in any way to the election which has already been held. As the term of office of the present judges will not expire until 1930, no general election is scheduled for eight more years, though vacancies may have to be filled in that interim. The successor to Judge Moore would very probably be an American; but if a future election should result in no American being among the judges, it would still be open to the United States, under Article 31 of the statute, to choose an American to sit *ad hoc* in any case in which the United States should be a contesting party. It is not so much a fear that the United States will not be represented on the Court as a desire to participate in choosing the other judges and to have an influence in the election equal to that of any other state which makes it essential that the United States have a voice in all future elections.

The procedure of the election is not simple. In the preliminary stage, nominations are made by the national groups in the Permanent Court of Arbitration set up by the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. The judges are then elected by the Assembly and Council, proceeding independently, from the list of persons thus nominated. The choice is restricted to such persons, except that in case of a deadlock between the two electoral bodies a joint conference of three members from each makes the selection.

In the first stage of this procedure, the United States now has the same voice as have states which have ratified the Court protocol. It is clearly provided in Article 5 of the statute that the invitation to nominate "persons in a position to accept the duties of a member of the Court" shall be addressed by the Secretary General "to the members of the Court of Arbitration belonging to the states mentioned in the annex to the Covenant or to the states which join the League subsequently." In 1921 an invitation was sent to the American members of the Court of Arbitration. It is possible that, in view of their having been named under the Hague Convention of 1907, the American members may consider themselves incompetent to go beyond their functions as defined in that Convention. In a letter of July 19, 1922, Mr. Hughes has said of the American failure to nominate in 1921

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that "the point was that the American judges had been appointed under the Hague Convention of 1907, and they were asked to take action under another treaty to which the United States was not a party." But the provisions of the Hague Convention are not restrictive, and the American judges could hardly fail to accede to the expressed wishes of the Secretary of State in this regard. The invitation is transmitted to them through the Secretary of State, and there would seem to be no difficulty about his giving special authority for making a nomination.

American participation in nominating the judges can thus be secured, as things stand now, without any action by the Government of the United States with reference to the protocol and statute of the Court. The four American members of the Court of Arbitration may nominate not more than two Americans, and not more than two persons of a different nationality. The choice of the American nominees would be certain to have great influence on the electoral bodies. Once it is determined that an American is to be chosen, these bodies would be very likely to elect as judge the American preferred by the American members of the Court of Arbitration.

In the second stage of the election procedure—the voting in the Assembly and the Council—the United States now has no part because it has no representation in either body. In naming the Assembly and the Council as the electoral bodies to choose the judges, the Court statute must refer to these bodies as constituted by the Covenant. It is to be noted that their competence as electoral bodies depends not upon the Covenant but entirely upon the statute itself.

If the Court is to be used by the United States as need arises, and if we are to give it the cooperation which is essential to its prestige and authority, it is necessary to make some arrangement which will allow us to participate in this second stage of the election. Even if we feel sure that an American will always be one of the judges, and that he will always be the first choice of the American members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, many Americans would still think it necessary for us to have a direct voice in the selection of the other judges. This involves a change in the existing situation, and Secretary Hughes has formulated the problem which this change would present. How can the United States cooperate in maintaining the Court, having an

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

appropriate voice in the election of the judges, without incurring any of the obligations of membership in the League?

The United States has been invited to sign the protocol to which the Court statute is annexed. A provision was inserted in the protocol itself that it should "remain open for signature by the members of the League of Nations and by the states mentioned in the annex to the Covenant of the League." When the draft of the protocol was presented to the first Assembly of the League, Dr. Hagerup, the *rapporteur*, explained this paragraph by saying: "This means that the United States can adhere to the Statute." Technically, action by the United States might take either of two forms—signature followed by ratification, or adhesion without signature. Perhaps adhesion would be the simpler method to adopt in view of American constitutional procedure; the Senate's consent would then be obtained before any formal action is taken by the Executive. The protocol does not exactly encourage such action, for it is cast as an instrument entered into by members of the League; but an explanatory saving clause would avoid all difficulty.

To meet the election problem some express provision seems necessary. Of course it is possible that the statute of the Court should be amended. But the general outlines of the present scheme for electing the judges have produced such universal satisfaction that no amendment should be considered which would lead to their abandonment. It would be disastrous to reopen the whole discussion as to the method of electing the judges,—the rock which wrecked the plans for a Court of Arbitral Justice in 1907. Mr. Root's greatest contribution to the new Court was his suggestion that the election should be entrusted to the Council and the Assembly. These are, indeed, the only two bodies in existence which reconcile in a practical way the theory of the equality of all states with the actual hegemony of a few. The compromise has given satisfaction to the small powers by reason of their participation in the Assembly and to the principal powers by reason of their votes in the Council. To upset the present scheme might mean a return to the deadlock of 1907. Any amendment in the statute, therefore, should keep the present election frame-work and in some way open up the electoral bodies to the representatives of the United States.

It would not be difficult to frame a general provision for insertion in the statute which would confer upon states which are

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mentioned in the annex to the Covenant and which sign and ratify or adhere to the protocol the same powers and privileges as are possessed by other states invited to sign the protocol by reason of their membership in the League. A provision might easily be drafted, also, which would assure to states named in the Treaty of Versailles as "principal powers" participation in the voting in the Council. Such an amendment would leave the electoral power with the Council and the Assembly, but would give to the United States a voice in those bodies when they act outside the Covenant in discharging the electoral function.

It is a less simple matter to plan how such an amendment of the statute can be put into effect. Unfortunately, the statute itself makes no provision for its amendment. Nor are the Assembly and the Council empowered to change the independent treaty which the protocol and statute together constitute. Such competence is conferred upon those bodies neither by the Covenant nor by the protocol; nor was it reserved when, on December 13, 1920, the Assembly passed its resolution approving the statute and directing the protocol to be opened for signature and ratification. It seems, therefore, that an amendment can be effected only by the same formal processes which were employed in the original promulgation of the statute. This would mean that a new protocol must be signed and ratified by all the thirty-five states which have ratified the existing protocol, if not by all of the forty-six states which have signed it. Such a procedure would be both cumbersome and time-consuming. In view of the rôle of the League in establishing the Court, no body outside the League is likely to take the initiative in framing the new protocol. It could be drawn up by the Council of the League, but the Council would probably want the collaboration of the Assembly before promulgating it for signature and ratification. The Assembly does not meet again in ordinary session until September, 1923. Furthermore, since the treaty-making machinery in most governments now involves some parliamentary action, few governments would find it possible to ratify until the consent of their parliaments had been given. Some parliaments meet infrequently. If the formal action of thirty-five or forty-six governments had thus to be awaited, a change in the statute of the Court could not be effected for many months or even years.

Moreover, the process of amendment might reopen some of the controversies which the compromises of the existing statute

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

put at rest. And since the United States is the only country on whose behalf the change would be attempted, the process might draw attention to the peculiar features of the American position in an unpleasant if not an embarrassing manner. It would seem most desirable, therefore, to avoid attempting to secure an amendment to the statute if provision for the United States to participate in the election can be made in any other way.

Is it possible to obtain the desired result—without changing the existing statute—by appropriate conditions or reservations to be attached to a ratification of the protocol establishing the Court? A reservation might stipulate that no election should become final until the United States had been consulted; but this might smack of reserving a veto possessed by no other state. Might not the United States ratify or adhere with a reservation that she be admitted to participate in the election of the judges by the Assembly and by the Council when those bodies act, not under any provisions of the Covenant, but as the electoral bodies named in Article 4 of the statute of the Court? The electoral functions of the Assembly and the Council as outlined in the statute are quite distinct from their general functions as outlined in the Covenant; and participation in the former would in no way involve the United States in the latter. To clinch this point, however, and to erect a buffer for the future, such a reservation might distinctly state that no other obligations are assumed by the United States. If necessary, it could be added that the United States might at any time denounce the protocol and withdraw from further cooperation.

Such a reservation would, of course, require the acquiescence of all the thirty-five states that have ratified the protocol of the Court. But it seems very probable that such acquiescence could be counted upon; and perhaps assurances of it could be secured in advance. It might be effected in the following manner: In line with a provision of the protocol itself, the American ratification or adhesion would be forwarded to the Secretary-General of the League for notification to other states and for deposit in the archives of the Secretariat. If it were desired, the Council of the League might specially authorize the Secretary-General to receive such ratification or adhesion as effective, and this authorization would have a *de facto* if not a *de jure* value for the future. The notification to the signatory states would give them the necessary opportunity to object to the American reservation. It

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

seems most improbable that any state would object. In the absence of objection the reservation of the United States would be established, just as the American reservations to three of the Hague Conventions of 1907 were established. It is difficult to imagine that any challenge to American participation in a future election would be made thereafter. Indeed, it would seem that the American reservation would create a juridical situation as an interpretation of the effect to be given to the language of the protocol itself; for in expressly stating that it should "remain open for signature by the members of the League of Nations and by the states mentioned in the annex to the Covenant of the League," the protocol must have established some degree of parity between these two classes of signatories.

From the point of view of the other Powers that have ratified the protocol, this procedure could hardly be deemed objectionable. It would not set any dangerous precedent which might become embarrassing if followed by other states; Ecuador and the Hedjaz are the only other states mentioned in the annex to the Covenant which are not members of the League, and if Ecuador should seek to ratify, with a reservation that she be permitted to participate in the voting in the Assembly, the other states would probably acquiesce. Of course, the United States would make clear her willingness to negotiate an arrangement regarding her quota of the expenses. This settled, the other powers would doubtless welcome American cooperation on the terms of the reservation suggested.

If ratification with such reservations is politically possible, it is manifestly simpler than an amendment of the statute. It would require action by only one legislative body, while amendment might require action by thirty. It is, of course, important to remember that the one body in question is the Senate of the United States. But it seems impossible to devise any satisfactory course which would avoid the necessity for some action by the Senate. Even if we stopped short of taking formal action with reference to the protocol and statute, if we should merely appropriate money for our quota of the Court's expenses and pass our blessing on Judge Moore's participation in the Court—which seems the least that can be done—still the Senate would have to act. We could not succeed in avoiding a debate on the statute and protocol at some stage. Nor would merely informal action achieve the result of allowing the United States to participate in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the election, unless it were accompanied by action by the other powers. Some formal action is needed in any event.

A ratification with reservations would not commit the United States to any of the provisions of the Covenant. Article 13 of the Covenant requires members of the League "to carry out in full good faith any award," and this may be interpreted to include decisions of the Court—a committee of the second Assembly gave it this interpretation in proposing that the meaning should be made clearer by amending the Covenant. But such "sanctions" for the Court's decisions as are to be found in the Covenant are not referred to in the statute, and in adopting the latter the United States would become in no way bound by the former. It would be a simple matter for a reservation to spell this out, by expressly stating that the United States becomes in no way bound by Article 14, which is the only article of the Covenant expressly mentioning the Court, or by any other article of the Covenant.

It may be concluded, therefore, that the necessity for having a voice in the election of the judges need not preclude immediate action by the United States if we desire to share in maintaining the Permanent Court of International Justice. The conditions set by Secretary Hughes would seem to be fully met if an American representative should sign the Court protocol, with a clear indication that the United States signs not as a member of the League but as a state mentioned in the annex to the Covenant; and if the President should ratify the protocol, with the advice and consent of the Senate, with reservations (1) that the United States shall enjoy all the privileges enjoyed by any other signatory state and shall be admitted to participate in the voting in the Assembly and the Council when those bodies act, not under any provisions of the Covenant, but as the electoral bodies named in Article 4 of the statute of the Court; and (2) that the United States does not by this act become in any way a party to, or bound by, Article 14 or any other article of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Such a ratification would give the United States a full voice in the election of judges, it would avoid any commitments to the League, and it would greatly enhance the prestige and moral power of the Court for the future. One does not need to be under any illusions as to the importance of courts in the political life of the world to think that a great opportunity is now offered to America, and Secretary Hughes' statement of October 30 gives promise that it will not be neglected.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM EMPIRE TO COMMONWEALTH

By Philip Kerr

DURING the past twenty years a very marked change has taken place in the character and constitutional system of what is known as the British Empire. The old view was described in 1911 in *The Round Table*, a quarterly devoted to discussion of the political problems of the Empire, as follows:

"Forty years ago the British Empire was regarded as a failure. Contemporary judgment, conscious of the difficulties and burdens of the day and of the doleful lessons of the past, could see no future before it . . . As Seeley said, 'We had not learnt from experience wisdom, but only despair.' History, indeed, seemed to prove that human beings failed of the capacity to rise above a certain territorial nationalism. In Turgot's phrase, colonies had always been 'like ripe fruits which cling till they ripen.' Was it not the manifest destiny of the British colonies also to declare their independence so soon as they could stand alone? Gladstone, indeed, went so far as to suggest that we should anticipate the inevitable end and settle the difficulties between England and America over the Civil War by an immediate transfer to America of British territory in Canada.

"There was much the same feeling about the dependencies. India and the West Indies were England's chief possessions—an empire she had gained by no deliberate policy, but which had been forced upon her in her struggles with France and Spain, and by the restless enterprise of traders and adventurers. Her own political traditions—especially as embodied in the phrase 'no taxation without representation'—compelled her to abandon the methods of earlier empires and refrain from levying tribute from subject peoples. There was, therefore, no great enthusiasm for the dependencies. The trade with them was considerable, but it affected only a small portion of the British population, while the burdens for their defence all had to bear. . . . In fact, to use a phrase of Mr. Asquith's, the Empire 'was regarded as a regrettable necessity, to be apologized for as half blunder, half crime.'

"In the colonies themselves there was a complete indifference to the subject. People were absorbed in the task of settling and developing a virgin country, and in casting off the thraldom of a somewhat ignorant, narrow, and unsympathetic office in Downing Street, Whitehall. They had little knowledge of world problems beyond their borders, they had but little consciousness of their own, and were content to let events shape their destiny."

Finally, there was no Imperial constitutional machinery of any

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

kind. The government of the Empire was conducted from Downing Street, at the unfettered discretion of the British Government save in the then unfederated provinces or states of Canada, Australia and South Africa, which governed themselves.

Nobody would say that this was a true picture of the British Empire today. It has been so transformed that even its name has been changed. In the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1921 it is officially described as "the British Commonwealth of Nations." It is the purpose of this article to describe the nature of this transformation, and the forces which have brought it about.

I. THE DOMINIONS

In the middle of the last century the territories now known as the Dominions, namely Canada, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand, consisted of a number of provinces, mostly governing themselves, but with no machinery for conducting their common affairs save the ordinances of the British Governor-General and the colonial office, and no means at all for participating in the management of the Empire of which they formed part. As population flowed in, however, the necessity for dealing with the problems of the colonies on a national basis became apparent, and the movement for federation everywhere began to grow. It was successful first in Canada, in 1867. Australia followed suit in 1900; South Africa in 1909, after the Boer War had removed the obstacle of the two flags.

The achievement of federation, in every case the work of purely local movements, produced two effects. It involved the final elimination of the power of the British Government in the internal affairs of the colonies. The Dominions, as they later came to be termed, became, so far as their internal politics were concerned, practically independent self-governing nations, united to the rest of the Empire by sentiment and by certain legal ties symbolized by allegiance to a common crown, but by no governmental control.

The second effect was a rapid growth of national feeling, which manifested itself in protective tariffs designed to develop local industries, and a determined resistance to anything like interference or dictation from England.

In proportion, however, as the independence of the Dominions grew and the authority of Great Britain diminished, the feeling of loyalty to the Empire as a composite of free nations—inde-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pendent of one another, but united in patriotism, pride in their institutions, and for common defense—steadily strengthened. The first outward manifestation of this new spirit appeared in 1887 on the occasion of Queen Victoria's jubilee. Then the first colonial conference was called, because, as the British Government declared, of their "conviction that there is on all sides a growing desire to draw closer in every practicable way the bonds which unite the various portions of the Empire."

In summoning the conference the British Government expressly disclaimed the desire to discuss "what was known as Political Federation." They said that their chief desire, in view of the new era of international expansion symbolized by the march of Russia across Asia, the union of Germany, and the general grab for African territory, was to examine the problem of improving the common organization for defense. The colonies, however, were not impressed at that time with the necessity of contributing to the common defense. The policy of the colonial representatives was rather to promote Imperial unity by introducing a system of tariff preferences for Empire goods.

This first Colonial Conference accomplished little. Its main importance is that its deliberations show the sentiment which then existed about the Empire. It was clear that there was no dissatisfaction with the organization of the Empire, as it then was. It was England's business to run the Empire as a whole, to conduct its foreign relations, to defend it from attack, to govern the dependencies. Colonial legislatures, on the other hand, were recognized as being solely responsible for the government of their own territories, but they assumed no responsibility for defending themselves from invasion across the seas or for assisting in the defense of the Empire as a whole.

In the ensuing twenty-five years, five further conferences were held—in 1897, in 1902, in 1907, in 1909, and in 1911. The tendency throughout all these meetings is quite uniform. There is a steady refusal on the part of the Dominions to consider any form of federal or constitutional union, and an ever increasing insistence on their status as independent nations within the Empire. On the other hand, there is a steady increase in the insistence by the British Government on the importance of the problem of defense, and in the sentiment on the part of the colonies in favor of inter-Imperial commercial preferences.

In 1907, twenty years after the first Colonial Conference, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

position was crystallized in a constitutional resolution. There were in future to be regular meetings, every four years and oftener if need be, of what was to be called the Imperial Conference. The Imperial Conference, however, was to have no legislative or executive authority. It was to be a conference between governments, represented normally by prime ministers, for the discussion of "questions of common interest," whose decisions were only to be effective if endorsed by the respective parliaments.

This was the first step taken by the peoples of the Empire in evolving a rudimentary organization and in the transition from Empire to Commonwealth. Apart from this resolution, however, the Imperial Conference of 1907 did not accomplish much. The question of defense was not seriously discussed because the British Government at the time was trying to make an agreement for the limitation of armaments with Germany, and because, having just been returned to power on a Free Trade policy, it could not fall into line with the Dominion policy of Empire preference.

Two years later, however, when the announcement of the new German naval programme, which provided for the creation of a navy greater than any then in existence, showed that the peace movement had failed, a special Imperial defense conference was summoned to consider the situation. The British Government had in the past been inclined to ask the Dominions to contribute in cash towards the cost of the British navy and in men towards the Imperial army. But the larger Dominions, Canada and Australia, had made it clear that while they were perfectly willing to share in the burden their assistance must be in the form of Dominion navies and national armies, and not of contributions in money or men to an Imperial army. At the defense conference of 1909 the British Government accepted this view, and Australia agreed to maintain, in Australian waters and under her own control, an Australian fleet unit consisting of one dreadnought, three armored cruisers, destroyers, etc.; Canada undertook to keep up two smaller units, one on the Atlantic, the other on the Pacific; while New Zealand and South Africa, which could not afford separate units of their own, contributed in ships or money directly to the British navy. Each, too, undertook to take steps to increase their national forces and to train them on uniform lines, so that cooperation should be easy in case war broke out.

It was immediately recognized, however, that if the Dominions

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were thus to share in the burden of defense it was essential that they should be consulted about the foreign policy which might lead to war. Accordingly, at the Imperial Conference of 1911, two years later, foreign policy for the first time figured upon the agenda.

The Great War did not change in the least the general line of constitutional development in the Empire. It only hastened and intensified it. To the amazement of the world the Dominions threw themselves from the outset wholeheartedly into the struggle against Prussianism. Out of a scattered population of about 15,000,000 they sent no less than 700,000 men to Europe. But even so the character of the cooperation of the Dominions grew steadily more national. At first the Dominion units were brigaded with the more experienced and trained British troops, but by the end of the war the Canadian and the Australian troops had become self-contained national armies, organized and commanded exclusively by Dominion officers, though under the orders of the British Commander-in-Chief for the purposes of the war.

The same process is to be seen in the direction of the war itself. In 1917, to quote the War Cabinet report, the Prime Ministers of the Dominions together with representatives of India "were invited to London to attend a series of special meetings of the War Cabinet in order to discuss the problems of the war and the possible conditions of peace. . . . The sessions of the Cabinet thus enlarged came to be known as the Imperial War Cabinet." In 1918, the Imperial War Cabinet again convened, remained in session as the supreme directing body until the armistice, and then went to Paris in 1919 as the British Empire delegation to the Peace Conference. Throughout this period the main questions of British policy were settled at meetings in which Dominion ministers took part on equal terms and with equal responsibility with British ministers.

The process of development from a colonial to an equal status reached its climax in Paris. While Great Britain and the Dominion delegates sat together as the British Empire delegation, the Dominions insisted upon being separately represented in the Peace Conference itself. They claimed that they had done a great deal more to win the war than many of the nations participating, and they would not tolerate being excluded in their individual national capacity.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The extent to which the new concept of the Empire as a Commonwealth of free and equal nations has grown is shown by the fact that on one occasion the Prime Minister of Canada took a line in a public session at variance with the rest, and that the British ratification of the treaty of peace could only be deposited after it had been separately approved by all the Dominion Parliaments. Finally, when the Covenant of the League of Nations came to be considered, the Dominions insisted upon independent representation within it, for the same reasons that they had insisted upon separate representation in the Peace Conference. This fact was afterward used in the campaign against the League of Nations in the United States in the form of the six votes to one slogan, to the general surprise of people in England, who thought that the United States had far more real control over the votes of Cuba and Panama or some of the Central American republics than Great Britain was ever likely to have over the votes of the Dominion nations.

Since the war, the Dominions have sent delegations to the League of Nations which have acted and voted more or less independently. On the other hand, at the Washington Conference the British Empire delegation, consisting of representatives of all its parts, acted more or less as a whole.

In 1921 the Prime Ministers reassembled in London to consider the post-war situation and the policy to be pursued at the Washington Conference. The anomalies of the present constitutional position are well illustrated by the difficulty which arose over the title to be given the gathering. The official title of the conference was "The Conference of Prime Ministers and Representatives of the United Kingdom, the Dominions and India." And this is the only name by which the body which in fact determines the policy of a commonwealth containing more than a quarter of mankind is officially known!

A second question which arose centered on whether Canada should send a minister of its own to Washington. Great Britain had already agreed to this being done. But the other Dominions objected on the ground that if Canada did this they would have to follow suit, and that they did not wish to have to incur the expense of sending ministers all over the world. So far no minister has been appointed.

But the chief problem before the conference centered about the control of foreign policy. Each self-governing part of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Commonwealth is independent so far as concerns its defensive preparations and the action it should take to deal with imperial or international crises as they arise. But who is to control foreign policy? That is the important thing, for it is foreign policy which leads nations into war and international complications or keeps them out of them. Yet foreign policy is not a matter which can wait for endless deliberation and consultation. Its essence is prompt decision and prompt action. How, therefore, is the foreign policy of a commonwealth of nations scattered all over the face of the globe to be conducted and controlled?

The conclusion arrived at by the Prime Ministers in 1921 was summarized in the *Round Table* in the following terms:

"Now, the 'Conference of Prime Ministers and Representatives' is recognized as the body which formulates the policy of the Empire, especially in foreign matters; while the British Government becomes charged with the duty of carrying out that policy in the intervals between the assembling of the Conference, subject to such consultation as is possible through resident or visiting ministers or the cables and the mails. From now onwards policy is a matter for the people of the Empire, and the British Government will occupy a position somewhat similar to that of the President of the United States, whose foreign policy, to be effective, requires the consent and cooperation of the Senate—in our case, the Dominions."

Since then the only change, and it is a very great one, has been the establishment of Ireland as a Dominion with the same status in the British Commonwealth of Nations as Canada. The self-governing portion of the Commonwealth now consists of six independent nations united under a single crown, linked in a common loyalty to one another, but possessing no common governmental organ save the occasional conference already described. Whether the Commonwealth is likely to develop a more effective organism of its own, or whether it will tend to develop along the League of Nations lines, I will briefly consider in the last section of this article.

II. THE NON-SELF-GOVERNING EMPIRE

The total population of the British Empire is given in the "Statesman's Year Book for 1922" as being 440,923,000, or more than a quarter of the whole population of the world. Not more than 65,000,000 of them are Europeans in origin, and 47,000,000 of them live in the British Isles. What of the balance?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The overwhelming majority, no less than 319,000,000, live in India, leaving about 65,000,000 people in about fifty other areas scattered all over the world, from territories like Nigeria through mandated territories like Palestine, down to coaling stations like Gibraltar and miscellaneous islands like St. Helena or Fiji.

To the average American mind this whole Empire stands for "Imperialism." To some extent this is true. The British Empire has grown partly because the dominant classes in Great Britain in the past valued the prestige and power and the commercial gains that Empire seemed to bring. But there were two other causes at work which, if one studies the history and the feats of the past, will be found to have been far more decisive. One has been rivalry and struggle with other powers. The other has been the problem of what to do with backward territories after civilization has begun to affect them.

The expansion of Great Britain in India, America, Africa and the isles of the sea has been fundamentally caused by exactly the same forces that led to the elimination of France and Spain from the hinterland of the thirteen original colonies, and to the incorporation of Texas, the purchase of Alaska, the annexation of Hawaii, the inclusion of the Philippines, and the exercise of tutelage over Cuba and the Central American republics, by the United States. Probably nobody deliberately planned to annex these territories. But if it came to a question of whether Japan or the United States was going to have Hawaii, or whether Russia was going to spread over to North America, or whether some European power or the United States was going to end disorder in Central America, America had no two opinions. This same factor has been the biggest single element in the growth of the British Empire proper. It was the reluctance to allow the new world to fall under the control of Bourbon and Napoleonic France, and later of Bismarckian Germany, which was the primary cause of the expansion of the British Empire during the last 200 years.

And this same factor will continue to operate until the whole world is brought under some system of law which will define the rights of nations, give security to all, promote self-government in the backward parts and so end the rivalry and suspicion which necessarily dominate the policy and action of all powers, so long as they remain in a "state of nature" towards one another.

The second cause is hardly less potent. Few people realize the effect of the impact of civilization upon a primitive community.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It usually disorganizes it altogether. The only African or Asiatic state which has been able to absorb the methods of the West without disintegrating has been Japan. At the other extreme take the following case. Forty years ago Swaziland was an ordinary Kaffir community, ruled by a paramount chief and his advisers, and living extremely primitively but in comparative happiness, though subject to tribal wars with its neighbors. The first person who came along was the trader. He sold beads and blankets and later bicycles and gramaphones in return for gold or ivory or anything else of value. Then he brought in liquor, then firearms. The old chief developed a taste for liquor, other natives for other things. They had no experience of how to deal in Western ideas. They soon had nothing to give in exchange for what they wanted save land and mining concessions. The last stage of the story of Swaziland was that the paramount chief, having signed away every concession he could, his own and his people's, signed a concession on his death bed for "all those concessions I have not already given," in return for a final consignment of gin. By 1902 the country was in chaos.

There is only one way of dealing with people as primitive as these, and that is for a civilized government to step in and control the foreign trader and concession seeker, whether he wants to do legitimate or illegitimate business, in the interests of the backward people. Some people say: "Leave them alone." It cannot be done. Every community can run its own affairs if left entirely to itself. But primitive communities do not know how to resist the deleterious aspects of modern civilization. It is obviously impossible to erect a ring fence round Africa and allow nobody to go in or out. In the case of Swaziland, George Grey, the brother of Sir Edward Grey, was sent in. He cancelled all concessions which interfered with the legitimate life of the people, redistributed the rest on fair terms, and set up a British resident with power to see that such things did not happen again.

If we study the history of the expansion of European states or of the United States we shall find this process operating everywhere. The primary cause of the entry of the British into Egypt was the disorder which followed the misgovernment and oppression of the Khedive when he tried to get taxes to pay for loans he had borrowed abroad. The greatest menace to China's future is the money which its military leaders and ministers can borrow in return for concessions and which they spend in fighting wars

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of their own. The United States had to stay in the Philippines because it could not leave the Filipinos without any government after the Spaniards had withdrawn. And Great Britain had to stay in Mesopotamia and other German colonies for exactly the same reason.

This does not mean that foreign intervention has not often been brutally oppressive and exploiting. Some of the worst scandals of history have occurred under this plea. Nor does it mean, as I shall show, that Great Britain has always been wise in the way she has governed the politically backward peoples. But it does mean that the problem is quite different from being a mere question of "Imperialism." The problem of adjusting the relations between advanced and relatively backward communities is one of the most urgent in the world. It cannot be ignored or solved by phrasemaking. It has to be dealt with somehow or other.

A study, indeed, of the history of Great Britain will show that at almost every stage her governments have been reluctant to increase the burden of her overseas responsibilities, but have felt forced to do so by one of the two fundamental considerations I have named, the general international situation, or the necessity of doing something to protect peoples ruined by the deleterious effects of Western civilization or by the consequences of war. Further, since the great trial of Warren Hastings towards the end of the eighteenth century awakened the public conscience, the British government of its dependencies has been benevolent. The testimony of impartial foreign witnesses is practically uniform that wherever Great Britain has gone she has introduced law and order, honest justice, good government and sound finance, and that railways and telegraphs, irrigation works, sanitary services, forestry work have sprung into being and that famines and private oppression have lessened. The evidence, indeed, is overwhelming that she has governed the peoples primarily for their own interest, that she has derived no tribute from them, and that prosperity has followed her footsteps everywhere. There is practically no doubt that in all these countries the people have never before in recorded history enjoyed such uninterrupted good government, peace, and order.

That does not mean that she has not benefited also. Though she has always maintained the open door to the trade and commerce of all nations, the fact that the territory is under British rule is undoubtedly an advantage to British traders, and the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

task of government affords employment to a certain number of soldiers and administrators. Great Britain undoubtedly derives great advantages from her empire, though it also imposes upon her shoulders a burden of responsibility and taxation. None the less if Britain gains the peoples she has governed have gained also. As in every sound commercial arrangement, both parties have profited.

It is interesting to contrast the ordinary British criticism of America's attitude with the current American criticism of Britain on this subject. To the American, Britain is an international profiteer, who gets something out of every war, and he is inclined to regard his own attitude of renunciation as evidence of virtue. To the Englishman, the American renunciation is simply that of a man finding an excuse for refusing to take a hand in a difficult world job. The advice of the American, "Why don't you leave all these peoples to run their own affairs?" strikes him as having about as much to do with the problem as the action of the United States in sending a warship full of toys for the suffering children of Europe in 1914 had to do with the problem of saving democracy and freedom. Unless the civilized peoples take steps to maintain some supervision and control, many of the backward peoples have no chance of progress at all, for either predatory and reactionary powers or deleterious elements of civilization will lay them in ruins. Every informed Britisher knows this, but few Americans have yet realized that it is true. Moreover, the Englishman feels the less inclined to admit the superiority of the American attitude when he remembers that whereas Great Britain has always maintained the policy of the open door in the territory she is responsible for, on the ground that she was a trustee and not entitled to profiteer, the United States has rejected the open door and keeps the trade in her dependencies for herself, practically excluding the foreigner altogether.

III. INDIA AND SELF-GOVERNMENT

Is there nothing, then, to be said against the British Empire? I think there is, and it is a serious criticism. It is that the British have paid undue attention to administration and material progress and not enough to education and self-government. The basis of this criticism is embodied in the aphorism: Good government is no substitute for self-government. In making this criticism, however, it must be remembered that modern democracy is comparatively a recent thing. The United States did not

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

begin upon the basis of universal suffrage. At first barely one in three of its population had the vote. Democracy did not find a firm footing among the great powers of Europe until 1870, when France finally established the republic. Democracy was unknown to Asia until 1911, when China became a republic, and even in China democracy in any true sense of the word has not yet been successfully worked.

None the less though Great Britain had established law and order in India and had planted the seeds of Western ideas of self-government and liberalism, she did little or nothing to prepare to train the people in the exercise of political responsibility.

The Ripon reforms of 1880 were a step in this direction, but came to nought, partly because the British officials were prepared to take all the responsibility and the Indian representatives were content to leave it to them.

Up till the beginning of the present century, however, there was no real demand for self-government. But the leaven of Western civilization and contact with Britain was steadily working, and after the success of Japan against Russia the nationalist movement rapidly grew. For a time it was regarded as seditious. In 1908, however, a long step forward was made in the Minto-Merley reforms, which constituted elected assemblies in all the chief provinces and for India itself. But these assemblies were really consultative. The Government kept an official majority, and while they improved government they did not place any real responsibility for it upon Indians themselves.

The war, however, brought about a great change. India, like the rest of the world, was profoundly moved by the cause for which the Allied Powers were fighting and by the utterances in which that cause was expressed. It threw itself generously into the struggle and nearly 1,000,000 men were enlisted for service in some capacity or other. Inevitably, however, the demand grew loud and insistent that further and immediate steps should be taken to make India self-governing. The British Government admitted fully the justice of the claims and in August, 1920, the famous pronouncement was made that the policy of the Government was that "of increasing the association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The decision, however, to introduce responsible government into India was simple as compared with the problem of finding ways and means.

In order to understand that problem it is necessary to realize what India is. India is not a territory containing ten or twenty million people, homogeneous in race, language or culture. It is tantamount to a continent. It contains almost as many people as Europe, and as many races, languages and religions. The 1921 census showed a total population of 319,156,396 people, of whom 71,000,000 lived in native states, mostly governed by hereditary autocratic princes. There were eleven main languages, with more than 10,000,000 speaking each, twelve languages spoken by between 1,000,000 and 10,000,000 people and ten lesser dialects. There are two main religions, the Hindu religion with 217,580,000 adherents and the Mohammedan with 66,640,000, while there are also 10,721,000 Buddhists, 3,870,000 Christians, 3,010,000 Sikhs, 1,248,000 Jains, and 10,000,000 animists, or primitives. There was the all pervading factor of caste, far more rigid even than the social hierarchies of Europe.

Democracy, beyond the limits of the village, has never existed in historic India. It has always been autocratically governed. There was no class with political training, no electorates, and even the vernacular press had only just sprung into being. How was self-government to be introduced into this vast area? Many people are now wondering whether it will be possible for the United States to work efficiently a federal system swelled to include much more than 110,000,000 people. How, then, was democracy to be introduced in a territory containing three times as many people, none of whom had any traditions or any experience of self-government, with no common language and with threatening military neighbors?

The solution which was adopted, and which was afterwards embodied in the Montague-Chelmsford reforms, was known as Dyarchy. It was recognized that the transference of responsibility for government in India must be gradual. If chaos was to be avoided a class of Indians must grow up with practical experience of government and of the working of democratic institutions. It was necessary, too, for electorates to develop of sufficient size and education and responsibility to control intelligently their representatives. Nothing but responsibility for the effects of their own actions would convert either elec-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

torates or representatives from mere critics into constructively minded administrators. Yet, obviously, full responsibility for so great an organism could not be suddenly transferred to inexperienced hands.

Under the plan of Dyarchy, the functions of government are divided into two categories, one of which is entrusted to the control of India Ministers, responsible to elected legislatures. Over this branch of administration Indian control and responsibility is complete. The control over the other category is retained in the hands of the Governor-General or Governor, as the case might be, subject only to the criticism of the legislatures.

Under the Montague-Chelmsford reforms two all-India bodies are created—the India Council of State containing sixty members, twenty of whom are official, and the Indian Legislative assembly containing one hundred and forty-four members, of whom twenty-six are official. Finally, as an essential part of the scheme it is provided that a Royal Commission should go to India every ten years to examine into the working of the Act and advise, on the basis of the practical success or failure of the Indian legislatures in working the powers entrusted to them, whether those powers should be increased or not.

That is the system which has been working for the last two years in that part of India governed by the British. It has been attacked from two sides. It has been attacked by reactionaries on the ground that it is bound to lead to chaos, that all the foundational work accomplished in the last century will be thrown away, because there is no sufficient number of Indians competent to work the system. It has been attacked from the other side by Mahatma Gandhi and the non-cooperationists, either on the ground that India is quite capable of taking over the whole work of government immediately, or on the ground that they want to break down the whole influence of Western civilization and that they object to the reformed system nearly as much as to the old system because it involves Westernization.

Whether India should follow in the path of Western civilization or strike out a line of her own is for the Indian people to decide. But they can do this only when they have learnt how to govern themselves. India will not gain peace or the ideal age by destroying government, but by creating for herself a better government. Fortunately, perhaps, for mankind, the blind worship of the word Democracy and its mechanism is passing

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

away. People everywhere are coming to see that the mere existence of the vote and the mere erection of democratic institutions is not self-government. The mere machinery of democracy, indeed, may lead to a more subtle and paralyzing form of autocracy and corruption than absolutism itself. True democracy only exists where there is a sufficient degree of self-control and a sufficiently high moral standard among the people to enable it to choose capable leaders and wise policies. India under the new system has the opportunity to prove and make good her capacity to govern herself.

IV. THE FUTURE

The foregoing pages will have made clear the immense transformation which has come over the British Empire in recent years. On the one hand the self-governing Dominions are now separate nations, completely independent within the Commonwealth and participating on equal terms in the direction of British policy so far as geography and circumstances permit. On the other hand Great Britain is now committed to the development of self-government in all other parts of the Empire, as rapidly as the inhabitants can take over responsible control. The process which has been begun in India is being extended in various ways to Egypt, Palestine and Malta, and its gradual development everywhere is inevitable.

They will have shown, also, that with all its defects and mistakes the modern British Commonwealth does serve a great purpose in the world. It maintains some kind of constitution and law among a quarter of the population of the earth, comprising within itself peoples of every race and color and degree of civilization, and it keeps the peace between them while promoting the growth of self-government everywhere.

What of the future? In my judgment the problems of the British Commonwealth are becoming merged in the world problem. It is no longer a question of maintaining law and order and promoting orderly self-government over sections of the earth's surface, but over the earth as a whole. Obviously there is going to be no peace or prosperity for mankind so long as it remains divided into fifty or sixty independent states, brought hourly into closer contact with one another, yet with no real machinery for adjusting their relations save diplomacy and war. Equally obviously there is going to be no steady progress in civilization or

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

self-government among the more backward peoples until some kind of international system is created which will put an end to the diplomatic struggles incident to the attempt of every nation to make itself secure, and which will hold in check, under a mandatory or other régime, those deleterious forces of civilization already described.

The real problem today is that of world government. Every month that passes will bring home to people more and more clearly that all political problems—whether of preventing war, of establishing stable conditions for trade and commerce, of ending unemployment and bettering social and economic conditions, of improving constitutional organization—all ultimately come back to the problem of ending international lawlessness upon the earth and establishing some method by which world problems can be discussed and settled by constitutional means rather than by force or the threat to use force.

There is no doubt that the combination known as the British Commonwealth is doing much to maintain peace, develop freedom and promote prosperity in the world. Its directing nations manifestly cannot carry a greater burden than they do today. If peace and freedom and prosperity are to be made universal over the earth, the United States and other powers must take their share of the burden and cooperate in some such scheme as the League of Nations. The alternatives before us, indeed, are obvious—on the one side chaos ending in another world war, on the other side the work and self-sacrifice necessary to substitute law for force throughout the world. What part is the United States going to play? Is she going to take a hand in the greatest enterprise for human betterment that has ever been presented to a people, or is she going to shatter that hope and reap the rewards that inevitably befall those who think only of themselves?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

GERMANY SINCE THE WAR

By Karl Kautsky

I

WHEN the armistice between the Allied Powers and Germany went into effect in November, 1918, the whole world drew a breath of relief. The slaughter, the suspension of intercourse between nations, was at an end; peace was bound to come, and with it a resuscitation of the afflicted peoples. To imagine that the peace treaties would without further ado prove guarantees of everlasting peace would have been a Utopian dream. But it was reasonable to expect that the conclusion of peace in 1919 would bring about a pacific state of affairs which would last at least as long as that effected by the Congress of Vienna in 1814 and 1815, to which, until 1853, no European war succeeded. Instead, however, we find an uninterrupted, nay, in many cases a constantly increasing unrest—war in the east, a series of political and economic crises in the west. Europe is unable to free herself from the fear of new disruptions which threaten to involve in ruin the entire civilized world.

Why did this latest World War come to a close so different from that which terminated the Napoleonic wars? We are able to look back upon the century since the Napoleonic wars as one of most brilliant economic growth, of fabulous progress in science and technology, of uninterrupted advance in democracy. Were not the conquerors of 1815 narrow-minded and reactionary? Were not those of 1918, on the contrary, progressive and enlightened? Certainly. But for the very reason that narrow, absolutist governments were made possible by the political and economic conditions of a hundred years ago, the problems of such governments, whenever they came to make peace, were of an extremely simple nature. The peoples had no recourse save passively to accept the dictates of their governments. And, except in rare instances, they were still economically dependent one on another. Nowadays all the peoples of Europe are inspired with an intense passion for self-determination, and even the peoples of the Orient are today harder to hold in leash than were those of the continent of Europe a century ago. At the same time international intercourse has so increased that, collectively, nations are living in close economic community. They are

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not always aware of this solidarity, and it is often interrupted by the antagonisms of competition or of monopolization. Yet every major violation of this solidarity not only injures those against whom it is directed, but in the end avenges itself even on its authors, no matter how powerful they may be.

The problems attending the laying of a foundation for world peace were in 1919, therefore, far more complicated than had been those facing the Congress of Vienna. They were such as could be solved only by the widest application of democratic principles and by the calmest consideration of economic questions, scrutinized in the light of all their consequences. But, as a matter of fact, the peace terms were evolved by methods and on principles suggestive of the era of absolutism and commercialism rather than those of an era of democracy and international intercourse.

In many respects the authors of the Versailles peace terms proved even less advanced than had been the statesmen at the Congress of Vienna. The latter had made a clear distinction between Napoleon and the French people. It was against Napoleon alone that they had waged war, not against his nation. Napoleon they deposed and banished, but to France they left the same frontiers she had had in 1792, and they imposed no war indemnity upon her. Even after Napoleon had returned from Elba and, to the great exultation of part of the French people, had recommenced the war, the peace conditions offered to France after he had succumbed a second time were only slightly more harsh. France had to cede a few communities and to pay a small war indemnity of seven hundred million francs—far less than the sum which the new France tossed to her nobles on their return from banishment by way of indemnity for the confiscation of their estates by the Revolution. French patriotism was so little aggrieved by the readjustment of the French frontiers in 1815 that even the Treaty of Versailles failed to extend them in 1919. Nor was this peace one-sidedly dictated to the French by the victors. At the Congress of Vienna, where the peace was negotiated and where its conditions were determined, France herself had a seat and a voice, on a footing of national equality; and she was, as an equal, abundantly able to defend her interests, thanks to the superior diplomacy of her representative, Talleyrand.

There were good reasons for this concession. The reactionary monarchs of 1814 were well able to distinguish between the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

government and the people. They had not waged war against the French nation, but against Napoleon. It was he whom they had wished to render powerless. But they realized very plainly that to attain their ends it was not only necessary to conquer him by the power of their armies, but also to see that the new government erected in France in opposition to him should win the favor of the country generally. It was possible to accomplish this only if the new government were successful in efficiently defending the interests of France against her conquerors.

But the Allies of 1918 were far from giving weight to these considerations of the Allies of 1814. It is true that Par. 227 of the Treaty of Versailles indicts "William II of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties." But in Par. 231 William II is no longer named as responsible for the war; it is Germany.

Now one may estimate as highly as one likes William's responsibility for the war; I myself do not consider it to have been small. But it was not he who signed the treaty of peace—it was the government of the German Republic. And the latter certainly bore not the least responsibility for the war. Moreover, in 1918 Germany had repudiated her war-guilty emperor far more decisively than France did her Napoleon in 1814. The German people had risen in irresistible revolt against William. France, on the other hand, left it to the Allies to remove Napoleon from his throne.

The great bulk of the German population had turned from the Emperor as from the author of the war who was therefore the author of all its misery. When, however, the republic came to be charged with as full a responsibility for the war as was that attributed to the emperor, when it was deprived of power to guard the people's interests against the conqueror, then the idea of the empire again began gradually to gain ground. If today Germany is confronted with the possibility of a monarchist *coup d'etat*, if she faces the threat of civil war, it is the fault of the Peace of Versailles, which is compelling the republic to do penance for the sins of the emperor. The monarchs of the Holy Alliance of 1814 understood better how to protect the interests of the Bourbons against Napoleon in France than did the democracies which took the field against the military monarchy of Germany in 1918 know how to guard those of the democratic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

republic against Kaiserism. Despite their intentions, they have, by the Treaty of Versailles, worked "pour le roi de Prusse."

Furthermore, by their refusal to discuss the terms of peace with the conquered they have injured themselves in yet another way. The economic and political conditions of a modern state are so complicated that no contemporary statesman, no matter how great his genius, is capable of foreseeing the consequences of every legislative proposal, even in his own country. Victors as well as vanquished have suffered severely as a result of numerous requirements of the peace treaties which were either incapable of fulfillment or which brought about economic confusion for them as well as for us. It is not by chance that simultaneously a cry is being sounded in Russia for the revision of the Communist system of administration and in the countries of the victors for the revision of the peace treaties. Both were evolved simultaneously and by the same methods, methods which are incompatible with the conditions and the necessities of modern existence. Nevertheless, let it not be denied that, just as in the Soviet administrative system, so in the peace treaties there are a number of excellent requirements. But these treaties were unable to do justice to their task of creating a permanent state of peace because their authors did not take counsel with the representatives of the peoples affected and because they did not consistently follow the course of modern social development.

II

It was a good thing that Germany was compelled to disarm by land and by sea. Unfortunately, the act was not followed by consequences correspondingly good. It was said before the war that German armament was forcing all the nations to increase their fleets and armies. But this incitement to the extension of armaments has now disappeared. France might reduce her army, thereby remedying her finances. What she is doing in this respect, however, is altogether insufficient. Poland, also, feels obliged to maintain in service a great and extravagant army at the expense of her economic welfare. This is not exactly the way to strengthen the pacifist idea in Germany and to make German disarmament lasting. The whole business is nothing but an imitation of the disarming of Prussia after Jena by a Bonapartism bristling with weapons—an act by which the peace of the world was in no way assured. Disarmament can only become a lasting

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

institution, a source of economic prosperity and an instrument of peace, when it is general, not one-sided. When it is only an individual affair it does nothing but excite the predatory and belligerent passions of the strong.

While disarming the vanquished, the peace treaties also brought about numerous alterations of frontiers, among them several of an excellent character which represent a permanent advance. Such are the breaking-up of moribund Austria, the restoration of Poland, the return of Northern Schleswig to Denmark and the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France.

The violent severance of the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine from France, to which they remained devotedly attached, was the original sin with which the new German Empire entered upon its existence in 1871. Therewith commenced the dislike of the democracies of the world for the German Empire; and thereby was the French Republic driven into the arms of the Russian Czar. Thus was evolved the concatenation of circumstances which led to the World War of 1914 and to the collapse of the Hohenzollern dynasty, and for which the German Republic is now doing such sore penance.

But the Peace of Versailles set about cutting Germany to pieces. The Saar Basin, with 600,000 inhabitants, was separated from Germany for fifteen years, its purely German population being robbed of their civic rights for this period and subjected to an alien rule which owes them not the least responsibility. Nominally the government of the Saar Basin is appointed by the League of Nations. Actually it governs in the interest of France. Matters were not improved by the decision that the population should, after the lapse of fifteen years, be polled on the question of whether or not they would prefer union with France. This decision merely constitutes an incitement to the French-controlled administration to torment as much as possible inhabitants of pro-German proclivities, in order either to intimidate them or to drive them out, thus establishing a population in agreement with the views of France.

Furthermore, as a guarantee for the performance of the terms of the peace treaty, there is the occupation by the victors' troops of the German territory west of the Rhine, with its six and a half million inhabitants. This comes near to being government of those regions by a military dictatorship. This condition of affairs is to last for fifteen years. But it may be extended by the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

conquerors even beyond that period, if they should be of the opinion that Germany had not given them sufficient guarantees against unprovoked attack. This authorizes an interminable stay of foreign troops in the occupied territory. But besides this, the treaty of peace gives the victors the right, if they believe themselves able to establish a "deliberate non-fulfillment" of the treaty by Germany, to take all such measures "as the respective governments may determine to be necessary in the circumstances." This clause is being construed, by France at least, in a manner which delivers Germany wholly over to the option of the conquerors. Indeed, French troops have already occupied districts eastward of the Rhine, near Düsseldorf and Frankfurt.

No less provocative are the frontiers laid down in the east. The authors of the peace treaty attempted to replace the Austrian state with a series of nationalistic states. That was a great step in advance. The object was not easy to achieve, for in the east the various nationalist groups were not definitely separated territorially, but were much intermingled. It was inevitable that each of the Succession States carved from the body of the old Austria-Hungary should contain not only its dominating race but also fragmentary groups of other nationalities. But, except in the cases of German-Austria and of Hungary, the establishment of the frontiers of these new states was carried far beyond the limits indicated by the circumstances. Each of the new states sought to embrace not only the entire body of the nationality which gave it its name, but also, for reasons of strategy or from a desire for important traffic routes or rich districts, to expand its borders as much further as was possible. Hence, with the aforementioned exceptions of German-Austria and Hungary, every one of the Succession States has become a new little Austria.

The oppression of the Germanic people by the peace treaties reached its climax in the determination to forbid Austria from attaching herself to Germany. Until 1866 Austria had belonged to the German confederation. The Germans of Austria had never ceased to look upon themselves as Germans. Only the antagonism between the Hohenzollern and Hapsburg dynasties had excluded them from the German Empire. These dynasties were overthrown by the victory of the Entente, which had taken the field for the liberation of subjugated peoples; and now it celebrated its victory by enslaving and dismembering the German nation, already given over to ruin by the Hohenzollerns and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hapsburgers, to an even greater degree than had been done by those guilt-burdened dynasties.

The victors did not perceive that by acting in this manner they were merely continuing the work of one of the vanquished. It was Bismarck who in 1866 threw the German-Austrians out of the German Confederation in order to secure the supremacy of Prussia in truncated Germany. The preponderance of Prussia in Germany will come to an end just as soon as the union of the latter with German-Austria is accomplished.

III

I have already referred to the fact that in 1814 the Allies refrained from imposing any war indemnity upon vanquished France. But even though the principal intention of the victorious monarchs may have been to give the new French government a good standing in the opinion of its people, their moderation also proved economically advantageous to the whole world. If that policy had not been followed Europe would never have calmed down and recovered so quickly after the downfall of Napoleon, nor, without it, would peace have endured four decades. It is true that the return of Napoleon from Elba led to the imposition upon France, after his overthrow, of a charge for war costs, but it was inconsiderable—700 million francs.

It was a long time before large war indemnities again made their appearance. The terms of the Peace of Paris, which terminated the Crimean War in 1856, imposed upon Russia no payment of indemnity. Nor did the vanquished Austria have to pay any war compensation in 1859; and in 1866 she had to pay only thirty million gulden to Prussia while she received thirty-five millions from Italy in part payment for the cession of Venice.

Hence the astonishment was all the greater when that same Bismarck who in 1866 had shown himself in such a moderate light, broke four years later with all the traditions of the past few decades in his dealings with vanquished France and demanded five billion francs as a war indemnity. To be sure, France caused even greater astonishment by producing this sum through loans so quickly that within two years she was able to pay her conquerors and rid French territory of foreign troops. From that time until the World War Russia alone of all the European powers was engaged in great conflicts. In 1877–1878, she defeated Turkey and at the Congress of Berlin imposed upon her a war

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

indemnity of three hundred million rubles. An even greater war, that between Russia and Japan, came to an end in 1905, the quarrel being settled through the mediation of America, who saved Russia from the payment of any indemnity. A few years before, in 1898, the United States had conducted a victorious war against Spain. By the treaty of peace the victors not only dispensed with the payment of any damages or war indemnity, but even paid the vanquished twenty million dollars as compensation for the cession of the Philippines.

In the face of such precedents the procedure of the conquerors at the conclusion of peace in 1919 could not but seem astonishing. During the whole century following the Napoleonic wars there had been concluded only *one* peace by the terms of which a huge war indemnity had been imposed. The victor—Germany—had not only suffered therefor the stern condemnation of the vanquished—France—but also that of the greater part of the civilized world. And yet, what were the four billion marks demanded by Bismarck in 1871 compared to the reparation claims of the Entente half a century later?

IV

On the present occasion the demand for an indemnity was nevertheless quite comprehensible. For four long years France and Belgium had been forced to submit to a horrible invasion which, especially in the north of France, resulted in widespread devastation. England had suffered severely from the new weapons, the airplane and the submarine. Were they finally to be victorious in the bloody conflict, only to bear alone the damages which had been sustained? Germany not only expected but was also willing, after her military collapse, to pay an enormous war indemnity out of which the victors would be able to make good a large portion of their damage. Had negotiations with the German government been opened, and on the basis of these negotiations had there been fixed a sum of such size that Germany would have been able to pay it without overstepping the limits of her capacity—Germany herself figured this sum in 1921 at fifty billions of gold marks—this amount might long ago have been raised through international loans. Northern France would have been restored, Germany would have been freed from foreign troops and foreign control, world commerce would have been again in full swing and general prosperity restored. Un-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fortunately, the victors were unable to adopt this simple, far-sighted procedure.

They wanted no payments made on the basis of military law, but an indemnification on that of higher morality; the Germans were to pay not because they had been conquered, but because they were wicked rascals, criminals who had brought on the war.

I have already pointed out the injustice of holding a people responsible for the deeds of a government which it has driven out. Subsequent governments are undoubtedly legally bound by the obligations with other lands entered into by their predecessors; but they are not morally responsible for the acts of those predecessors. Should such a responsibility be admitted, however, the Germans and the Hungarians should not alone be held responsible. There were Polish members, too, in the Austrian government which declared war on Serbia, and a large portion of the Polish population greeted with joy a war against Russia. It was only after the outbreak of the Russian Revolution that they turned to the Entente. If the Germans are to be held responsible for the war and all its devastation, then the same treatment should be accorded the Poles. But the latter, instead of being punished by the victors, have been rewarded.

However, if the republic was supposed to be responsible for the misery brought about by the empire, it should have sufficed for the victors to have announced this as their conviction. They could, furthermore, have called to witness the fact that the decisive declarations of war were made by Germany and have coupled with this the invasion of Belgium. But that was not enough for the authors of the Treaty of Versailles. They demanded that the representatives of Germany should themselves recognize her responsibility—even her sole responsibility—for the war. Without this confession there was not to be any peace, the war was to continue—no longer against the armies of the Central Powers, for these had been dissolved, but against starving children, women, old men, whose every avenue of sustenance had been cut off by the victors.

Nevertheless, the German signature to a confession of guilt was exacted. And today many statesmen even dare to proclaim this signature as the evidence of German guilt and as a legal title to complete indemnification by Germany for all damages.

The reparation charges which were imposed upon Germany were divided into two groups. On one side they were definite

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and exact. They consisted of the delivery of the most widely diverse materials, including the transfer of the entire German fleet to the victors. The handing over of the war fleet was not a bad thing. It relieved Germany of a heavy load and rescued her from the false position into which she had been brought by her naval armaments, which, without purpose and without the possibility of success, had called forth the enmity of England and the mistrust of America. But the surrender of the merchant fleet was another matter. Germany had to deliver nearly five million tons of shipping, gross register. That was a hard blow to German commerce. Like blows to German industry were the loss of the Saar coal district, together with a great portion of the Upper Silesian coal district, and the annual loss of the great quantities of coal—in round figures about forty million tons a year—which Germany had to deliver to Belgium, France and Italy. Along with all this countless deliveries of chemical products, live-stock, etc., were required.

In addition there must be figured the expenses, annually renewed, of maintaining the conquerors' troops in the occupied territory. Up to the present they have already cost four billions of gold marks, nearly as much as the entire war indemnity which France had to pay in 1871. The occupation is to last another quarter of a century. How many billions are in this way going to be needlessly wasted in the name of reparations, to which not even a penny of them is applied?

All these requirements serve the purpose of restoring the devastated regions and repairing the damages of the war far less than they serve that of creating, year in, year out, ever-renewed sources of friction with Germany.

V

Worst of all, however, are those reparation charges which have to be paid straight-out in cash, for by the treaty of peace their amount is in no way definitely stipulated. To determine them there was appointed a Commission on which Germany is not represented, which is not even required to negotiate with the German Government, which consults *in camera*, and which "shall not be bound by any particular code or rules of law or by any particular rule of evidence or of procedure, but shall be guided by justice, equity and good faith." This is unrestricted dictatorship, after the kind of the Bolsheviks, and it is extended

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

over a very wide territory. "The Commission shall in general have wide latitude as to the control of the present treaty and the handling of the whole reparation problem." Unbelievable sums were spoken of as to be raised in the shape of reparations by the Commission. Mention was made of more than three hundred billions—about as much as the national wealth of Germany before the war. This wealth, too, has been considerably reduced since by the demands of the war, by the loss of territory and by the deliveries of raw materials. Very conservative estimates put this diminution at one-third of the whole.

At the Paris Conference in January, 1921, the total amount of reparations to be paid in money to the Allied governments was fixed at 226 billion gold marks. This was to be paid in full within forty-two years, in annual installments which, commencing with one of two billions in 1921, were to be made at the rate of six billions a year from 1932 to 1963. In addition to this there was to be paid twelve per cent of the value of German exports over a period of forty-two years, which might amount in all to between 40 and 60 billions. Altogether, nearly 300 billions. Messrs. Briand, Lloyd George, and the others who formulated this marvelous demand, seemed to believe it possible that Germany could keep on paying, one year after another, about twice the sum which France, in 1871, had to pay but once, and which she was then enabled to get together merely in the form of a loan on which she had only to pay the annual interest.

And this mad state of affairs was to last for over forty years! For that length of time Germany and the world were not to be allowed to quiet down!

Even the Reparations Commission itself was startled at such madness. A few months later it set the sum of Germany's reparation obligations at one hundred and thirty-two billions, less than half of what the leaders of the Entente had shortly before demanded. Nothing can more clearly indicate the frivolity with which such demands were conceived—a frivolity fully equal to that with which the German Government set going a World War in 1914. It is also a very plain indication of the rationality and precision of a treaty which left such enormous sums hanging absolutely in the air.

The authors of the Treaty of Versailles can not say that they wandered on to the wrong road unwarned. Keynes early pointed out its perils with admirable clearness, advising that there be

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fixed a definite total for the war indemnities which would not overtax the power of Germany. Today this demand is being reechoed everywhere. In the meanwhile, however, Germany's affairs have become so thoroughly entangled that their reclamation is much more difficult. They could nevertheless be improved in time to prevent catastrophe in Europe if the reparations demands were to be so modified that German credit could be reestablished in the money markets of the world. That Germany has no such credit at the present moment is the most striking proof of the fact that in the opinion of the world's bankers the reparations demands as at present conceived surpass Germany's capacity to pay.

A moratorium, whatever relief it might have afforded earlier, would no longer suffice today.

It seems to be imagined that Germany's failure to command credit is due to her financial disorganization, that she should first rectify her budget deficiency by higher taxation, and that then she would be able to get credits. As a matter of fact, the case is just the other way around. Germany's financial disability is principally occasioned by the rapid and persistent fall of exchange, a result of the banknote inflation. But the latter is the consequence not only of the deficit in the budget, but also of the adverse balance of international payments.

This last is being enormously increased by the reparation demands. Yet even disregarding the reparations, the German payments balance is for the moment on the wrong side of the book. Germany is an industrial nation, producing an insufficient amount of food supplies and raw materials. Such nations, as a rule, have a balance of trade against them; England has, Germany had even before the war. The war wiped out Germany's reserve stocks of food and raw materials, and peace deprived Germany of a number of districts producing such supplies and materials. The result is that today Germany's need for foreign raw materials and food stuffs is greater than ever, far greater than her industrial exports. Germany's special trade in 1920 consisted of imports to the total value of 99 billions of paper marks and exports to the value of 69 billions. The imports of raw materials and food stuffs amounted to 72 billion marks, the exports of industrial products only to 52 billions. The balance of trade deficit which in the last years before the war amounted annually to a round two billions (in gold marks) was in those days

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

covered by the receipts of the mercantile marine on the one hand and on the other by the interest payments on German capital investments abroad, the proceeds from which flowed back to Germany. The war, with its consequences, destroyed both these means of compensating for the deficit of the balance of trade, at the same time forcing German capitalists to seek credit abroad or to sell their holdings to foreigners. Thus the flow of interest is headed away from Germany. All this has combined to make the deficit of Germany's payments balance even larger than that of her balance of trade. The only way of compensating for this deficit remains, for the moment, that easy but universally destructive process, note inflation.

The foes of Germany are fond of asserting that she is less heavily loaded with taxation than are the victorious countries. This assertion is contested by the German Government. In January, 1922, Dr. Wirth, Chancellor of the German Republic, presented to the Reparations Commission a memorial in which, among other matters, it was reckoned that in Germany roughly thirty per cent of the popular income was being paid in taxes, while in France the ratio was but fifteen per cent. According to the proposal of the German national budget, appearing in the recently published "Statistical Year-Book of the German Reich," out of an estimate of expenditures totaling 352 billion marks not less than 226 billions—sixty-four per cent—were designated as expenditures in connection with the execution of the peace treaty. Only thirty-six per cent were to be used for German purposes.

That a budget of this sort should constantly be broken down by the force of circumstances is evident, nor is it any less plain that the falling rate of exchange should make it impossible to calculate with certainty in advance either in the commercial or the political field. A tax levy may appear enormously high at the moment of its establishment and by the time of its collection its money value may have shrunk materially. When its proceeds are applied to the compensation of expenditures, the value of the tax may be at a minimum.

It is quite hopeless to expect to rehabilitate Germany's finances and to put an end to money inflation until Germany is granted credits that will permit her for a time to meet her obligations without issuing further notes. Then such issuance can be forbidden; then it will be possible to construct a stable and provi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dent system of taxation; then the taxes can be so ordered that they will suffice to cover expenditures—unless reparations make further senseless demands. And then we should be given time to draw our breath and an opportunity of attaining a surplus of exports, which, together with the income from a growing mercantile marine and from capitalistic accumulations, might serve to pay interest and amortization charges on the reparations debt.

As to getting a loan that would save us, there are various means of accomplishing that end. This is not the place for me to discuss them. I can only emphasize here once more that such a loan is an urgent necessity, and that very soon.

One should not be led astray by misleading tales of comfort and swollen luxury discovered by foreign observers in Germany. Moscow, also, has similar pictures to offer. But no one would venture to assert for that reason that the Russian people were living in comfort.

German conditions so far are naturally not as bad as those of Soviet Russia. But each approximation to the latter must here in Germany have a far more disintegrating effect than in Russia, because there the agricultural element is preponderant and many industrial laborers can become simple peasants. That way out is closed to the mass of German workmen. Even emigration is today open to but few of them. If their industrial labor fails them, if their products become incapable of purchasing food from abroad, there will be a terrible mortality.

There are, of course, capitalists in Germany who have been interested in the fall of the rate of exchange because they believed that it would make German industry capable of more effective competition. Such a belief is based on the fact that wages rise more slowly than the value of money declines, and that in this way the German working classes are constantly becoming more miserable. But now even these shortsighted capitalists are beginning to groan over the decline of exchange value, for it constantly is increasing their difficulty in obtaining foreign raw materials and foreign credits.

The only ones who still have a personal interest in the decline of the exchange and in inflation are the speculators, those vultures who always foregather wherever a people is dying. They make their profits from the uncertainty of circumstances, they become rich not by any productive activity but through dealings that are the counterpart of gambling. And, gambler-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

like, they never think of accumulating their winnings, but squander them in the most frivolous and prodigal fashion.

Such are the elements that give rise to the appearance of well-being and of luxury in Germany. That the consumption of champagne within the customs jurisdiction of Germany has not decreased is to be laid at their door. In 1913 this consumption reached a total of twelve and a half million bottles; in 1920 (I have at hand no later figures) ten and one-tenth million. The per capita consumption, therefore, of the population since the war is practically the same as in the days that preceded it. It might be fair to investigate to what degree exchange-favored foreigners and officers of the armies of occupation are concerned in this consumption. But in any case, the figures relating to the consumption of champagne testify to a notable looseness of conduct among certain higher elements of the population. The statistics tell quite a different story, however, when we look into the use of luxuries by the lower classes. The consumption of beer within the German excise jurisdiction declined from 69 million hectoliters in the year 1913 to 23 million in the year 1920.

The intellectual workers are hit even harder than are the manual laborers by the results of the fall in exchange. Everywhere, whenever there is a rise in prices, it becomes plain that many of the actual laborers, whose activities cannot for a moment be dispensed with, are much better able to protect themselves against the consequences of the rise than are the intellectual workers, without whose labor the world can, in case of need, get along for a while. But nowhere, except perhaps still in Austria, is the privation of scholars and artists so distressingly manifest as in Germany. Many of them are literally starving. And they are starving not only physically; they are finding it more and more impossible to satisfy their intellectual hunger, to purchase books, instruments and other scientific means of support.

In this wise Germany is steadily becoming more and more impovished by the fall in the exchange value of her currency. She is losing not only in material values, but also in her physical ability to work and in the field of scientific qualifications.

Nearly a hundred years ago Charles Dickens showed, with masterly delineation, how imprisonment for debt deprives the debtor of every capacity for and enjoyment in labor and demoralizes him to the utmost, without the slightest advantage to the creditor and to the disadvantage of society as a whole.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The German nation is now undergoing imprisonment for debt. It is wasting away and is more and more losing in the process the capacity to make its labors pay its debts.

VI

When the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles became known in Germany we were all horrified. The German people had been far from unanimous in their attitude toward the war. Those of us who judged the war to have been brought about by the German Government, either by design or through incompetence, were not, even from the beginning, merely an isolated portion of the population, and the longer the war continued the larger became the number of those who opposed its continuation and who demanded of the German Government that it express its readiness to enter into a peace of understanding. But all of us, even the most determined denouncers of Germany's military policy, were fully agreed that the Versailles Treaty was terrific and impracticable, and that, if mention were to be made of moral guilt, the criminal war-responsibility of Germany was more or less matched by the criminal peace-responsibility of the authors of the treaty provisions. We held it to be our duty to criticize this peace-guilt as sharply as we had criticized that war-guilt.

When the German people learned the conditions of peace in May, 1919, they were completely united for the first time since the outbreak of the war. They condemned them with a single voice. But a new disagreement arose as to whether or not, despite all condemnation, the treaty should be signed.

We who demanded that it be signed were at first very few in number. But as the decisive moment approached the majority came over to us. No one, however, demanded that it be signed because he deemed it tolerable or practicable; the reason of everyone who made the demand was merely that there was nothing else to do. After the evidence we had received from the victors, it seemed to us that there was no possibility that a refusal would influence them to reconsideration and to negotiation. Refusal would have been taken as a defiant denial of any sort of reparation; it would have roused the victors to unmeasured fury, to deeds of violence which would have imparted to Germany's desperate situation an even more dreadful aspect and which would not have saved us in the end from having to sign under even more unfavorable circumstances.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But although nobody in Germany who advocated the signing of the treaty regarded its complete execution as possible, that must not be taken to mean that the treaty was signed with a *reservatio mentalis*, with the intention of not carrying it out. It was signed with the firm determination to fulfill all of its obligations as far as should prove possible. A revision was considered inevitable, but this was not expected as the result of passive resistance. By that our opponents would only be irritated and made still more implacable. The revision was hoped for as the result of a change of mind on the part of the conquerors. But this change of mind was to be expected only in the event that the most loyal fulfillment of the terms of the treaty was contemplated. Despite some opposition here and there, manifested among a few of the organs of the government and a few groups of the population, that is what occurred. In reality the policy of fulfilling the treaty is much more generally recognized as necessary than the party ratios in parliament would seem to indicate. It met with decisive opposition only from the Communists, who hoped that the repudiation of the treaty would be a cause of renewed chaos in Germany,—from the Pan-Germans, principally former officers,—from the intellectuals,—and from déclassés of all sorts. Among the productive elements, only a portion of the agricultural population imagined that the German Government could act like that of Angora. It is worthy of remark that the districts from which the strongest opposition to the policy of fulfillment emanates are the most backward agrarian ones of Germany, such as Southern Bavaria and East Prussia.

The governments committed to the policy of fulfillment have been not only weak, they have also been responsible for many blunders, and have thus interfered with their own objectives: the cooling of the war hatred against Germany and the growth of a realization that under present conditions of international intercourse the economic collapse of any great civilized nation, even of Germany, would create uncertainties all over the world.

This policy of fulfillment has not yet accomplished its aim of stabilizing conditions in Germany. But during the past year there has been unmistakably a softening of the previous attitude of Germany's late opponents. They have begun to abandon the Bolshevistic method of dictation and to adopt the democratic one of negotiation between parties equally entitled to justice. For all that, the process of modification is going on all too slowly

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and too inadequately, while the ruin which the peace terms brought in their train advances swiftly. It is not always enough to do the right thing; it must be done at the right time. The words "too late" have played a fateful role in every great historical catastrophe.

VII

For all this holding off and hanging back and postponing of the inevitable the French Government is principally to blame.

It is a well known fact, and one that needs no further elaboration, that it is the French Government which most bitterly opposes every suggestion of discussion or of alleviation of the reparation terms and which is first in the field to threaten fresh violence, such as for instance the occupation of the Ruhr district.

Since the German population is growing while that of France scarcely increases at all, the German nation will soon be twice as numerous as the French. For France that is a very alarming outlook. And it goes far toward explaining her present policy.

There is no doubt that a rehabilitated Germany could become terrible to France as an enemy. But one would think that a realization of this fact would lead her to consider the necessity of pursuing a policy which would not isolate her from the world and which would render it possible for her to live on friendly terms with Germany. Otherwise she is left with no alternative but to strive from now until eternity to prevent Germany's recuperation, to tear open afresh, day by day, the wounds inflicted on her by both war and peace, thus permanently depriving all Europe of tranquillity, security and welfare—a policy which would finally rally all Europe in support of Germany and lead to a catastrophe for herself.

There could be an excuse for this suicidal policy only if Germans and Frenchmen were fashioned by nature to be as hostile towards each other as cats and dogs, a state of affairs which could never be altered. This conception is as senseless as was the one which counted for so much throughout the eighteenth century and into the beginning of the nineteenth, namely that a natural enmity existed between Englishmen and Frenchmen. Enmity between two nations always is only the result of historical circumstance and it passes with the historic causes which occasioned it. The historic causes which brought France as well as many other nations into opposition with Germany are practically passed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This opposition was fundamentally an opposition to Prussian militarism. Prussia as the youngest, smallest and poorest of the great powers in the eighteenth century was only able to assert herself by making sure that her army was equal to that of any other important state, an achievement requiring of her that more than any other state she should devote all her energies to her army. During the whole of the first half of the nineteenth century what was then the most cultivated portion of Germany, her west and south, full of sympathy for the France of the great revolution, strove against Prussian militarism. Only when the attempt of 1848 failed to unite Germany by democratic methods, and when later from 1866 to 1870 Prussian militarism succeeded by its own methods and by the expulsion of Austria in bringing about unification, did this militarism win over the sympathies of the portion of the German people living outside of old Prussia—and even then not without exceptions. In that very period, too, about 1866–1870, there came into being, though from very different causes, the two parties opposed to Prussian militarism, namely the Social Democrats and the Catholic Centerists, which today constitute a majority of the German people.

The policy of Prussia increased the aversion toward Germany in the most influential European nations. We have already designated the violent annexation of Alsace-Lorraine as the original sin of the new German Empire. With this mistake of Bismarck's William II associated the second and far greater one of a competition in naval armament, whereby England felt herself threatened. Finally German policy committed still a third error, the most fateful of all. Being able to find only a single ally whom she trusted under all circumstances, Germany allowed herself to be influenced in her decisions by that ally. And the ally was the Empire of Austria, which had become wholly moribund. For Austria's sake Germany came into opposition with Russia, with the growing Balkan states and even with her old associate Italy. It was not in defense of a German but of an Austrian claim that the World War broke out. Thus the German Empire made all the world its enemy and consequently it had in the end to fight against almost all the world.

Along with the German Empire, all these stumbling blocks have been removed. The old Austria has vanished, the German war fleet has been surrendered, Alsace-Lorraine has been given back to France. At the same time the root of all the evil, Prusso-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

German militarism, has ceased to exist. Nor was it overcome only from outside by the act of compulsory disarmament; it was vanquished also from within. It has lost the commanding influence that it used to exert on the mind of the German people.

No great army in Europe ever had such an almost unbroken series of victories to point to as did the Prussian army. True, this army which believed itself almost invincible was disastrously smitten in 1806 at Jena; but in 1913 it had ironed out this dent in its shield. From 1870 on the confidence of the entire German people in its army reached almost unbelievable heights.

And now, at the conclusion of the World War, came crushing defeat, all the more paralyzing because it was not due to any lack of stoutness in the troops but to the incompetent policy of the military command, which had taken upon itself to lead the German nation into the field against an overwhelmingly superior force. From the heights of wealth and glory Germany was cast down by the war into the depths of bitter poverty and indignity. Hereafter only absolute despair could make it try once more a passage at arms, which, under the circumstances, would but lead to renewed, to absolutely crushing disaster.

The German people are therefore becoming more and more convinced that Germany's salvation no longer depends on competitive armaments, but on a general disarmament; not on the increase of her own army, but on the decrease of the armies of others. The rôle that she would play in the society of nations is the exact opposite of what it has hitherto been. From a menace she is becoming a promise; from a martial peril she is turning into a pledge of world peace.

In many quarters the sincerity of this intention is not trusted. People seem to think that it would vanish again upon the economic rehabilitation of Germany.

It must be admitted that this new intention is not yet universal, although it already inspires a majority of the nation. The old generation cannot easily rid itself of inherited trains of thought. But the new idea is being developed by the new conditions themselves, and will root itself ever more deeply in the minds of the young generation which is growing up under its influence and is no longer being dazzled by militaristic stage-shows. The strengthening of Germany's economic life will not impede but will further a pacifistic development. The stronger the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

peaceably inclined body of workmen becomes, the less numerous will be those déclassés who are bent on desperate schemes.

It is not Germany's economic resuscitation but her economic collapse which means danger to her neighbors. If the victors pursue a policy tending to plunge the German people ever deeper into misery, they will be adopting the best means of bringing again to life ideas of armed opposition and revenge.

What the German nation wants and needs is peace—lasting, actual peace, with complete self-determination for all its parts and with no slave labor to perform for the benefit of its conquerors. It demands nothing but that these shall at last proceed to make good what they promised in Wilson's Fourteen Points. The principal obstruction in the matter up to the present has been offered by France. But it is not from outside that this obstruction can be overcome. It is wholly mistaken to expect Germany's rescue to result from a conflict between England and France. Such a conflict would only put the climax to Europe's hapless situation and would not improve French relations with Germany. The world needs peace and friendship between France and England just as urgently as it needs peace and friendship between these two and Germany. Should these three become united and join in a hearty understanding with the great transatlantic Republic, the peace of the world would be assured; then would be possible a League of Nations which would not be a gendarme of the conquerors, but one to which all nations would belong, which all nations would trust, and which would be in a position to solve peacefully all the problems which have grown out of the peace pacts concluded in 1919.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES IN REGARD TO CHINA

By Stanley K. Hornbeck

"It is a remarkable fact that, with the exception of a part of one session which was devoted to the situation in Siberia, the entire work of the Conference at Washington, so far as it dealt with political questions in the Pacific and the Far East, was concerned with the affairs of China."—W. W. WILLOUGHBY, *China at the Conference: A Report*, Preface, p. iii.

WHATEVER the future may hold in store, the work of the Washington Conference in reference, directly and indirectly, to the affairs of China and to the relations of the powers thereto has placed the whole problem of the Pacific and the Far East on a new basis and has given China an opportunity for self-salvation better than she has enjoyed at any time in recent decades.

The Conference committed the powers collectively to the principle of maintaining the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China; it reaffirmed and defined the principle of equality of opportunity and treatment for the commercial and economic interests in China of all nations; it condemned, circumscribed and took steps toward abolishing the practice in China of spheres of influence and interest. It did much more, but if it had produced only the Treaty between the Nine Powers Relating to Principles and Policies to be Followed in Matters Concerning China, this achievement alone would more than justify the efforts which it involved. A distinct advance must be recorded in international relations when the foremost statesmen of several great nations recognize that the giving of pledges to observe the principle of the "open door" and the prosecution of practices based on the assumption of special rights in "spheres of interest" are inconsistent, when they admit and affirm that the two courses cannot be reconciled, and when they undertake "not to enter into any treaty, agreement, arrangement, or understanding . . . which would infringe or impair the principles" of the open door policy and "not to support any agreements by their respective nationals . . . designed to create Spheres of Influence."

It has generally been understood that the term "open door

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

policy" relates to the principle of equality of commercial opportunity—and so it does—but it involves not this principle alone. There is a necessary corollary. Equality of commercial opportunity can prevail in respect to a given territorial entity only while and so long as certain political conditions prevail within that territory and between it and other entities. Twenty-five years ago there was serious talk of partitioning China. Since then there have been in operation forces undermining that country's integrity, both administrative and territorial. As between partition and the inevitable tendencies of spheres of interest there is a difference only in degree. While spheres of interest are emphasized, while special interests are accorded special recognition, while exclusive and preferential rights are enjoyed by particular foreign countries in particular regions, so long as some nations contemplate the possibility that portions of another's territory may come ultimately within their political systems, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country thus under observation are menaced, and the principle of equality of opportunity is in practice impaired. Such at least are the conclusions to be drawn from the recent history of China. Shantung and Manchuria after 1898 afford obvious examples. The maintenance of the administrative and territorial integrity of China seems an indispensable condition to an effective general application of the principle of equality of economic opportunity in China. The two principles together constitute the essential features of a bona fide open door policy.

There has been a diversity of counsels as to what should be done with, to, about, and—occasionally—for China. Differences of opinion on these subjects have coincided in a measure with differences in theories and practices of foreign policy and with differences in opinions regarding what China is and what the Chinese people can, may and should be expected to do. There have been counsels of compulsion, calling for interventions; there have been counsels of conquest, by peaceful or by forceful means, looking toward partition; and there have been counsels of patient and sympathetic persuasion, of assistance, moral and material, to the end that the Chinese people may work out their own problems and resolve the perplexities of readjustment and reconstruction in their own way.

It has frequently been asserted in recent years that the United States has had "no Far Eastern policy," or has had "no China

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

policy." The authors of this assertion have failed to distinguish between *policy* and *plan of action*. The United States has had a perfectly clear and consistent China policy, insofar as policy connotes principles. The chief obstacle to an easy realization of this has been the fact that this policy has had no peculiar and conspicuous objective which would give it a distinctive character; it has been simply a particular application of the traditional and fundamental general principles of American foreign policy. These principles are: (1) in general, respect for the legal and moral rights of other states and peoples—with expectation of like treatment in return; (2) in regard to commerce, equality of opportunity and treatment—on the basis of conditional most-favored-nation practice; (3) in political relations, abstention from alliances and from aggression; (4) in diplomatic approach, persuasion rather than coercion. There have been some inconsistencies in practice, but they have been few and have been due to the lack of continuity which prevails in the American system of administration rather than to deliberate and conscious intent.

During the negotiation of the first treaty between the United States and China, Caleb Cushing stated in a formal memorandum to the Chinese: "We do not desire any portion of the territory of China, nor any terms and conditions whatever which should be otherwise than just and honorable to China as well as to the United States." Twenty years later, Anson Burlingame endeavored to secure concerted action on the part of the powers, with a substitution of "fair diplomatic action in China for force." The principles advocated and practiced in the China policy of the United States have been: recognition of China's rights as a sovereign state; effort to ensure equality of commercial opportunity; opposition to activities threatening to impair China's territorial and administrative entity; and cooperation on the part of the powers in dealing with China. Whether dictated by idealism or by considerations of self-interest, whether enlightened or unenlightened, these have been the constant features of a clearly traceable record of diplomatic effort.

There was no new principle involved in the proposal which Secretary Hay put forward in 1899 on behalf of equality of opportunity in "spheres of whatever influence or interest" in China. There was merely a specific application to a particular situation. For some time prior to and during the feverish "scramble for concessions" of the years 1894–1899, the staking out of spheres of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

influence or interest, the leasing of Chinese ports, and the acquisition of monopolistic grants and special privileges had been apparently the chief preoccupation of some of the legations at Peking. The United States had taken no part in these activities and had acquired no grants and no assurances. Some action was required, in defense of American interests, to remove uncertainty and to guard against possible misunderstandings. There were distinct limitations to what a diplomatic proposal by the United States might be expected to accomplish. Taking full cognizance of the complicated situation, of the network of commitments in which the rights and interests of the powers had been expanded and those of China compromised, Secretary Hay undertook simply to make the best of the situation and to secure some definition of the general rights upon which the United States and other nations might rely under the conditions actually prevailing.

The replies of the powers to the Notes of 1899 gave some measure of assurance. But there remained the possibility that spheres of interest would be developed into cessions and annexations. With the passing of any part of China into the political system of another power, tariff barriers would presumably go up and equality of commercial opportunity in that region would be, as between the annexing power and others, at an end. Therefore, when the events of 1900 placed the political future of China in doubt, Hay announced in clear terms that it was the policy of the United States to seek a solution which would "preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity." He hoped that the other powers would declare themselves committed to the same principle. All the great powers forthwith affirmed, in one way or another, their devotion to this principle.

Thus formulated, the "Hay policy" was, like the Monroe Doctrine, not a rule of law, but a declaration of intentions. It had from the outset, however, what the Monroe Doctrine has not had, a quasi legal international status, in that both of its features were assented to and were positively affirmed not alone by the United States but by the other principal world powers.

It should be noted that the pledges of the years 1899 and 1900 did not have the character of treaties; still less were they embodied in a general international act; and they did not involve the consent and the participation of China. They were a collection of declarations, made by the United States in the first instance, and, at its suggestion, by a number of other powers individually.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In that respect, to begin with, the status of the open door policy during the twenty years which followed its enunciation must be compared and contrasted with the more formal recognition which has been given to its principles in the deliberations and formal declarations of the Washington Conference.

The events of 1899–1901—the decision of the Manchu Court to grant no more leases and to make no more concessions, the defeat of the attempt made by the Boxers and the Court to expel the foreigner and to destroy all of his works, the Hay Notes, the British-German agreement of 1900, the formulation and acceptance of the provisions of the Protocol of 1901 by the twelve powers chiefly concerned, including China, and the new frame of mind in which the Empress Dowager took up the task of reconstruction and reform—these in some measure clarified the situation but did not materially simplify the problems which were by that time inherent in it. The existence of the leased territories and the survival and extension of the principle and practice of spheres of interest were destined to be the roots of much political and economic difficulty. They were obstacles over which Hay's China policy was bound to trip and stumble; they became instrumentalities in whose presence it was repeatedly shown and declared to be impotent.

Over and over again during the years from 1901 to 1921 one or another of the powers repeated its pledges of adherence to the two principles of equality of commercial opportunity and maintenance of China's integrity. This was done sometimes unilaterally, in the course of routine diplomatic correspondence, sometimes in the form of administrative declarations, in the course of public explanations and justifications of given acts; more often it was done in the texts of bilateral agreements concluded for the furtherance of special objectives of the contracting parties.

So many times and in so many forms was fidelity to these principles affirmed, and so many, so varied and so well substantiated became the charges of infidelity in their application, that many believers in, and advocates of, the theory of the open door grew thoroughly skeptical of the efficacy of this policy. The alternative was a frank acceptance of the full implication of the spheres of interest idea and a resort without reservation to the principles of self-interest and self-help.

In spite of discouraging evidences of the ineffectiveness of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

open door policy, and in spite of criticisms and suggestions that the policy should be scrapped, it was readily to be assumed that the United States at least would not voluntarily abandon the principles involved, for the very simple reason that it could not. The principles expressed in the Hay Notes were not discovered or invented on the spur of the moment. The doctrine of equality of commercial opportunity had behind it a century and a quarter of American diplomatic expression and effort; it required no explanation to the American people; it was representative of the average American's conception of justice and of his own and other countries' rights. The corollary was almost equally axiomatic in American thought. The average American believed, whether he could give reasons for his belief or not, that China's independence and integrity should be respected.

Any doubt as to the survival of the open door principles in the official esteem of the American Government is dispelled by reference to the note which issued from the State Department on May 13, 1915, addressed in identical terms to the Chinese and the Japanese Governments, in connection with the negotiations which were at that time being carried on between those two governments and which were concluded by the signing of treaties and agreements on May 25, 1915. Again, in the letter addressed by Secretary Hughes to the Chinese Minister at Washington on July 1, 1921, in connection with the protests which had been made against a wireless concession granted by China to an American corporation, Mr. Hughes said:

> "Your reference to the principle of the open door affords me the opportunity to assure you of this Government's continuance in its wholehearted support of that principle, which it has traditionally regarded as fundamental both to the interests of China itself and to the common interests of all powers in China, and indispensable to the free and peaceful development of their commerce on the Pacific Ocean. The Government of the United States never has associated itself with any arrangement which sought to establish any special rights in China which would abridge the rights of the subjects or citizens of other friendly states; and I am happy to assure you that it is the purpose of this Government neither to participate in nor to acquiesce in any arrangement which might purport to establish in favor of foreign interests a superiority of rights with respect to commercial and economic development in designated regions of the territories of China, or which might seek to create any such monopoly or preference as would exclude other nationals from undertaking any legitimate trade or industry or from participating with the Chinese Government in any category of public enterprise."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In 1899 the American Government had not been alone in holding the beliefs which led to the first of the Hay Notes. Suggestions had come from other sources, particularly British. And thereafter Americans had not been alone in seeing the inconsistency between the open door principle and the spheres of interest practices. There had developed, however, during and after the War, particularly in connection with the Shantung question and the question of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, not a little uncertainty and doubt as to the views and intentions of the British Foreign Office.

In November, 1919, a Conference of the British Chambers of Commerce of China passed a series of resolutions, among which was the following: "This Conference is of the opinion that the time has come when the policy of the open door should be reaffirmed as an essential commercial principle and that reaffirmation be accompanied by an international agreement for the abolition of spheres of influence."

In the course of negotiations connected with the organization of the Four Powers Banking Consortium the position of the British Government began to be exhibited with some definiteness. In the correspondence it was repeatedly made plain that both the British and the American Governments were unwilling to permit the principle and practices of spheres of interest to stand in the way of cooperative international financial assistance to China. In a memorandum submitted to the Japanese Government, dated August 11, 1919, the British Government expressed this view emphatically: "One of the fundamental objects of the American proposals as accepted by the British, Japanese and French Governments is to eliminate claims in particular spheres of interest, and to throw open the whole of China without reserve to the combined activities of an international consortium. This object can not be achieved unless all the parties to the scheme agree to sacrifice all claim to enjoy any industrial preference within the boundaries of any particular sphere of influence."

On October 31, 1921—subsequent, it should be noticed, to the summoning of the Washington Conference, but before the Conference assembled—the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of the British Foreign Office made in the House of Commons the statement: "The policy of spheres of influence in China has been superseded by one of international cooperation, and the further

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

development of this policy will no doubt form one of the subjects of discussion at the Washington Conference."

The deliberations of the Arms Conference, insofar as they were directed to the affairs of China, began with the presentation of an open door program by the Chinese. They brought out the fact that the China policy of the United States had not changed, except in that it was directed toward securing more definite assurances. They effected a clarification, with unambiguous enunciation, of British policy. They concluded with an agreement unequivocally committing all of the nine powers present to a straightforward open door policy.

In the course of the discussion at the fourteenth meeting of the Committee of the Whole of the Conference, Mr. Balfour said that, "so far as Great Britain was concerned, spheres of interest were things of the past." He suggested that it should be declared that, "no one wished to perpetuate either the system of spheres of interest or the international understandings on which they depended."[1] Mr. Root expressed the opinion that Mr. Balfour's statement had created a new situation in regard to spheres of influence; it was the most public, open, positive declaration that had come to his notice.[2]

In a formal statement read at the fifteenth meeting of the Committee of the Whole, Dr. Wang, of the Chinese Delegation, said: "These spheres of interest seriously hamper the economic development of China"; "the whole system is contrary to the policy of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations"; they threaten the political integrity of China and give rise to international jealousy or friction; "the Chinese Delegation asks that the powers represented in this Conference disavow all claims to a sphere of interest or of influence or any special interests within the territory of China."[3]

During the eighteenth meeting of the Committee, Mr. Balfour said that, "the British Empire Delegation understood that there was no representative of any power around the table who thought that the old practice of 'spheres of influence' was either advocated by any government or would be tolerable to this Conference. So far as the British Government was concerned, they had, in the most formal manner, publicly announced that they regarded this practice as utterly inappropriate to the existing situation."[4]

[1] 67th Congress, Second Session, Senate Document No. 126, "Conference on the Limitation of Armament," p. 563. [2] *Ib.*, p. 567. [3] *Ib.*, pp. 580–581. [4] *Ib.*, p. 616.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

At the twenty-third meeting of the Committee, a resolution was unanimously adopted which was later approved bythe Conference in plenary session and which appears, with slight verbal changes, in Article IV in the Nine Powers Treaty Relating to Principles and Policies to be Followed in Matters Concerning China, of February 6, 1922. This article reads: "The Contracting Powers agree not to support any agreements by their respective nationals with each other designed to create spheres of influence or to provide for the enjoyment of mutually exclusive opportunities in designated parts of Chinese territory." It should be noted that this undertaking applies only to the future; it is not retroactive.

The other phase of the work of the Conference in direct application to the problem of general China policy appears in the reaffirmation and definition of the open door principles.

During the period 1900–1921, the Chinese Government on a number of occasions had referred with approval to the open door doctrine as applied to China, but not until the Washington Conference did it ever make a formal statement that it was itself prepared to accept and be bound by this doctrine.

In the statement of the Ten Points which the Chinese Delegation made at the first meeting of the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions, November 16, 1921, there appeared the following:

"1. (a) The powers engage to respect and observe the territorial integrity and administrative independence of the Chinese Republic.

"(b) China, upon her part, is prepared to give an undertaking not to alienate or lease any portion of her territory or littoral to any power.

"2. China being in full accord with the principle of the so-called open door or equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations having treaty relations with China, is prepared to accept and apply it in all parts of the Chinese Republic without exception."

At the second meeting of this Committee certain remarks of M. Briand raised the question, "What is China?" In reply to this Dr. Koo said, in part, that, "the territories of the Chinese Republic were defined in its Constitution;" that these were to be considered an entity; that "so far as the outside world was concerned it would appear clear that the principle of administrative

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

integrity should be confirmed for the Chinese Republic as one unit;" and that the principle of territorial integrity should apply not to "China proper alone . . . but all the territories of the Chinese Republic should be taken as a basis."[5] So far as is known, this statement was not effectively challenged and its substance became definitive.

The Conference ultimately adopted both the "integrity of China" and the "equality of opportunity" principles, the latter to apply "throughout the territory of China," first as numbers 1 and 3 of the Root Resolutions and then as sections of Article I of the Nine Powers Treaty of February 6, 1922.

When the Conference had declared itself opposed to the principle and practices of spheres of interest and had committed itself to a reaffirmation in general terms of the open door doctrine, it became advisable to give the principles agreed upon some greater measure of definition than they had formerly received. At the eighteenth meeting of the Committee of the Whole, Secretary Hughes, after quoting the third of the Root Resolutions, said that, "it was manifest that the granting of special concessions of a monopolistic or preferential character, or which secured a general superiority of rights for one power to the exclusion of equal opportunity for other powers, was in opposition to the maintenance and application of this principle of equal opportunity."[6] He then read a draft of a resolution intended to give precision and definition to the open door principle. Mr. Balfour commented favorably upon the fact that the repudiation of the system of spheres of influence was "as clear and unmistakable as could possibly be desired."[7] At the next meeting, Mr. Hughes introduced a revised draft of this resolution, of which the first three sections were in the end unanimously adopted.

The various provisions upon which the Conference had agreed in reference to the general features of China policy were assembled ultimately in the Treaty Between the Nine Powers Relating to Principles and Policies to be Followed in Matters Concerning China, signed on February 6, 1922.

In the introductory paragraph of this treaty, the nine powers declare it their desire "to adopt a policy designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and interests of China, and to promote intercourse between China and the other powers on the basis of equality of opportunity."

[5] *Ib.*, p. 452. [6] *Ib.*, p. 613. [7] *Ib.*, pp. 616–617.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In Article I, the Contracting Powers, other than China, agree: (1) "To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China; (2) to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity of China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government; (3) to use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China; and (4) to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges."

In Article II, all the Contracting Powers agree not to enter into any treaty or agreement which would infringe or impair the principles stated in the preceding article.

In Article III, the Contracting Powers other than China agree that they will not seek or support their respective nationals in seeking: (a) any arrangement which might purport to establish in favor of their interests any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in any designated region of China; or (b) any such monopoly or preference as would be calculated to frustrate the practical application of the principle of equal opportunity. These stipulations are not to be construed so as to prohibit the acquisition of properties or rights which may be necessary to the conduct of a particular commercial, industrial or financial undertaking or to the encouragement of invention and research. China undertakes to be guided by the principles stated in dealing with applications for economic rights and privileges from governments and nationals of all foreign countries.

In Article IV the Contracting Powers agree "not to support any agreements by their respective nationals with each other, designed to create Spheres of Influence or to provide for the enjoyment of mutually exclusive opportunities in designated parts of Chinese territory."

In Article V, China agrees not to exercise or permit unfair discrimination of any kind on her railways; and the powers other than China assume a corresponding obligation with respect to railways in China over which they or their nationals exercise any measure of control.

In Article VI, the Contracting Powers other than China agree fully to respect China's rights as a neutral during a war to which China is not a party, and China undertakes to observe the obligations of a neutral.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In Article VII, all the Contracting Powers agree that whenever a situation arises which involves the application of any of these principles and which renders desirable a discussion of the application, there shall be full and frank communication.

In its report to the President, of February 9, 1922, the American Delegation said: "It is believed that through this Treaty the open door in China has at last been made a fact."[8]

The Conference did not, however, content itself with mere declarations of principle. Concurrently with the work of framing and adopting formulae of principle and policy, it grappled with the problem of devising ways and means to render the principles agreed upon effective. In this connection its efforts were both destructive and constructive—destructive of practices which have been inconsistent with the open door principle and of obstacles to its effective application, constructive of machinery calculated to prevent future inconsistencies and gradually to remove remaining obstacles.

Thus, to begin with, it was agreed in the Nine Powers Treaty Relating to the Chinese Customs Tariff not only that the schedules of the Chinese tariff shall be revised at once, and periodically in years to come, but that a Special Conference shall take steps to prepare the way for abolition of *likin* and for increasing the tariff rates. Furthermore, the inequalities in the customs duties which have prevailed upon the land frontiers are to be removed. The provisions of this treaty are to "override all stipulations of treaties between China and the respective Contracting Powers which are inconsistent therewith, other than stipulations according most favored nation treatment."[9] A Commission has already sat at Shanghai to effect the first revision of the tariff schedules promised in this treaty, and the Special Conference is to give practical effect to other provisions.

It was agreed in a formal resolution that there shall be established a Commission to inquire into the present practice of extraterritorial jurisdiction in China, with a view to furthering the efforts of the Chinese Government to create conditions which will warrant the powers in relinquishing their rights of extraterritoriality. Elsewhere, the powers declared it their intention to withdraw their armed forces now on duty in China without authority of any treaty or agreement, whenever China shall be able to assure protection of the lives and property of foreigners in

[8] *Ib.*, p. 831. [9] Article IX.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

China. They adopted provisions substantially limiting the operations of foreign owned radio stations, both government and private, and they agreed that any such station maintained without authorization by the Chinese Government shall be transferred to or taken over by that government. They recorded their hope that the future development of railways in China shall be so conducted as to enable the Chinese Government to effect the unification of railways into a system under Chinese control, with such foreign financial and technical assistance as may prove necessary to the interests of that system. They expressed "the earnest hope that immediate and effective steps be taken by the Chinese Government to reduce its military forces and expenditures." The four powers which have postal agencies in China agreed to abandon these agencies.

Probably more important than any or all of these restrictive or corrective arrangements are two distinctively constructive measures which were agreed upon, the one to ensure publicity, the other to provide a procedure for dealing with certain types of possible controversy.

Declaring it "desirable that there should hereafter be full publicity with respect to all matters affecting the political and other international obligations of China and of the several powers in relation to China," the powers agreed to file lists of all treaties, conventions, exchanges of notes or other international agreements which they have with China or with other powers in relation to China and which they deem to be still in force and upon which they may desire to rely, and to file all such agreements which they may conclude in future. They also agreed to file lists, as nearly complete as possible, of contracts between their nationals and the Chinese Government or Chinese authorities and to give notification of every such contract which shall be concluded henceforth. The Chinese Government, for its part, took upon itself like obligations. This agreement, if lived up to—and disregard of it will tend automatically to invalidate arrangements which the offender seeks to keep under cover—may be expected to remove uncertainty and doubt, to terminate some and prevent other intrigues, and to promote fair dealing, straightforward competition and genuine cooperation.

To provide a procedure for dealing with questions arising in connection with the execution of Articles III and V of the Nine Powers Treaty it was agreed by resolution that there shall be

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

established a Board of Reference to which such questions may be referred for investigation and report. A detailed plan for the constitution of this Board is to be worked out by the Special Conference which is to be created to carry out provisions of the Nine Powers Treaty Relating to the Chinese Customs Tariff. (The plan, when formulated, will have to be referred to the various governments of the Contracting Powers for approval.) The establishing of this Board will be a novel measure; the Board may be able to function as a clearing house for complaints and as a diplomatic shock-absorber; if it functions to advantage in dealing with questions referred to it, it is conceivable that the scope of its authority may in time be made more broad.

Toward clearing away debris and inconsistencies, the Treaty for the Settlement of Outstanding Questions Relative to Shantung —negotiated at, but not by, the Conference—provides for Japan's relinquishment of the Shantung sphere of interest, which has been the most productive of controversies of all the foreign spheres of interest. Mr. Balfour's announcement of the British Government's intention to restore to China the Leased Territory of Weihaiwei, and the statement of the French Delegation that France would be willing to enter into negotiations with the Chinese Government for the restoration of Kwangchouwan were further steps in the same direction.

Other impairments of China's sovereignty and independence are diminished by certain provisions of the Treaty Relating to Insular Possessions and Insular Dominions in the Pacific Ocean and by the Naval Treaty. The former carries the provision that as soon as the Treaty is ratified the Anglo-Japanese Alliance shall terminate. The Chinese have considered this alliance derogatory to their national dignity and a menace to their rights and interests, while some other states have felt that it interfered with the proper working of the principle of equal opportunity. The Naval Treaty, materially lessening the likelihood of war in the Pacific, greatly increases China's assurance of immunity from the hardships of a war which may not be of her making or of direct concern to her. Moreover, if by any chance such a war should occur the foreign powers have elsewhere (in the Nine Powers Treaty) specifically guaranteed China's neutrality and China has expressly promised to perform her obligations as a neutral. When it is remembered that the land operations of the Russo-Japanese War were fought almost wholly on Chinese soil, and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that most of Japan's land campaign against Germany was conducted on Chinese soil, the importance to China of this provision becomes obvious.

Finally, one of the paradoxes of the diplomatic record of the open door policy, the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, is assumed to lose (by virtue of the adoption of the provisions of the Nine Powers Treaty,) if not all its force, at least such force as any of its provisions may have had in a sense contrary to the express terms of the new agreements. The Lansing-Ishii Agreement had been from the very first very distasteful to the Chinese, being regarded by them as a menace to their rights and interests. President Harding has stated to the Senate that it can henceforth "have no binding effect whatever . . . which is in any sense inconsistent with the principles and policies explicitly declared in the Nine Powers Treaty." "The negotiation of this treaty," he said, "is in itself a most formal declaration of the policy of the Executive in relation to China and supersedes any Executive understanding or declaration that could possibly be asserted to have contrary import."[10]

There are, and doubtless there will long continue to be, widely divergent views regarding both the quantity and the quality of the positive achievements of the Washington Conference. Extravagant praise and reckless criticism have marked the comments of publicists, editors, and political figures. In reference to much of the work, only time and the tests of practice will warrant conclusive judgments.

Certain things are, however, clear and incontestable. Whereas before the Conference it was doubtful which policy, that of the "open door" or that of "spheres of interest," had the practical approval of the majority of the powers, at the Conference all of the nine attending powers undertook henceforth not to seek or support any arrangements or agreements designed to establish spheres of interest and pledged themselves to an open door policy prescribed in comprehensive and specific terms. Whereas previously the open door policy rested upon unilateral declarations and bilateral agreements, to none of the latter of which was China a party, that policy is now incorporated and defined in a major international agreement to which nine powers, including China, are parties. Whereas previously the conditions in respect to other engagements and to the policy pursued by certain powers

[10]Congressional Record, March 8, 1922, p. 3984.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were such that the principle of equality of opportunity could not, in the nature of the situation, be expected to have substantial and vital effectiveness, there have now been prescribed conditions, limitations, prohibitions and positive courses of action; there has been developed a suggestion of a sanction; and a step has been taken toward providing preventive and remedial procedure.

That these provisions have given the open door policy a new and enhanced position in the realm of international commitments, that they place the problem of international relations in the Far East on a new basis, and that they offer China a vastly improved opportunity for solving her many and difficult problems of reconstruction, are propositions scarcely open to challenge. They do not purport to have made a new world, a new Far East, or a new China. They are intended to promote peace and to safeguard the rights and interests of all the peoples concerned.

During the next twenty years the value of these pledges will be tested. If the nine governments cooperate fully in the endeavor to enforce faithful observance of the principles upon which their representatives have agreed, and if the Chinese conduct their domestic affairs in such a manner as to justify the effort which has been made to afford them a fair opportunity to put their house in order, the judgment of the statesmen chiefly responsible for the determinations of the Washington Conference will be vindicated and the work of the Conference will be regarded by historians as marking a decisive turning point not only in the affairs of China, nor only in the annals of the Pacific and the Far East, but in the whole course of world politics.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE INTERNATIONAL POLICY OF SPAIN

By Ramiro de Maetzu

IT IS easy to ridicule the international policy of Spain by saying that at Geneva when England and France vote "Yes," Spain votes "Yes;" when England and France vote "No," Spain votes "No;" and when England says "Yes" and France "No," or vice versa, Spain refrains from voting. What is not quite so easy is to outline the possibilities of a more positive international policy for Spain. So long as Germany made her voice felt in international councils it was possible for Spain to consider another alternative, though vaguely, it is true, she being separated from Germany by the French army and the British fleet. But now, Germany being out of the way for the moment, the policy of Spain necessarily runs parallel with the policies of England and France—when the latter are in agreement. As soon as they disagree the most unpleasant dilemma confronts Spain. England, the market for her minerals and fruit and therefore her naturally ally, does not appear to desire an alliance with her; while France does not seem to have any policy towards her except to keep her weak, in order that all French strength may be concentrated upon the Rhine.

In spite of the timidity of her spokesmen and representatives, Spain's international ideals have been traced out clearly and firmly by history and the force of circumstances. They are concerned chiefly with Spanish America, Portugal and Morocco. Spain feels that she is the agent of civilization in Morocco, by reason of her eight-hundred-year war of reconquest against the Moors, her four-hundred-year possession of Melilla, Ceuta and the rocky cliffs of Velez and Alhucemas, and because of her general geographical position. Spain feels also that territorial continuity and an affinity of blood, speech and ideas draw her especially closely to Portugal. And, finally, she considers the South American republics as her children, physically and intellectually, conceived during the supreme hour of her history.

I do not say that this feeling of solidarity has found expression in any concrete political ideal. Some of us in Spain believe that history has shown the impossibility of holding close to the motherland countries of the same race, if the former is ruled by a patriarchal or patrimonial system such as still obtains with us.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For that reason we dream of a fraternity of Spanish peoples in which the old patriarchal nexus of the "ascendancy" will be displaced by a feeling of common ends. But this is an idea which has not yet reached the general public. The latter feel that Cuba, Colombia and the Argentine are not foreign in the same sense as are France, Italy and England; and the same feeling exists among the Spanish-American countries toward Spain. When Señor Alvear was elected President of the Argentine Republic, he was received in Spain as a national hero, not only by the governing classes but by the populace as a whole. And Señor Alvear returned the compliment by calling Spain his "Mother Country." A year ago, when the President of the Puerto Rico Chamber of Representatives, Señor Coll y Cuchi, related to the Athenaeum Society of Madrid the story of his people's struggle to preserve the Spanish language in their schools, the audience felt tears in its eyes. Only a few days ago the Cuban delegate to the League of Nations spoke of Spain as a mother, always loved and respected.

Likewise, the sentiment of solidarity between the Spanish and Portuguese peoples has latterly found numerous opportunities of expression. The Portuguese and the Spaniards do not regard each other as foreigners. Great as is the fear of the Portuguese lest the peninsular-wide imperialism of the Philips should be reborn in Spain, this uneasiness gives way to one of solidarity at the first opportunity. Although from time to time imperialistic ideas are reborn in the minds of Spanish statesmen, they very quickly discover that the people as a whole do not share them and that nobody in Spain really wishes to see the Minister of Finance collecting taxes in Lisbon.

Equally strong is the feeling that Spain has an historic mission in Morocco. On the day when the French troops entered Fez, in 1911, the spirit of Spain was galled and the general discontent would certainly have found expression in some form had not the country's consciousness of its own weakness closed its lips.

Here we have another explanation of the timidity of Spain's international policy. The Spanish people are not only well aware of their own weakness, but think themselves much weaker than they actually are. Spain's sense of weakness is quite justified up to a certain point, and it is well that its policy should be tempered to accord with its resources. In her dealings with Spanish-America, for example, it is evident that Spain could not, even if she would,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

establish such close and important commercial relations as England and the United States maintain. Similarly, Spain does not possess accumulated capital in sufficient quantity to act as financier for the increasing productivity of Spanish-America. Possibly the capital she amassed during the war would have sufficed to help Portugal exploit her wealth and raise her depreciated currency. But Spain has lost a large part of her war gains speculating in marks, and so various enterprises long since projected must wait until by economy she acquires the capital to harness the waterfalls of the Douro, on the Spanish-Portuguese frontier, and form a consortium to enable both countries to exploit the cork industry.

In the case of Morocco, Spain for years had to wage a diplomatic battle with France which culminated in a treaty which had scarcely been signed when the European war broke out. According to this treaty, Spain remained in possession of five per cent of the ancient territory of Mogreb, and France of ninety-five per cent. The French zone was rich and relatively well settled, owing to its having been governed by the Sultans for centuries, while the Spanish zone, the Rif and the hinterland of Ceuta and Larache, was little more than an arid and hilly district in which half a million Kabyles led a semi-nomadic existence.

It is certain that but for our faltering diplomacy we might have made an agreement with France before the Entente Cordiale was sealed in 1904, whereby Fez and the adjoining territory would have been included in the zone of our Protectorate. At that time, however, Spain had just emerged from her colonial wars and did not wish to attack the problem of Morocco until her forces were restored. The truth is that the old Spanish dream of being the bearer of civilization in Morocco was frustrated by the Entente Cordiale, and that, at the beginning of the European war, Spain was still a little embittered by the result of the negotiations with France. This partly explains her neutrality during the Great War. It is not pleasant to have to make way for another power simply because one does not feel capable of resisting.

But the timidity of Spain's diplomacy and her neutrality in the war are explicable on more serious grounds. Mr. Bernard Shaw, despite knowing nothing whatever about Spain, said, in "Man and Superman," one of the profoundest things which has ever been said about our country: "Every idea for which Man will die will be a Catholic idea. When the Spaniard learns at last that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

he is no better than the Saracen, and his prophet no better than Mohamet, he will arise, more Catholic than ever, and die on a barricade across the filthy slum he starves in, for universal liberty and equality." The Spaniards are characterized by a personal and local pride which almost incapacitates them from acting rationally in the world. But from time to time a Catholic idea arises in Spain in which the pride of the individual can be satisfied and expand simultaneously, each person conscious of being a minister of the true Church. These moments of faith in their mission are also the moments of the Spaniard's historical greatness. It was Rome that first fired every Spaniard with the glory of belonging to an empire reaching from Persia to Cadiz. Then it was the Church that made the Iberian slave and the most powerful noble of the Goths equal before the throne of God. Afterwards it was Charles V who made the Spanish believe that they were fighting the battles of the Lord. It is in these moments of faith that the name of Spain is heard in the world. But when this spirit of "individual distinction by sacrifice," as the historian Martin A. S. Hume has called it, is consumed within itself, then Spaniards return to their personal and local quarrels, which are all-engrossing but insignificant from an international standpoint.

At the present time Spain is living on the ideas of 1898. On the day when a United States squadron burned and sank at Cavite the poor little wooden ships of Spain, the Spanish conscience was aroused by the glow of the flames and began asking why empires had perished. The answer at which our best minds arrived does not seem so satisfactory today as it did then; but the important point is that the questions asked were ones which Spanish intellectuals have not yet ceased to ask, as to the reason for what was then called national decadence, and as to the way to what was then, and is still, called national regeneration. The prevalent belief at the time was that Spain had been the victim of too many wars. Don Joaquin Costa said: "Double-lock the tomb of the Cid (the popular hero of the wars against the Moors) so that he may not ride again." Don Miguel de Unamuno said: "Robinson Crusoe has conquered Don Quixote." By the former he meant the practical mind, by the latter the idealist—in which comparison Robinson Crusoe stood for the United States, with its industries, machinery and wealth, while Don Quixote represented dreamy Spain, indifferent to profitable business but ready to fight for things of no concern from a practical standpoint.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Let us not go too far in identifying Crusoe with the Anglo-Saxon world, nor Don Quixote with our own. Some of us might think that the origin of Anglo-Saxon greatness lies in a spirit of puritanism which is not intrinsically practical. And so far as we in Spain are concerned, let us try with all our strength to resuscitate the Cid and Don Quixote; ideals alone make daily life tolerable.

The Spanish people during the past twenty years have made considerable progress in science, education and the exploitation of their natural resources; but they still remain persuaded that the majority of their ills are due to the numerous wars they formerly waged. Sometimes they were the victims of foreign dynastic ambitions, like those of the houses of Austria and Bourbon; at others they were carried away by generous but impossible ideals, such as that of a universal church. This feeling is the chief cause of our timidity in international politics and also of the non-success of our little Moroccan war, in which we failed, after wasting time, money and human lives, to solve a problem which would not be a problem at all for a Spain that really wanted to solve it. The entire zone of Northern Morocco, entrusted to Spanish protection under the treaties, does not cover more than some 25,000 square kilometres. It extends from the southern shore of the Straits of Gibraltar to Tangier, and has a total population of about 500,000, most of them Kabyles, who recognize no other social unit but the tribe and who usually lack all culture. Yet this Protectorate has cost Spain about ten million pesetas since operations began in 1909, and there is no sign of its being definitely pacified.

The educated classes in Spain do not feel that the civilizing mission of their country in Morocco is worth the sacrifices that war implies. The reason for this feeling is that war now requires ten men to accomplish what could formerly be done with one and ten million pesetas for what should cost only one. In this last respect the war has been really disastrous for us. Prior to 1909, when Señor Maura, then Prime Minister, began operations, each administration had inherited from its predecessors a "holy horror of deficits," thus carrying on the work of keeping down the budget which Señor Villaverde had initiated immediately after the loss of the colonies. The operations in Morocco caused a deficit, and, just as happened in the belligerent countries during the war, once the reduction of the budget was prevented by

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

military necessity the squandering of money extended to all departments. Once the government no longer denied the war departments whatever they asked they had not the courage to refuse the demands of all the others. Thus the deficit rose from 390 million pesetas in 1909 to 538 millions in 1919–20, and at last to 1,298 millions in 1921–22. Deducting the expenses caused by the war in Morocco, the normal deficit—that is, the difference between ordinary revenue and ordinary expenses—amounts to 700 millions. The Secretary of the Treasury, Señor Bergamin, never tires of repeating that the first step towards restoring the Treasury must be made by putting an end to the war in Morocco. To that end General Burguete has been appointed Spanish High Commissioner in Morocco with a new policy of bringing the tribal chiefs on to the side of Spain with gifts. There seems, also, to be an attempt to limit the area of warfare. But it does not appear wise to buy off the tribes, for they have not been properly defeated and will rebel again as soon as the gifts cease.

Despite all this, important civilizing work is being accomplished in the Spanish zone in Morocco. Melilla is the only western town in northern Africa. Built chiefly between 1910 and 1914, it has broad, well-paved streets, schools for Spaniards and natives, parks, theatres, clubs, hospitals, a magnificent harbor, and two railways connecting it with the mines and the villages of the interior. The exploitation of the iron mines in the vicinity is the principal source of revenue to the railways. A model farm teaches the Moors how to get the best returns from the soil. I do not speak of the agricultural colonies, because the desire to get possession of Moorish land at inadequate prices was perhaps the chief cause of the tribal insurrections last year. I hope our authorities in Morocco have learnt their lesson on that score once for all.

The modest activities of Spain in Morocco have an international significance which foreigners are inclined to overlook, though specialists know it. The British Foreign Office realizes quite well the importance of the Straits of Gibraltar to world traffic. If Spain were to decide to retire from Morocco, and France wished to develop her submarine fleet, nothing would be easier than for the latter, in case of war, to close the Straits of Gibraltar absolutely, despite the presence of England at the Rock.

In this sense the world is affected by the problem which keeps Spain in Morocco. In its turn, the general situation of the world

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

affects Spain. The world today is not buying from Spain even one-half of what it bought before the war. A few months ago Don Luis Clariaga, the economist, published the following comparative table of our principal exports:

	Millions of Pesetas	
	1913	*1921*
Iron	97.8	20.1
Pyrites	37.7	15.5
Mercury	8.1	3.3
Argentiferous pig-lead	14.8	5.4
Common pig-lead	65.3	35.3
Copper (moulds and bars)	37.5	32.7
Silver (bullion)	14.5	10.1
Raw wool	23.1	2.9
Oranges	68.3	52.1
Fresh grapes	19.3	10.9
Tinned sardines	29.9	18.2
Common wines	106.9	77.5
Fine wines	35.1	28.2
Cotton tissues	50.3	37.8
Footwear	8.2	1.8
Cork manufactures	44.7	26.4

For two years Spanish industry did everything it could to ward off the crisis which all the belligerent countries, one after the other, have gone through since the armistice. Thanks to a continuous rise in import duties a shortage was maintained when prices were falling rapidly in the rest of the world. But the fall in our own exports finally produced a critical decline in prices in Spain. The poorer coal mines, which were worked during the war, were closed down; but the fact could not be attributed merely to the superiority of English coal, for there was also a general reduction of consumption. At present the demand for iron ore is diminishing. It is not alone England which cannot resume her metal production with the old intensity; Germany also is cancelling her orders because she has no hope of being able to continue work next winter. In recent cattle fairs an immense decline in orders and prices is noticeable. The wine harvest has been large, but there is no market, for some countries have reduced consumption by increasing taxes while others have absolutely prohibited alcoholic beverages. All the signs indicate that the coming winter will find us in the midst of a crisis. If to the general economic crisis there be added a crisis in the Treasury, and we have another disaster in Morocco such as that of 1921, it is not impossible that the pressure of public opinion in favor of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

abandoning Morocco may be so great that the government will have to give way before it.

In view of these dangers there are certain public men, notably El Conde de Romanones, who would like to see Spain emerge from her old international isolation. He would like to have a defensive agreement between England, France, Italy and Spain to replace the agreement which was attempted between the United States, England and France. Such an agreement would involve grave responsibilities for Spain in the event of a Germano-Russian alliance and an overturn of the frontiers fixed by the Treaty of Versailles. On the other hand, it would be a great relief to us to work in Morocco in agreement with France, provided that the latter respected our zone. Under such an agreement the Spanish Government would probably expect the assistance of France in discouraging whatever secessionist element there is in Catalan nationalism. The reigning Spanish dynasty, which has never been quite secure, would also look to an alliance with France to discourage anti-dynastic movements in Spain similar to those which led to the downfall of the monarchy in Portugal.

The difficulty of such an agreement, however, resides in the fact that its adoption does not depend upon Spain. The relations between France and England go from one crisis to another. Italy, too, is passing through a period of domestic crisis which makes her foreign policy uncertain. Yesterday she seemed to be wholly Anglophile; today she is almost Anglophobe. And so we return to our point of departure. It is not difficult for us to follow France and England together, but to have to choose between them is an undertaking of great difficulty, even for a government more distinguished and more interested in international politics than any we are accustomed to see in Spain.

The fundamental question for Spain, however, is one of ideals. None of the problems which confront Spain is so important as her own spiritual problem. The Spanish people are thoroughly sane; but they have no ideal. They follow slowly the course of modern civilization, in order not to be left entirely behind, but they show no creative enthusiasm. If we could discover the way to convince the Spanish that the business of everyday life also has an eternal significance, then the name of Spain would soon again be heard beyond her own borders.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INTERNATIONAL ELECTRICAL COMMUNICATIONS

By Walter S. Rogers

I

OPINIONS regarding international electrical communications differ widely according as the sponsor is concerned with the operation of facilities or with their social, military, political or commercial employment; according as he is moved by general international or by particular national considerations; and according as he conceives either that electrical communications should be conducted on a public service basis similar to the post-office or that they should be left to competitive or monopolistic commercial exploitation.

Perhaps the broadest conception is that the entire world should be provided with adequate, interconnecting facilities, handling traffic in every direction at low rates, ultimately at nominal rates, and so organized as to prevent international or commercial controversies arising out of efforts to control communications for selfish purposes. This is carrying over to electrical communications the conception underlying the Universal Postal Union. Behind such a conception is a recognition that facilities for communication constitute highways of thought and commerce and a belief that international intercourse should be stimulated. As sometimes expressed, the international electrical communication, network constitutes the world's neutral system and every improvement in that system may be expected to contribute in the long run towards making possible world integration.

Others are blind to this vision of a world-wide network of communications or pooh-pooh it as fantastic idealism. They believe that their particular country should have such communication facilities and services as are required for social, military, political and commercial purposes, and in the field of international communications should gain for its nationals as many exclusive privileges and preferential advantages as possible. The proponents of this idea consider electrical communications a legitimate field for international rivalry.

Countries having dominions, colonies and possessions are found often to be interested in the provision of communication services with and between such territories. Notably has there

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

been a growing appreciation in the British Empire of the desirability of adequate, nominal-rate services throughout the empire as an agency for furthering empire unity. A comprehensive imperial wireless scheme has been approved and is being worked out. Plans are under way for the duplication of the Canada-Australia cable, jointly owned and operated by Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. A comprehensive empire system of communications would give the British Empire practically a world-wide system, as short connections only would be required to reach most countries.

Many officials in charge of commercial enterprises engaged in providing international communications services seem to resent any conception of communications other than that they should be left to private exploitation and should be free from national and international regulation, especially as regards rates. According to this view, governmental activity should be limited to protecting the interests of companies, to aiding them in securing privileges in other countries, and in some instances to the furnishing of subsidies. These officials assert that along many of the great international trade routes their companies have fully met commercial needs, save possibly during exceptional circumstances such as were created by the World War, and that through reduced rates for press messages and for deferred services they have met other needs. Obviously all the factors involved in international communications must be weighed in passing judgment on such assertions and assumptions. At bottom, however, there is clearly a marked difference between a conception of international communication services conducted for profit and of such services conducted on a public service basis. A postal service handling letters generally throughout the world for two or five cents each is conceived on a radically different basis from one which fixes its charges by distance and by what the traffic will bear and avoids unprofitable activities.

II

As diplomatic negotiations are now largely carried on or directed by cable, and as perhaps no code can be devised that can not be broken, foreign offices today are much concerned with the accuracy and speed with which messages are handled and with the degree of trust that can be placed in the transmitting agency. It is particularly in times of international crisis and of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

war that they require assured services, passing through the fewest possible intermediate jurisdictions, and also available alternative routes. Discussions regarding the place at which an international conference is to be held often revolve around the availability of suitable services of communication.

Among naval and military authorities there is a growing appreciation of the communications factor. The almost world-wide cable system controlled by the British, partly governmentally operated and partly existing as a result of subsidies, made possible at the outbreak of the World War a prompt mobilization of the moral and material forces of the empire and during the war proved of the greatest value. The bulk of the world's cable traffic was subject to the scrutiny of British censors —and war-time censorships tend more and more to serve purposes of economic control.

One result of the development of radio has been greatly to modify naval strategy. The naval power possessing suitably located radio shore stations has perhaps a decisive advantage over a rival less well equipped. The time is soon coming when a British naval vessel need never be out of reach of a radio station situated on British soil and through that station it will have access to empire-wide cable and radio facilities.

Military and naval requirements have resulted in the erection by governments of many radio stations primarily for such purposes. Many of these stations, however, are available in time of peace for the handling of national and international traffic. But efforts to utilize the extensive American naval services for handling messages other than government have been opposed by American cable and radio commercial interests.

Military considerations, as well as national pride and the desire to avoid censorships and dependence upon neighbors, are leading to the erection by the smaller nations of expensive high-powered radio stations for which there is little economic justification.

The precise part played by communication services in the conduct and development of international trade is, of course, impossible to gauge. It is clear, however, that an importing and exporting center requires adequate international communications services at reasonable rates. The difficult question of rates bobs up continually. What constitutes reasonable rates depends, of course, upon many factors. From the standpoint of the trader a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reasonable rate is a rate which does not hamper him in the transaction of business. Often he is concerned with comparative rates; for example, the American exporter wants as low a rate to China as that enjoyed by his Western European competitor. And both would like as low a rate as that enjoyed by their Japanese competitors!

Large transactions, financial or commercial, can be carried on despite high communications rates or even despite discriminatory rates. On the contrary, the direction taken by smaller transactions is frequently determined by relative advantages of communication. Transactions in commodities or securities whose prices fluctuate markedly are largely carried on by telegraph, cable or radio. The successful, competitive operation of shipping requires a wide range of communication contacts free from adverse services and rates of a discriminating nature. It is no mere coincidence that London is at once the financial and commercial center of the world, the cable center, and the principal news center.

The extent to which the range and quantity of news distribution is affected by communication services and rates is a matter of growing international concern.

In this connection it is sometimes pointed out that through the spread of education this has become a literate world, that newspapers are now read everywhere, that popular government is spreading throughout the world, that foreign relations are becoming more intimate, that foreign questions are being passed upon by electorates, that newspapers are the most cogent force in the creation of current public opinion—particularly in regard to international affairs as to which the ordinary individual has no opportunity for personal knowledge,—that the flow of news is largely conditioned by communication services and by press rates, and that high press rates make easier the control of the distribution of news by governments and by vested interests.

In estimating the part played by press rates it is necessary to keep in mind that only a relatively few newspapers—in many countries none—have developed as commercial enterprises to the point where they can afford to pay much for individual news services or for news agency reports. Consequently any press rate, other than a nominal rate, is unsatisfactory, if the aim be to bring about a generous flow of news in all directions throughout the world.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Although there is by no means an unlimited demand for international news or everywhere a willingness to publish unbiased reports, there can be no doubt that nominal press rates would greatly stimulate the flow of international news, would encourage many more newspapers and periodicals to maintain correspondents abroad, and would make more difficult the supression or manipulation of news. The conception of adequate communication facilities transmitting press messages at nominal rates is a constructive and enlarged approach to one aspect of the freedom of the press, freedom to print being strengthened by some machinery encouraging the widest possible gathering of news.

Whether this is desirable or not of course depends upon one's predilections. A good many professional diplomats believe in the necessity of their directing the distribution of news. For many years there have been low press rates and an extensive exchange of news between the several European countries, yet it is pointed out that the World War came just the same. International news services, however, while they may be expected to help break down provincialism and to throw the spotlight of publicity on many problems, can scarcely be expected to prevent conflicts arising out of fundamental racial, religious, political and economic differences. An authority in the field of international news has given as his opinion that one of the contributing causes to the World War may be found in the unfortunate way in which news services were organized in Europe.

British Empire Press Conferences have gone on record as favoring the establishment of a press rate of a penny a word between any two points within the empire, however far apart they may be. They have opposed the subsidizing of newspapers or of news services by governments, and they do not regard the establishment of low press rates as a subsidy to the press but as a contribution towards the unity of the empire. Certainly no such rate is likely to be made by any commercial enterprise, and it is problematical whether, as an incident to other services, it can be made by a government-owned system without involving considerable losses. In any event there are many, and by no means uninfluential, people who believe that nominal press rates are of sufficient social and political importance to justify the tax payer meeting a deficit, on precisely the same theory that he provides funds for highways and schools.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

III

As might be expected, a number of international controversies have arisen over efforts to get or to retain advantages regarding communications. That the number is not larger is due in part to the International Telegraph Convention and its accompanying regulations. While the scope of this agreement is essentially limited to facilitating the international exchange of traffic, the working relations that have resulted between government administrations and companies have brought about a certain degree of international comity.

When cables were first developed Great Britain already had a colonial empire. Naturally enough the laying of cables between the different parts of the empire received official encouragement and attracted British capital. In consequence Great Britain at once achieved and has maintained a supremacy in the manufacture of submarine cable and cable apparatus, in the extent of her trained personnel, and in the number of miles of cable owned. As Germany became a colonial power, built up a navy, a merchant marine and overseas trade, the desirability of becoming independent of Great Britain in the matter of cables became increasingly apparent to her. The manufacture of cable in Germany was therefore encouraged and in time an extensive system of German cables was laid. Progress in this field was opposed both by the British Government and by British cable companies. As far as the writer is aware, the cable rivalry between Great Britain and Germany is the only international controversy over communications which has been systematically studied and written about.[1]

Immediately following the outbreak of war the German cables in the British Channel were cut. Later the other German cables were cut, including two lying between New York and the Azores. Besides this certain lengths were taken up and other cables were diverted. Among these last were the two which connected Borkum (Emden), the Azores and New York. One of them was diverted to connect Penzance (England), the Azores and Halifax; the other to connect Brest, the Azores and New York, the terminal in the latter city being transferred to the offices of a French cable company. Some of the actions of the various allies as to the German cables were clearly justified as legitimate war

[1] Charles Lesage: La rivalité Anglo-Germanique. Les cables sous-marins allemands. Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 1915.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

activities, but others seem to indicate a purpose to dismember permanently the German cable system and to strengthen their own.

At the Peace Conference the German cables were the subject of considerable discussion. The United States insisted upon the restoration of pre-war services, at least so far as the transatlantic cables were concerned, pointing out that the diversion of these cables injured the United States quite as much as it injured Germany. France and Great Britain, having previously reached an understanding regarding them, would not consent to their reestablishment. By the treaty of peace, Germany renounced in her own behalf and in behalf of her nationals all title to the cables in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Although extended negotiations have since taken place, the powers have been unable to come to an agreement regarding the distribution of the cables, with the exception of the relatively unimportant cables radiating from Yap. The powers which seized and diverted them are still in possession.

British and Danish companies hold concessions by virtue of which they claim the exclusive rights until 1931 to land cables on the coasts of China and to exchange traffic with the Chinese overland telegraph system. They assert that their concessions cover radio. The concessions were secretly obtained, and the monoply provisions have been challenged by the United States as constituting violations of treaty rights. In 1900, during the Boxer troubles, when the first extensions of the concessions were made, apparently one object of the companies was to prevent the laying of a transpacific cable except upon such terms as they might dictate. In this they succeeded, as in the present transpacific cable—which was laid to forestall an American governmental one—the British company has a half interest and the Danish company a quarter interest. No competing cable has been laid. In the face of the cable concessions China has granted several radio concessions, one to a Japanese company conferring a long time monoply over external radio communications. Despite British, Danish, and Japanese protests China has also granted a non-monopolistic concession for a high-powered radio station and certain secondary stations to an American company, which during the course of negotiations received the vigorous backing of the American Government.

Electrical communications in the Pacific formed an item on the agenda of the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Arma-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment. For various reasons the subject was not taken up. Nevertheless, the development of comprehensive cable and radio systems in the North Pacific, operated in a manner to meet the various needs and organized in a manner to prevent conflicts between the nations concerned, offers an opportunity for constructive statesmanship.

IV

Early in the development of telegraphs in Europe frontiers were met, and international agreements had to be made for the exchange of traffic and for the forwarding of through traffic. The various agreements crystallized in the International Telegraph Convention of 1875 with its annexed service regulations. The convention has remained unchanged, but the regulations have been the subject of several revisions. Although the convention and regulations grew out of immediate European needs, most of the countries of the world have adhered to the convention, the notable exceptions being China, where communication services have largely been dominated by foreign companies, and the United States, which alone among the great powers has not gone in for a large measure of government ownership and operation.

While the status of companies engaged in commercial communication enterprises is none too clear, in practice their views have been given friendly consideration whenever changes in the regulations have been contemplated. They on their side, with the exception of American cable companies, abide by the international service regulations. Even the American companies comply with all but a few of them, and the departures are tolerated by the foreign governments partly out of an unwillingness to coerce the American companies and partly because the deviations concern American interests more than foreign.

Besides objecting to certain of the international regulations, the American companies have been opposed to adherence on the broad ground that the convention is essentially a compact between nations operating their own telegraph systems. As Congress has never undertaken to provide for the somewhat dubious project of regulating unilaterally international communications, American non-adherence to the convention leaves the companies free from regulation of their international traffic, except to the extent that foreign governments assert control over operations in their respective jurisdictions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The present International Radio-Telegraph Convention and Regulations date from 1912. Owing to subsequent developments in radio both the convention and the regulations require extensive revision and amendment. Most of the nations, including the United States, but with a far-reaching reservation, are parties to the radio-telegraph agreement. By cross reference many articles of the Telegraph Convention are incorporated in the Radio-Telegraph Convention and Regulations.

Meetings of the signatories to the telegraph and to the radio-telegraph conventions were postponed because of the World War. In view of the obvious need of them, and largely as an outgrowth of the discussions over the seized German cables and a somewhat nebulous discussion of the internationalization of cables, there was adopted during the course of the Peace Conference the following resolution:

> The Principal Allied and Associated Powers shall, as soon as possible, arrange for the convoking of an International Congress to consider all international aspects of communication by land-line telegraphs, cables, or wireless telegraphy, and to make recommendations to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers with a view to providing the entire world with adequate facilities of this nature on a fair and equitable basis.[2]

On October 8, 1920, a preliminary conference of representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers met at Washington. It worked through several committees. The reports of these, other than those dealing with the former German cables and the improvement of facilities between the participating powers, while not published, have been furnished to the nations of the world and to the principal cable and radio companies for criticism and suggestion.

The conference considered a wide range of subjects, many of them of a highly technical character. Although the subject was taken up, no agreement was reached for distribution of the former German cables. In the discussions regarding the improvement of communication services between the participating powers, the American representatives were little more than spectators. As the other four powers conduct communication services, they were in a position not only to consider constructive proposals but to bind themselves to carry them out.

[2]Includes telephones and wireless telephony. The existing telegraph regulations contain telephone provisions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

During the coming year further international meetings will be held to discuss international electrical communication matters. There will probably be at the same time meetings of the signatories to the Telegraph Convention and to the Radio-Telegraph Convention and also a continuation of the Washington Communications Conference and of the work of a technical radio committee which met at Paris in 1921.

V

Only the barest outline can be given here of the communications problems which require, or are susceptible of, international consideration. Of such subjects some demand consideration by the powers generally, others only by the powers immediately concerned. Arrangements for telephone or telegraph facilities for through operation come in the latter class.

As radio emanations do not respect man-made political borders, radio operations and practices are of general international concern. There is need for international agreements providing for the classification of wave lengths, for their allocation for different classes of service and, in the case of wave lengths employed in long distance transmission, for their allocation among the nations. The question arises as to where lies the ultimate right to determine who may use or who may not use a given wave for transmission. Private enterprise and possibly certain nations believe that prescriptive rights can be obtained. If this is true, invaluable rights are being obtained by a process analogous to squatting.

Inasmuch as a given message in its course to its destination may be transmitted by telephone, telegraph, cable, radio and even by means of sound and visual signals and may traverse any number of countries, there is an apparent need for uniformity in service regulations. To insure such uniformity, the proposal has been made that along with the revision and extension of the present telegraph and radio regulations the conventions be amalgamated, and that sound and visual signalling be included.

The only rates fixed by existing telegraph regulations are European terminal and transit rates, the European countries having agreed upon uniform rates. Were all the communications of the world government operated, there presumably would come about in time uniform terminal and transit rates throughout the world, or rates based on a world-wide system of zones.

As the grant by a country of a telegraph, cable, or radio

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

monopoly covering its external communications affects other countries, as has been pointed out in the case of monopolies granted by China, the Washington Communications Conference considered the possibility of an international agreement obligating the signatories not to grant or to support their nationals in seeking monopoly rights except under unusual and specified circumstances. Such a proposal is in line with American policy, as the United States has not granted monopolies and apparently favors competition. But whether competition between American companies, and between them and foreign companies and governments, is in American or international public interest or in the interest of the communication companies is debatable.

Since for effective operation a cable should not exceed by very much two thousand miles, certain islands, like the Azores and the Hawaiian, are strategic cable relay points. As the local business is often negligible, the suggestion was offered at the Conference at Washington that the nations owning such strategetically located islands agree to make them freely available for cable relay purposes, free from tax and free from censorship, even to a considerable degree in war time.

Such a proposal raises the whole question of the status of communication services in war time, and particularly of the status of cables. The actions of the Allies in cutting, taking up and diverting German cables and requiring their renunciation by Germany, even though the cables were privately owned, constitute precedents disquieting to cable companies and tending to encourage the erection of high-powered radio stations in preference to the laying of cables. The subject of the status of cables in war time has long been discussed. President Buchanan's message to Queen Victoria upon the opening of the first transatlantic cable touched upon it. The Washington Communications Conference looked at the subject, but did not get very far.

At the Washington Communications Conference the question was also brought up as to whether existing laws and international agreements are so phrased as to afford protection to copyrighted material transmitted by radio. As radio messages can be intercepted by others than the station to which they are directed, the further question arises as to whether the transmitting station is in any way responsible for the content of messages. For example, a radio station transmits in the regular course a libelous message or a message offensive to a friendly power. Does the fact that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the message may be generally intercepted, and is so intercepted, provide grounds for action against the station by the person defamed or for complaint by the nation affected?

VI

Before leaving the subject of international electrical communications, which at the most charitable estimate has merely been touched upon, something needs be said about the attitude of the various governments. There seems to be a general recognition of the need for uniform operating and traffic regulations and for rather detailed technical understandings regarding radio. Naturally there are wide, but not insurmountable differences of opinion as to the scope and details of such agreements.

While there is some doubt as to whether general international understandings can be reached to check the granting to commercial enterprises of radio and cable monopolies affecting international communications, and to make generally available strategetic islands and other places suitable for cable relay purposes, there appears to be a willingness to discuss these questions.

On the other hand there is much doubt as to the desirability or feasibility of attempting to bring about an international agreement defining the status of cables in war time. The subject bristles with difficulties and certainly is not likely to be taken up until after Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and America have reached an agreement regarding the former German cables.

Generally speaking, governments owning and operating services have shown a willingness to consider specific proposals for the provision of additional facilities for international traffic or for the joint provision of international cables. It is an open secret that certain governments would like to take up with the American Government the question of jointly providing certain facilities and services and jointly regulating the rates of international connections provided by commercial enterprises.

As to the broad conception of an international network operated on a basis of world-wide public service, the government operating administrations have usually a sympathetic attitude, which is due in part to the example afforded by the Universal Postal Union.

A thorough survey would require the presentation of the policies and interests of each of the nations, but this is out of the question here.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In Japan there is complete government ownership and operation, with the single exception of a Danish owned cable laid long before Japan had adopted a communications policy. In Japan, as in some other countries, there is an apparent difficulty in harmonizing the radio interests of the communications department and those of the navy. While Japan's immediate concern in communications lies in the Far East, her government takes an active interest in world-wide communications and a particular interest in the improvement of services with the United States.

In Great Britain, the Dominions and the British possessions generally there is a large degree of government ownership and operation. Nevertheless several of the great cable systems of the world are operated by British companies and British private enterprise is encouraged to some extent in radio. The working balance which has been struck between government activity and private enterprise has given a commanding position to the British. Although of all the powers Great Britain is best able to take care of its own interests, the policy of the government has been to approach international communication matters in a broad and liberal manner.

As the practice of the United States—it can scarcely be called a policy—has been to leave the establishment and conduct of its international communications services to private enterprise, very largely American and unregulated as to international services, America in this regard is in a unique position among the nations. To what extent, under the circumstances, the American Government should participate in general international communications conferences is a question that concerns not only the United States but the other countries as well. Without taking a new tack the United States certainly can not participate in limited international arrangements looking toward the joint provision, by the countries immediately concerned, of new facilities or the joint regulation of rates of services provided by commercial enterprises.

No attempt will be made here to discuss the various courses open to the American Government or to conjecture the attitude that it is likely to adopt. Certain general statements, however, may be in place. The pressure of events will probably force it to take a more lively interest than heretofore in international communications and in communications with and between its possessions. The political, military, and naval significance of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

communications are becoming better understood; the American press is taking an interest in communications as affecting the import and export of news; and commerce and shipping are becoming aware of their requirements.

The actions of other countries, too, affect the United States. The American army and navy regard the development of communication facilities abroad as having an immediate bearing on their own concerns. The fact that the British Government now operates services between Canada and Great Britain affects American communication companies and other American interests. Readjustments of services and rates to aid foreign trade and news distribution promptly react on American interests.

The character of forthcoming general communications conferences will be largely influenced by whether or not the United States participates. With the United States not participating, the conferences will be composed of delegates representing countries having either complete or at least a large degree of public ownership and operation. With the United States participating, efforts will be made to compromise the interests of commercial enterprises with the interests of government operated systems. If the United States participates solely to further the immediate interests of American cable and radio companies, its participation will not be relished by those who envisage a world-wide network of communications operated on a public service basis.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Fig. 1—Railroads, ports and trade in relation to projected zones of influence. The names of the seven principal ports of Turkey before the First Balkan War are written in full capital letters. The letters D, E, F, G indicate small districts for which a special régime was devised.



Fig. 2—Proposed division of Turkey according to the Treaty of Sèvres and the Tripartite Agreement of 1920.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A NOTE ON THE POLITICAL MAP OF TURKEY

By Isaiah Bowman

THE PROPOSED DIVISIONS OF TURKEY

Before the World War, foreign financial interests in Turkey were principally of two sorts: 1, those associated with the Ottoman Public Debt; and 2, those that grew out of a series of concessions involving chiefly railroads and ports. The first map on the opposite page shows the railroads as they are today, and though there have been many changes since 1914 it indicates the principal foci of transportation interests then as now. Placed close to the names of the seven principal ports are two rectangles, one shaded, the other open. They represent the exports and imports respectively, the sizes of the rectangles being proportional to the value of the trade. The statistics are for 1910–1911, just before the Balkan wars. The statistics for the seven chief ports are as follows:

COMMERCE OF THE PRINCIPAL PORTS OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE (1910-11)

	Imports	*Exports*
Constantinople	31.48%	9.00%
Smyrna	10.87	20.60
Saloniki	10.64	5.04
Beirut	9.98%	4.66%
Haidar Pasha	Total of 5.94%	
Trebizond	2.24	1.28
Dedeagatch	1.65	1.82
Total value of exports in 1910–11		$80,000,000
Total value of imports in 1910–11		150,000,000

As a result of the Balkan Wars Saloniki and Dedeagatch were lost to Turkey. During the World War it was planned to parcel out large portions of Turkish territory among the principal Allies. Various treaties and agreements were signed to this effect: the London, Sykes-Picot, St. Jean de Maurienne, Sazonov-Paleologue, etc., sometimes called collectively the "Secret Treaties." The French and Russian zones took in the whole Armenian territory and traversed all rail and caravan routes across Anatolia. The British zones embraced Mesopotamia and strategic points in Palestine. The Italian zones encircled Smyrna. So much for early Allied agreements. Those of later date are embodied in the Treaty of Sèvres and the Tripartite Agreement, signed on the same day, August 10, 1920.

The territorial clauses of these treaties are illustrated in Fig. 2. Beneath the heavy lines that stand for proposed boundaries is a population density shading in four grades.[1] The solid lines represent the lines of the Treaty of Sèvres (except for the Persian boundary and the Russo-Turkish boundary of 1914 in the Caucasus); while the broken lines represent the Tripartite Agreement of Italy, France, and Great Britain (except for the line of the Armenian boundary shown by dots and dashes in the upper right-hand quadrant; on the Turkish side it is drawn as submitted by President Wilson on the invitation of the Treaty of Sèvres.)

[1]Both this map and that of population density are based on pre-war statistics and in many places the actual conditions today depart widely from those shown. Nevertheless such maps are of real value as showing where population established itself under stable conditions and where it is likely to resume its usual activities.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Fig. 3—Treaty lines in Thrace from 1878 to 1922.



Fig. 4—Administrative divisions of Syria under the French mandate. The shaded area represents a frontier zone of military occupation as designated by the Treaty of Sèvres and modified by the Angora Agreement.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE THRACIAN BELT OF POLITICAL STORMS

Map 3 gives the boundaries in Thrace that have been projected or actually delimited during the past forty-odd years. No natural or ethnic divisions can really be found. Elsewhere in the Balkan peninsula two (or rarely three) powers have been in conflict over disputed territory, whereas in Thrace five groups of interests are in conflict. Greece has sought to encircle Constantinople and shut off Bulgaria from the Aegean as well as Turkey from Europe. Bulgaria has persistently sought a territorial and commercial outlet to the Aegean on the south. Turkey has resisted both Greece and Bulgaria. And in 1920 the Powers put into force a special régime for the Zone of the Straits that introduced a fourth group of interests. The trade of Russia gives her also a primary interest as a fifth power.

The positions of the various treaty lines are geographically interesting. The line of San Stefano followed natural features in western Thrace; in eastern Thrace it would have produced serious dislocations in the life of that time because it cut across the grain of the country owing to the absence of dominating natural features that run in an east-west direction. The Treaty of Berlin that superseded it put the line in a more natural position, in closer relation to minor watersheds northeast of Adrianople while still retaining the natural features of river (Arda) and mountain crest (Black Balkans) in western Thrace for a considerable distance. The Treaty of Constantinople between Bulgaria and Turkey (1913) provided for a frontier on the Maritsa River for a short distance above its mouth. It then ran west of north, cutting across drainage and relief in such a way as to encircle Adrianople at a distance, while it gave to Bulgaria on the border of the Black Sea a block of territory whose southern margin followed the Resvaja River. The changes stipulated by Bulgaria in 1915 as part of the price of her entry into the World War placed her frontier on the Maritsa River opposite Adrianople and also gave her ownership of the *left bank* of the Maritsa. The border of the Zone of the Straits and of the Constantinople zone of the Treaty of Sèvres on the north side of the Sea of Marmara took advantage of natural features only to a limited degree, for the special régime under which these two territories were to operate was itself designed to provide flexibility of frontier arrangements.

THE SYRIAN MANDATE

Map 4 shows the administrative divisions of Syria. The shaded area represents the zone of military occupation as established in 1920 and the line of dots the new boundary of the occupied area as laid down in the Angora Agreement with France, 1920. By the Treaty of Sèvres, Syria was to be established as an independent state, with France as a mandatory power for the time being. It is divided into four governments or territories: Aleppo, Alaouite, Great Lebanon, and Damascus. These have an area of 60,000 square miles and a population of about 3,000,000. There are ten principal towns with a population of about 1,000,000 and ranging in size from 14,000 (Zahlah in the Lebanon) to 250,000 (Damascus and Aleppo). Physically, the country is divided into four main north-south belts of climate and relief. Along the coast is a belt of mountains and plateaus, and just within them lies a long, dry valley that represents a sunken block of the earth's crust. Farther inland on the east side of the valley is a highland belt which has more rain; and then comes a semi-arid plateau that grades into the Syrian Desert.

(Maps prepared by American Geographical Society.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOKS ON THE FAR EAST SINCE THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

By Kenneth Scott Latourette

CHINA AT THE CONFERENCE, A REPORT. By Westel W. Willoughby. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1922.

THE SHANTUNG QUESTION, A STUDY IN DIPLOMACY. By Ge-Zay Wood. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1922.

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE. By Raymond Leslie Buell. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1922.

AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA. By Tyler Dennett. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922.

THE CHRISTIAN OCCUPATION OF CHINA. Milton T. Stauffer, Editor. Shanghai: China Continuation Committee, 1922.

NOW that the Washington Conference has been over for ten months it is more nearly possible to appraise its results than in the weeks immediately succeeding it. It is true that not all participants at the gathering have acted on the treaties, but discussion and propaganda have partly subsided and we have emerged from the atmosphere of after-dinner speeches. Some of the projects agreed upon at the gathering have been carried out, as, for example, the revision of the Chinese tariff; others are in process of being carried out; and, more important still, on both sides of the Pacific public opinion and to a certain extent governmental policies have had time to become adjusted to the decisions of the Conference. What, then, shall be our estimate of the Conference? How successful has it been in allaying suspicion and in removing the causes of friction between the nations that are chiefly interested in the North Pacific? Has it been a failure, as some would have us believe; has it removed the danger of war between the United States and Japan; or are its achievements to be judged as somewhere between these two extremes?

The Japanese official position seems, on the whole, to be one of satisfaction at what was achieved at Washington. There are, of course, critics. Some of them are moved by genuine fear of the United States and resentment at what they deem her interference in Far Eastern affairs; others are finding fault with what was done, not so much from conviction as from the desire to embarrass

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the present cabinet; still others are saying little but disapprove of any restraint upon an aggressive policy of territorial expansion. On the whole, however, the articulate portion of the nation seems to feel that the danger of imminent war with the United States has been removed and that Japan was given an opportunity to present her case and was courteously listened to. It is not likely that any virulently anti-American book would now obtain the wide reading that Tokutomi's[1] had on the eve of the Conference. The present government, moreover, seems to be intent on carrying out in good faith the Washington agreements.

Among the Chinese there seems to be general although rather chastened approval. Ge-Zay Wood's book on the Shantung question is in a certain sense a semi-official utterance of the Chinese delegation, for much of the material which he presents was prepared for publicity purposes by the press department of that body. After giving the Chinese view of the controversy, he expresses himself as well satisfied by the decisions at Washington. In his concluding pages he states what in his judgment are the objections to the settlement, and goes on to say:

"There is much to be said for the Shantung Agreement reached at Washington. The very fact that the question was brought to a solution in connection with the Washington Conference was a matter for congratulation. China had thrice refused to negotiate directly with Japan about the restoration of the province; she had little hope of presenting the question to the League of Nations with any success; compelled to fall back upon direct negotiation, she would have great difficulty in winning her points. Now, as collateral to the Washington Conference, she debated the Shantung question with Japan, and settled it much to her satisfaction."

Dr. Willoughby gives a soberly written, well-documented account of the parts of the Conference that had to do with China. As a technical expert attached to the delegation he also reflects the opinion of the Chinese, although not to so great a degree. He, too, feels satisfaction at what was accomplished. His opinion is the more important because he discusses, not the Shantung question alone, as does Mr. Wood, but all phases of the Conference's action on China. Most thoughtful and well-

[1]Tokutomi, Japanese-American Relations, translated by S. Yanagiwara (Macmillan) contains some of the chapters of a virulently anti-American book that appeared in Japan on the eve of the Conference and attained a circulation of 300,000. For a more moderate Japanese point of view see K. K. Kawakami, Japan's Pacific Policy, (Dutton, 1922), a book written for the American reader.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

informed Chinese, unless committed to the Southern Government, probably feel with Professor Willoughby that it is a matter for congratulation that:

"Despite the undeniable breakdown of the authority of the Central Government of China; despite the fact that it had been obliged to make default upon certain of its foreign debts; despite the fact that there was in the south of China a political party and political organization which denied, *in toto*, the legitimacy of the Peking Government itself, China came from the Conference not only without any new administrative or other limitations upon her autonomous powers, but with the formal and unqualified assurance that the Powers would not take advantage of existing conditions to impose any new restraints upon her freedom of action."

In China itself there seems to be far more interest in internal politics than in the outcome of the Conference, and so far it has not, as Mr. Buell believes, increased the hostility of the Chinese towards the Japanese. Anti-Japanese feeling has, indeed, somewhat subsided.

In the United States the tension has undoubtedly been relieved. For at least the time being attention has been somewhat diverted from the Pacific and there are fewer prophecies of an early war with Japan than there were a year and a half ago. On the agreements made at the Conference, however, opinion is sharply divided. Some hail them as a great achievement. Others feel that by the 5–5–3 ratio and the Four-Power Treaty we have given away our case and have left Japan supreme in the Far East, quite beyond the reach of any force that we will be able to bring to bear. These two attitudes are but new expressions of conflicting convictions that are almost as old as our diplomatic relations with Japan and China. Mr. Dennett, in what is quite the most important connected narrative of our relations with the East of Asia before 1900 that has yet appeared, points out that for sixty years or more various policies have been contending for the mastery. One policy emphasizes cooperation with other powers and dependence upon treaties rather than the use of force or the acquisition of territorial outposts and naval bases. Another, while envisaging—at least occasionally—cooperation with other powers, stresses as our chief reliance our fleet and accordingly recommends the building of a large navy and the acquisition and retention of outposts in the Pacific and Asia. Still another policy is that of isolation, of action independent of all other powers.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As Mr. Dennett also points out, there has been a remarkable continuity of our policy and we have on the whole trusted to cooperation and treaties rather than to isolation or armed force. This reliance upon agreement was modified by our acquisition of Hawaii and the Philippines, but in the main it has predominated.

In choosing, then, as we did at Washington, to place our chief dependence for fair play and the maintenance of our rights in the East of Asia not upon our fleet but upon friendly cooperation with other interested powers, upon treaties, persuasion, the force of public opinion and the good faith of governments, we have been true to what has been the dominant note in our relations with the East of Asia. It is probable that a majority of well-informed Americans are content with this position, although it may later prove significant that so many are not. Mr. Buell's is the most comprehensive account of the Conference that has yet appeared in book form. He points out that the naval ratio and the Four-Power Treaty, while removing the danger of war between the United States and Great Britain and postponing—"let us hope indefinitely"—war between the United States and Japan, have made it possible for the United States successfully to attack Japan in Far Eastern waters or for Great Britain and the United States to unite in an attack on her. Since many Americans regret the adoption of a policy which would handicap us in a resort to force and continue to view Japan with distrust, it is inevitable that the Washington agreements and the policy of the Administration should come in for sharp criticism.

These, then, are the opinions in the three countries most deeply concerned with the Far Eastern features of the Washington settlement, for while Great Britain was a major party in the gathering her interest was primarily in naval competition. She is satisfied with the elimination of the danger of any possible war with the United States and is too much engrossed in the Near East and in the affairs of other portions of her far-flung empire to give much attention now to the Far East.[2] France, even more than Great Britain, is absorbed in Europe and the Near East and has little attention to spare for the Pacific.

The tension in the countries vitally interested has been relieved. But will it recur? No one can face the situation honestly

[2]See a British analysis of the situation in E. Golovin, The Problem of the Pacific (Glydendal, London, 1922).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

without acknowledging that the chances are all in favor of repeated crises.

In the first place, conditions in China are almost certain to continue to provoke at least the interference and probably the aggression of foreign powers. Here is a great country, with extensive natural resources and a teeming, industrious population. She is at once one of the world's greatest potential sources of raw materials and probably its greatest undeveloped market. Her industrialization and her equipment with modern transportation facilities will make her, if once order is restored, an inviting field for the investment of capital. Yet, as all the world knows, China is politically in a state little better than anarchy. Conditions are worse than they were ten or even six years ago, and there is no likelihood of marked improvement for many years to come.[3] It is true that in some sections there has been marked industrial development, that the public press is more in evidence than it was some years ago, that Western ideas are increasingly gaining currency, that in some localities there has been improvement in educational facilities and standards, and that in a few local centers, as in the province of Shansi and in the city of Peking, there is an orderly government. It is also true that a large proportion of those who know the Chinese best have confidence in the ability of the race to find its way out of the difficulties that now beset it and emerge with a stable government and a reconstructed civilization.

But all of these facts, important and significant as they are, must not be allowed to obscure the deplorable political condition in which China now finds herself or to foster a belief in the early termination of that condition. The country has scrapped the monarchy, and much of the national administrative machinery of the land was so dependent on the monarchical idea that it has disintegrated. It is obviously a task of decades and even centuries for so large a country to acquire the education and the experience in democratic, representative institutions on a national scale that are essential to the stability of a republic, and, on the other hand, it is probable that the democratic idea has become so strongly rooted that, combined with factional and sectional jealousies and the personal rivalries of leaders, it will

[3]Two recent general descriptions of conditions, neither of them entirely adequate, are Stanley High, China's Place in the Sun (Macmillan), and Bertrand Russell, The Problem of China (Century). Both are readable, but Russell's book is disappointing because one expects from a writer of his acumen a more penetrating analysis than he has given.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

make impossible or at least extremely difficult the restoration of any kind of strong monarchy. Add to this the corruption and intrigue that are the inheritance of the old régime and one has an extremely dark political outlook.

A second cause for uneasiness is that Japan cannot help being interested in China and the temptation to interfere in the affairs of her huge neighbor is periodically all but irresistible. Her situation is, of course, well known. Her growing population is confined to a limited area and is shut out by the white races from emigration to the less thickly settled fertile sections of the globe. Her one recourse is to become an industrial nation, and this she is rapidly doing. As an industrial nation she needs markets and raw materials and an outlet for any surplus capital that she may accumulate and she sees these at hand on the adjoining continent. Here, however, she finds intriguing Western powers, some of whom would, if they dared, close the door in her face. In addition, she has a martial tradition and an intense patriotism, strengthened by compulsory military training on the European model and by three successful wars. It is probably true, as Buell points out, that the growth and pressure of her population have sometimes been exaggerated. It is certainly true that in the past few years there has been a growth of liberalism and that the outcome and the aftermath of the Great War have been a blow to the aggressive military and imperialistic groups. It seems inevitable, however, that Japan will be increasingly interested in China and in Eastern Siberia, and unable to resist the temptation to active interference.

The Washington Conference, for all its pacific outcome and its naval settlements, has still further committed the United States to an active part in Far Eastern affairs. By the very act of calling the gathering America took a more emphatic lead in the adjustment of Far Eastern questions than ever before, and considered in the light of all our previous relations to the East of Asia the Conference means that unless we execute a radical *volte face* we are to have an increasing prominence in Far Eastern diplomacy. Our trade with China is as yet relatively negligible and our invested capital inconsiderable, but the attention of American business was turned toward the Far East during the Great War and there is a feeling abroad that the increasing amount of our capital seeking foreign investment and the growing surplus of our factories above our domestic needs will lead us to seek outlets

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

across the Pacific. It may be an indication, moreover, that we are later to modify our policy of dependence on international cooperation and treaties in the direction of a greater reliance upon force that in so many circles the Washington agreements were assailed as a surrender of America's future in the Pacific. This may be realized earlier than we suspect if the naval treaties fail of ratification by France and Italy. Prophecy is uncertain, but the trend of events undoubtedly points to a more and more active American participation in Far Eastern affairs.

For the moment, moreover, the United States is the chief obstacle to Japan's expansion. Their sense of fair play, their sentimental interest in the Chinese Republic, and their economic ambitions lead Americans to resent any further expansion of Japan at the expense of the latter's neighbors. Great Britain and France are too preoccupied elsewhere to make any active resistance to Japan and might even, as in the late war, acquiesce in exchange for support for their own interests. Russia is an unknown factor as far as the future is concerned. The situation on the continent invites and may at any time provoke Japanese interference. It seems, then, reasonably certain that there will from time to time be friction between the United States and Japan, with China as the helpless cause. This does not mean that the Washington Conference failed; far from it. Even at its least the gathering relieved the tension between the United States and Japan and probably averted war. It has cancelled the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and has made a combination of the two countries against America highly improbable. Should the Four-Power Treaty and the naval agreements go into effect the causes of friction will have been still further reduced. Partly as a result of the Conference, Japan has for the moment adopted a much more conciliatory policy toward China and Siberia. If it has meant nothing else, the Washington Conference has demonstrated that friction between the United States and Japan does not necessarily mean war. It could not, in the nature of the case, eliminate all the causes for friction, but it has shown that hostilities between the two countries are not inevitable. It has, moreover, given time for the work of these more slowly operating forces that make for peace. It now remains for intelligent men in both countries to take advantage of the opportunity that has been given them, and to see that friction, when it does recur, is reduced more easily and quickly than it was this last time.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOME RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

By Harry Elmer Barnes

General International Relations

THE EXPANSION OF EUROPE. By Ramsay Muir. London: Constable, 1922, 365 pp.

A largely re-written edition of a standard work. Too much space is assigned to British achievements.

EUROPE AND BEYOND. By J. A. R. Marriott. New York: Dutton, 1922, 335 pp.

An excellent brief survey of world politics since 1870, by a leading English publicist.

PROBLEMI SOCIOLOGICI DELLA GUERRA. By C. Gini. Bologna: Zanichelli, 1921, 390 pp.

A volume of important essays, explaining wars as due primarily to pressure of population.

ASPETTI SOCIALI ED ECONOMICI DELLA GUERRA MONDIALE. By Achille Loria. Milan: Vallardi, 1921, 458 pp.

A suggestive book by a well-known exponent of economic determinism.

Foreign Relations of the United States

THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS. By Quincy Wright. New York: Macmillan, 1922, 412 pp.

A critical comparison of the powers and duties of governmental organs in foreign relations under international and constitutional law. A valuable supplement to Matthews' recent volume.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES. By Graham H. Stuart. New York: The Century Company, 1922, 404 pp.

An excellent survey of the commercial and diplomatic factors involved in the recent relations of the United States with Latin America.

LA POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS EN EL CONTINENTE AMERICANO. By R. de Cárdenas. Havana: Sociedad Editorial Cuba Contemporánea, 1921, 284 pp.

A remarkably charitable and sympathetic exposition of the growth of the United States as a world power.

Europe

CROSS-CURRENTS IN EUROPE TODAY. By Charles A. Beard. Boston: Marshall Jones, 1922, 278 pp.

Probably the ablest analysis of European problems which has appeared from the pen of an American writer.

THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN EUROPE. By L. Haden Guest. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1922, 318 pp.

An interesting and fairly judicious survey of post-war developments in Central and Eastern Europe.

SOCIALIZATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE. By H. Ströbel. London: King, 1922, 341 pp.

An objective study of the principal socialistic experiments in Europe since 1917. Especially valuable for the German socialization program.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LET FRANCE EXPLAIN. By F. Bausman. London: Allen and Unwin, 1922, 260 pp.

The most trenchant indictment of French and Russian imperialists which has yet appeared in English.

LE LIVRE ROUGE AUSTRICHIEN DE 1919. By C. Jordan (Ed.). Paris: Costes, 1922, 3 volumes.

A valuable collection of documents from Austrian archives on responsibility for the World War.

LES ORIGINES ET LES RESPONSABILITÉS DE LA GRANDE GUERRE. By E. Bourgeois and G. Pagès. Paris: Hachette, 1922, 500 pp.

An authoritative conventional interpretation.

ENTENTE DIPLOMACY AND THE WORLD, 1909–1914. By B. De Siebert and G. A. Schreiner. New York: Putnam's, 1922, 762 pp.

An important documentary revelation of Entente diplomatic policy.

LE COMBAT DES TROIS. By Mermeix. Paris: Ollendorf, 1922, 308 pp.

A survey of the diplomatic duel since 1918, which is interpreted as ending in an English victory.

LA POLITIQUE RHÉNANE. DISCOURS PARLEMENTAIRES. By Maurice Barrès. Paris: Bloud and Gay, 1922, 143 pp.

Passionate parliamentary appeals for a French "national policy" in "La Rhénanie."

HISTOIRE DE FRANCE CONTEMPORAINE. TOME NEUVIÈME: LA GRANDE GUERRE. By E. Lavisse (Ed.). Paris: Hachette, 1922, 560 pp

An important cooperative work by distinguished French historians. By far the best history of the war in the French language.

FRENCH PUBLIC FINANCE. By Harvey E. Fisk. New York: Bankers Trust Company, 1922, 363 pp.

A thorough study.

HISTOIRE POLITIQUE. CHRONIQUE DE QUINZAINE. By Raymond Poincaré. Paris: Plon, 1922, 299 pp.

The fourth volume in the series. It gives the French Premier's views on the important period which included the Conferences of Washington and Cannes.

LA FRANCIA DEL DOPO-GUERRA E IL PROBLEMA DELLE RELAZIONI FRANCO-ITALIANE. By Rodolfo Foa. Milan: Société d'éditions Unitas, 1922.

An analysis by an Italian journalist with keen perceptions.

RECONSTRUCTION IN FRANCE. By William MacDonald. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922, 349 pp.

Gives many useful facts in readable form.

THE WRECK OF EUROPE. By Francesco Nitti. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1922, 294 pp.

The American edition of the former Italian Prime Minister's attack on the peace settlement which, he thinks, placed cultured German peoples on a plane of mere equality with inferior barbarians such as Poles, Czechs and Serbians.

MODERN ITALY. By T. Tittoni. New York: Macmillan, 1922, 236 pp.

A general, not very interesting, survey of contemporary Italian civilization. Williamstown Lectures.

BOLCEVISMO ITALIANO. By M. Pantaleoni. Bari: Laterza, 1922, 276 pp.

An account of post-war radicalism.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DAS SAARGEBIET UNTER DER HERRSCHAFT DES WAFFENSTILLSTANDSABKOMMENS UND DES VERTRAGS VON VERSAILLES. Berlin: Stilke, 1921, 362 pp.

An important collection of articles, speeches, despatches and newspaper notices.

THE ECONOMIC RESOURCES OF AUSTRIA. By K. Hudeczek. London: Dawson, 1922, 74 pp.

A brief compilation.

THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC. By J. Cisar and F. Pokorny. London: Fisher Unwin, 1922, 276 pp.

An excellent handbook.

POLAND REBORN. By Ray Devereux. New York: Dutton, 1922, 256 pp.

An interesting discussion of post-war Poland, chiefly valuable because of the scarcity of English works on this subject.

DISMEMBERED HUNGARY. By L. Buday. Budapest, 1922, 288 pp.

A Magyar *historia calamitatum*.

EMINENT EUROPEANS. By Eugene S. Bagger. New York: Putnam's, 1922, 283 pp.

Character studies of ten contemporary European personalities, some of them important, some unimportant but none the less interesting.

THE A. B. C. OF COMMUNISM. A POPULAR EXPLANATION OF THE PROGRAMME OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF RUSSIA. By N. Buharin and E. Preobrazhinsky. London: Communist Party of England, 1922, 422 pp.

Probably the most comprehensive apologia in English.

THE RUSSIAN TURMOIL. By A. J. Denikin. London: Hutchinson, 1922, 344 pp.

Memoirs of the Anti-Bolshevik leader.

LA DETTE PUBLIQUE DE LA RUSSIE. By A. Raffalovitch, P. Apostol, A. Michelson, M. Bernatzky and W. Novitsky. Paris: Payot, 1922, 240 pp.

Data on the fiscal history of contemporary Russia.

LA RECONSTITUCION DE EUROPA Y LA RUSIA DE LOS SOVIETS. By Andrés Révész. Madrid: Biblioteca Internacional, 1922.

Interesting comments of an eminent Spanish publicist on the Genoa and The Hague Conferences.

THE SECOND YEAR OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. By H. W. V. Temperley. London: Hutchinson, 1922, 223 pp.

A summary of the problems and achievements of the League.

THE GENOA CONFERENCE. By J. Saxon Mills. London: Hutchinson, 1922, 436 pp.

The policies and activities of Lloyd George at the Conference described in eulogistic fashion. The volume contains some valuable documents.

REPARATIONS, TRADE AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE. By L. L. B. Angas. London: King, 1922, 351 pp.

A criticism of the indemnity policy with a consideration of its relation to inflation, the dumping of goods and unemployment.

LA CRISE. HIER-AUJOURD'HUI-DEMAIN. (LES DOCUMENTS DU TEMPS.) By J. F. A. B. Paris: Stock, 1922, 190 pp. 5th ed.

The author concludes that the world's economic recuperation will come from peace in Europe and the reconstruction of the European market, rather than in the search for new markets.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The British Empire

THE FISCAL AND DIPLOMATIC FREEDOM OF THE BRITISH OVERSEAS DOMINIONS. By Edward Porritt. Oxford: Clarendon, 1922, 492 pp.

A survey of the development of fiscal and administrative independence in the self-governing dominions, published under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

THE ORGANIZATION OF A BRITANNIC PARTNERSHIP. By R. A. Eastwood. New York: Longmans, 1922, 148 pp.

A contribution to the understanding of the British Empire's problems.

L'IRLANDE ET LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS. By Francisque Gay. Paris: Bloud and Gay, 1921, 164 pp.

The author believes "Ireland would be infallibly assured her liberty" by adopting a policy of "pacific work" rather than by the catastrophic policy of the past.

THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND THEORIES OF THE HINDUS. By B. K. Sarkar. Leipzig: Verlag von Markert und Petters, 1922, 242 pp.

A stimulating survey containing frequent comparisons with the institutions of Western Europe.

GANDHI AND ANARCHY. By C. Sankaran Nair. Madras: Tagore, 1922, 262 pp.

An Indian publicist's critical analysis.

The Near East

THE WESTERN QUESTION IN TURKEY AND GREECE. By Arnold J. Toynbee. London: Constable, 1922, 420 pp.

An indispensable book, stressing the growing Oriental impatience with Western interference, and indicating the disastrous results of Allied bungling in the Near East.

SPEAKING OF THE TURKS. By Mufty-Zade K. Zia Bey. New York: Duffield, 1922, 271 pp.

A young Turk, resident ten years in the United States, goes back to Constantinople and describes the changes since the war in Turkish habits and outlook.

A HISTORY OF THE BALKAN PENINSULA FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT DAY. By Ferdinand Schevill. New York: Harcourt, 1922, 558 pp.

The most up-to-date and reliable history of the Balkans in the English language.

LES ALLIÉS ET LA CRISE ORIENTALE. By E. Nicol. Paris: L'Edition Universelle, 1922.

A timely work.

LA CICILIE ET LE PROBLÈME OTTOMAN. By Pierre Redan. Paris: Gauthier-Villars, 1921, 144 pp.

An argument for a more vigorous French policy in the Levant.

LA RELÈVEMENT ÉCONOMIQUE DE LA GRÈCE. By E. J. Tsouderos. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1920, 254 pp.

The author describes the economic resources and problems of contemporary Greece.

LA MORT DE NOTRE CHÈRE FRANCE EN ORIENT. By Pierre Loti. Paris: Calmann-Lèby, 1920, 295 pp.

A violent criticism of Anglo-Greek policies in the Near East since 1918. France, M. Loti argues, is the logical champion of the Turks.

THE HEART OF ARABIA. By St. J. B. Philby. London: Constable, 1922, 2 volumes, 386, 354 pp.

A work on contemporary Arabia and its international problems.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Africa

THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH OCCUPATION OF EGYPT. By W. S. Blunt. New York: Knopf, 1922, 416 pp.

A piece of inside history.

THE SUDAN IN EVOLUTION. By Percy F. Martin. London: Constable, 1921, 557 pp.

A comprehensive work on the development of this area in recent times.

EDUCATION IN AFRICA. By Thomas J. Jones (Ed.). New York: Phelps-Stokes Fund, 1922.

A thorough study by American investigators of African needs in primary and secondary education, and in training in agriculture, trades, medicine and religion.

The Far East

THE RISING TEMPER OF THE EAST. By Frazier Hunt. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1922, 247 pp.

A vivid, but impressionistic, sketch of the rise of democratic and nationalistic sentiment in the Far East. Written in sympathetic mood.

THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA. By Sun Yat Sen. New York: Putnam's, 1922, 265 pp.

A plea that "the vast resources of China be developed internationally under a socialistic scheme." The author looks upon the Chinese problem as chiefly economic.

CHINA AWAKENED. By M. T. Z. Tyau. New York: Macmillan, 1922, 475 pp.

A somewhat indiscriminate catalogue of recent changes in Chinese civilization due to Occidental influences.

THE SHANTUNG QUESTION. By Ge-Zay Wood. New York: Revell, 1922, 372 pp.

A moderate work from the Chinese point of view, reprinting valuable documents.

WAR AND ARMAMENT LOANS OF JAPAN. By M. Kobayashi. Oxford: Clarendon, 1922, 221 pp.

A compilation.

Latin America

HISTORY OF THE LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS. By W. S. Robertson. New York: D. Appleton, 1922, 615 pp.

A substantial work, devoted mainly to political and diplomatic events.

THE NEW LATIN AMERICA. By J. Warshaw. New York: Crowell, 1922, 415 pp.

A survey of contemporary Latin American civilization with the emphasis on economic factors.

Miscellaneous

THE NORTHWARD COURSE OF EMPIRE. By Vilhjalmur Stefansson. New York: Harcourt, 1922, 274 pp.

A suggestive work on the colonial possibilities of the Arctic and sub-Arctic areas.

THE TREND OF HISTORY. By W. K. Wallace. New York: Macmillan, 1922, 372 pp.

A suggestive review of certain phases of national and international politics during the last century.

THE WORLD AT THE CROSS-ROADS. By B. L. Brasol. London: Hutchinson, 1922, 409 pp.

Verbose and prejudiced discussions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOURCE MATERIAL

I

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS OFFICIALLY PRINTED

By Denys P. Myers

Documents may be procured from the following: United States, Government Printing Office, Washington; Great Britain, P. S. King & Son, 2 and 4 Great Smith Street, London, S. W. 1; France, Librairie Terquem, 1 Rue Scribe, Paris; League of Nations, World Peace Foundation, 40 Mt. Vernon Street, Boston; International Labor Office, World Peace Foundation. For other countries no special references can be given except application to the respective Foreign Offices.

ARMAMENT

AMERICAN NAVAL POLICY as Outlined in Messages of Presidents of the United States from 1790. Washington, Govt. Printing Office, 1922. 30 p. 23½ cm. 5 cents.

GREAT BRITAIN. Navy Estimates for the year 1922–23. (Presented to Parliament by command of His Majesty.) Ordered, by the House of Commons, to be printed, April 26, 1922. London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1922. 290 p. 24½ cm. (Parl. Pap., 1922, House of Commons, 74.) 15 s.

GREAT BRITAIN. Navy Estimates, 1922–1923. Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1922–1923. Presented to Parliament by command of His Majesty. London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1922. 14 p. 24½ cm. (Parl. Pap., 1922. Cmd. 1603.) 6 d.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS. THIRD ASSEMBLY. Budget Expenditure on National Defence, 1913 and 1920–1922. Geneva, September, 1922. 51 p. 32 cm. (A. 31 (*a*). 1922.) $.60.

Contains accounts of Australia, Belgium, Brazil, British India, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Rumania, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS. THIRD ASSEMBLY. Report of the Temporary Mixed Commission on Armaments. 83 p. 31½ cm. (A. 31. 1922. C. 631. 1922.) (C. T. A. 173.) $.80.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS. THIRD ASSEMBLY. Reduction of Armaments. Report of the Third Committee to the Third Assembly. Rapporteur: Lord Robert Cecil. 14, 14 p. 33 cm. (A. 124. 1922. IX. [A. III. 17. 1922.]) $.30.

Contains the text of the treaty of guaranty proposal of the rapporteur, the proposal for an international conference on reparation and interallied debts to effect "moral disarmament," and numerous other important propositions voted with only editing changes by the Third Assembly on September 26.

NAVY. Fleets, British and Foreign Countries, at 1st February, 1922. Return of particulars of launch, displacement, armaments, etc. London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1922. 108 p. 24½ cm. (Parl. Pap., 1922, House of Commons, 123.) 2 s.

WARSHIPS. To Scrap Certain Naval Vessels, report to accompany H. R. 11214; submitted by Mr. Poindexter . . . June 30, 1922. Washington, Govt. Printing Office, 1922. 1 p. 23½ cm. (67th Cong., 2d sess. S. Rept. 802.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BESSARABIA

TREATY between the Principal Allied Powers and Rumania respecting Bessarabia. Signed at Paris, October 28, 1920. Presented to Parliament by command of His Majesty. London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1922. 11 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 15 (1922). Cmd. 1747.)

CLAIMS

AGREEMENT between the United States and Germany for a Mixed Commission to determine the amount to be paid by Germany in satisfaction of Germany's financial obligations under the treaty concluded between the two Governments on August 25, 1921. Signed August 10, 1922. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1922. 8 p. 23½ cm. (Treaty Series, No. 665.)

ENEMY-OWNED PROPERTY. Hearing before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 67th Cong., 2d sess., on S. 3852.... Washington, Government Printing Office, 1922. 42 p. 23½ cm.

EXPENSES of Mixed Claims Commission, United States and Germany. Supplemental estimate of appropriation for Department of State, fiscal year 1923, for Mixed Claims Commission, United States and Germany. August 25, 1922. Washington, Govt. Printing Office, 1922. 4 p. 23½ cm. (67th Cong., 2d sess. H. Doc. 276). 5 cents.

VERA CRUZ. Claims Arising out of the Occupation of Vera Cruz. Communication from the President of the United States, transmitting a report from the Acting Secretary of State, together with a letter from the Acting Director of the Bureau of the Budget, respecting the claims of nationals of Spain, France, Great Britain, Germany, Austria, Italy, Cuba, and the United States arising out of the occupation by the American forces of Vera Cruz, Mexico, in 1914. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1922. 23½ cm. (67th Cong., 2d sess. Sen. Doc. No. 252.)

DANUBE

CONVENTION Instituting the Definitive Statute of the Danube. Signed at Paris, July 23, 1921. (British Ratification deposited March 30, 1922.) Presented to Parliament by command of His Majesty. London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1922. 31 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 16 (1922). Cmd. 1754.)

DANZIG

CONSTITUTION of the Free City of Danzig. (German text with translations in English and French.) 20, 20, 20 p. 33½ cm. (*League of Nations Official Journal*, Special Supplement No. 7, July, 1922.) $.75.

GENOA CONFERENCE

CORRESPONDENCE between His Majesty's Government and the French Government respecting the Genoa Conference. Presented to Parliament by command of His Majesty. London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1922. 10 p. 24½ cm. (Parl. Paps., 1922. Miscellaneous No. 6 (1922). Cmd. 1742.)

HAGUE CONFERENCE

PAPERS relating to The Hague Conference. June–July, 1922. Presented to Parliament by command of His Majesty. London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1922. 18 p. 23½ cm. (Parl. Pap., 1922. Cmd. 1724.) 6 d. net.

Consists of the Report of the non-Russian commission, and of its subcommissions on private property, debts and credits. The conference was in session June 15 to July 20.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

HAPSBURG FAMILY

DOCUMENTS diplomatiques concernant les tentatives de restauration des Habsbourg sur le trône de Hongrie. (Août 1919–novembre 1921.) Prague, 1922.

This title taken from *L'Europe Nouvelle*, Sept. 23, 1922, p. 1,200, where the white book o Czechoslovakia is completely reprinted.

INTERALLIED DEBTS

DESPATCH to the Representatives of France, Italy, Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Rumania, Portugal and Greece at London respecting War Debts. Presented to Parliament by command of His Majesty. London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1922. 4 p. 24½ cm. (Parl. Paps., 1922. Miscellaneous No. 5 (1922). Cmd. 1737.)

Signed by Lord Balfour, August 1, 1922.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

N.B.—Current issues of the periodicals will not be reported. The Monthly Summary of the League of Nations, The Monthly Bulletin of Statistics and The League of Nations Official Journal are issued monthly. The Treaty Series is usually issued in volumes five or six times a year.

ASSEMBLY. Journal of the Third Assembly of the League of Nations. Geneva, 1922. No. 1—September 4, 1922 [—No. 25—Sunday, October 1, 1922]. 298 p., caption titles. 32 cm.

Not in commerce. Contains minutes of plenary and committee meetings, and communications for the information of the delegates.

ASSEMBLY. Verbatim Record of the Third Assembly of the League of Nations. 1st plenary meeting, Monday, September 4, 1922. . . .[—25th plenary meeting, Saturday, September 30, 1922]. 25 fascicles. 32 cm.

Not in commerce. French and English in parallel columns. A permanent revised edition will be issued.

COUNCIL. Minutes of the Nineteenth Session of the Council held at London from Monday, July 17, to Monday, July 24, 1922. Pp. 781–1020. 32½ cm. (*League of Nations Official Journal*, III, No. 8, Part II.)

Contains proceedings confirming A and B mandates, and texts—B mandates: Belgian for East Africa; British for East Africa, Cameroons and Togoland; French for Cameroons and Togoland; A mandates: British for Palestine; French for Syria and Lebanon.

COUNCIL. Report to the Third Assembly of the League on the Work of the Council and on the Measures taken to execute the Decisions of the Assembly. 83 p. 32½ cm. (A. 6. 1922.) $.80.

COUNCIL. Supplementary Report to the Third Assembly on the Work of the Council and on the Measures taken to execute the Decisions of the Assembly (July–August, 1922). 22 p. 32 cm. (A. 6 (*a*). 1922.) $.20.

MANDATED TERRITORIES

JEWS. Establishment of national home in Palestine, hearings on H. Con. Res. 52, expressing satisfaction at re-creation of Palestine as national home of Jewish race, April 18–21, 1922. Washington, Govt. Printing Office, 1922. iii, 170 p. 23½ cm.

MANDATE for Palestine. Letter from the Secretary to the Cabinet to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations of July 1, 1922, enclosing a Note in reply to Cardinal Gasparri's letter of May 15, 1922, addressed to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations. Presented to Parliament by command of His Majesty. London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1922. 8 p. 24½ cm. (Parl. Paps., 1922. Miscellaneous No. 4 (1922). Cmd. 1708.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MANDATES. Report presented to the Assembly [of the League of Nations] by the Sixth Committee. 3, 3 p. 32 cm. (A. 72. 1922. VI.)

PALESTINE. Correspondence with the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organization. Presented to Parliament by command of His Majesty. June, 1922. London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1922. 31 p. 24½ cm. (Parl. Paps., 1922. Cmd. 1700.) 6 d.

TOGOLAND. Report on the British Mandated Sphere of Togoland for 1920–21. London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1922. 24½ cm. (Parl. Pap., 1922. Cmd. 1698.) 1 s.

PANAMA CANAL

TREATIES and Acts of Congress relating to the Panama Canal. Annotated, 1921. [Compiled and annotated by J. J. McGuigan.] Mount Hope, C. Z., The Panama Canal Press, 1922. 258 p. 23½ cm. Paper, $1; buckram, $2.

A volume of Executive Orders is announced, which will supersede the following series:

EXECUTIVE ORDERS relating to the Isthmian Canal Commission. March, 1904, to June 12, 1911. Washington, Govt. Printing Office, 1911. x, 237 p. 23½ cm.

EXECUTIVE ORDERS relating to the Panama Canal. . . . Washington, Government Printing Office, 1913–15. 3 fascicles, pp. 239–399. 23½ cm.

Contents: Supplement No. 1, June 13, 1911, to March 3, 1913, inclusive; Supplement No. 2, March 4, 1913, to April 16, 1914, inclusive; Supplement No. 3, April 17, 1914, to June 30, 1915, inclusive.

A NEW AGREEMENT with Panama. . . . recommending. . . . abrogation of the so-called Taft Agreement, and the Negotiation of a New Agreement. Letter of the Under-Secretary of State, September 5, 1922. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1922. 2 p. 23½ cm. (67th Cong., 2d sess. Sen. Doc. No. 248.)

PASSPORTS

PASSPORTS. Executive order [amending Rules governing granting and issuing of passports in United States, approved June 13, 1920, and prescribing that passport issued by Secretary of State after January 3, 1918, to which is attached photograph and signature of person to whom passport is originally issued, will be accepted in lieu of identifying witness]. June 5, 1922. Washington, 1922. 1 p. folio. (No. 3690.)

REPARATION

REPARATION COMMISSION. I. Statement of Germany's Obligations under the heading of Reparations, etc., April 30, 1922. Extracts from the accounting records of the Reparation Commission. London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1922. 35 p. 24½ cm. 2 s. net. (At head of title: For official use.)

The first authentic statement of reparation accounts, inaugurating a series of publications giving "information as to Germany's payments under Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles and the distribution of such payments between the Allied Powers," which is to be issued at half-yearly intervals. Presumably the payments of Austria, Bulgaria and Hungary under the treaties of Saint Germain-en-Laye, Neuilly and Trianon will also be published.

Titles of two other volumes are announced: No. 2—Agreements concerning Deliveries in Kind to be made by Germany, under the heading of Reparations; No. 3—Official Documents relative to the amount of Payments to be effected by Germany, under the heading of Reparations (May 5, 1921–July 1, 1922).

The Introduction of No. 1 is signed by the General-Secretary of the Reparation Commission, Andrew McFadyean.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SLESVIG

TREATY between the Principal Allied Powers and Denmark relative to Slesvig. Signed at Paris, July 5, 1920. (With map.) Presented to Parliament by command of His Majesty. London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1922. 5 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 17 (1922). Cmd. 1585.)

TRADE

AIR. Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation of October 13, 1919. Procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications, and notification of the accession of Persia. [In continuation of "Treaty Series (1922], No. 2.") Presented to Parliament by command of His Majesty. London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1922. 9 p. 24½ cm. (Parl. Pap., 1922. Treaty Series No. 11 (1922). Cmd. 1741.)

CANADA. Supplementary Convention between the United States and Great Britain providing for the Accession of the Dominion of Canada to the Real and Personal Property Convention of March 2, 1899. Signed at Washington, October 21, 1921. . . . Washington, Government Printing Office, 1922. 2 p. 23½ cm. (Treaty Series, No. 663.)

HANDBOOK OF COMMERCIAL TREATIES. Digests of commercial treaties, conventions, and other agreements of commercial interest between all nations. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1922. xiv, 899 p. 23½ cm. (United States Tariff Commission, Washington.) $.75.

LEGAL. Convention between the United Kingdom and France respecting legal proceedings in civil and commercial matters. Signed at London February 2, 1922. (Ratifications exchanged at London May 2, 1922.) Presented to Parliament by command of His Majesty. London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1922. 10 p. 24½ cm. (Parl. Pap., 1922. Treaty Series. 1922. No. 5. Cmd. 1661.)

LITHUANIA. Agreement between the British and Lithuanian Governments respecting commercial relations. Signed May 6, 1922. Presented to Parliament by command of His Majesty. London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1922. 4 p. 24½ cm. (Parl. Pap., 1922. Treaty Series No. 9 (1922). Cmd. 1711.)

SALESMEN. . . . Convention between the United States and Paraguay. Facilitating the work of traveling salesmen. Signed at Washington, October 20, 1919. . . . Washington, Government Printing Office, 1922. 1 p. l., 5 p. 23½ cm. (Treaty Series, No. 662.)

A series of such treaties is coming into force between the United States and Latin American states.

WORLD WAR

STATISTICS of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War, 1914–1920. London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1922. 880 p. 33½ cm. 10 s. 6 d. net.

Dated, The War Office, March, 1922. This extensive work, divided into 32 parts, contains much information covering the war as a whole: XX, Strength of the belligerent armies; XXI, Enemy prisoners of war; XXVI, List of published despatches on military operations during the Great War; XXVIII, Armistices; XXIX, The military effort of the British Empire in the Great War; XXXI, Outline diary of main events in the various theatres of war.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOURCE MATERIAL

II

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS UNOFFICIALLY PRINTED

By Denys P. Myers

Relations between states are indexed in English alphabetical order under the name of the first state party thereto.

All dates are of the current year unless otherwise indicated.

Newspaper references are to the files which are most widely available. The letters A. P. indicate that the document is to be found in an Associated Press dispatch, and that it is probably available in any newspaper which is a member of that association.

AUSTRIA—*Economic restoration*—Agreement (protocols 1–3) between British, Czechoslovak, French and Italian Governments and Austria, under auspices of League of Nations, Geneva, October 3, *L'Europe nouvelle*, October 14, p. 1302; *Le Temps*, October 6, p. 2.

CHILE-PERU—Protocol of arbitration of Tacna-Arica dispute, and supplementary act, Washington, July 20, *Bulletin of the Pan-American Union*, Sept., p. 220.

CHINA—*Chinese Eastern Railway*—Note of United States announcing withdrawal of allied committee at Vladivostok and technical board at Harbin, in accordance with Washington Conference resolutions, Peking, Oct. 31, New York *Times*, Oct. 31, p. 1.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA-ITALY — Conference of foreign ministers, communiqué, Venice, Oct. 10, *Le Temps*, Oct. 11, p. 2.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC—Provisional Government installed on Oct. 21 by proclamation of Military Governor, Rear Admiral Robison, U.S.N., Oct. 20, New York *Times*, Oct. 21, p. 13.

EGYPT — *Constitution* — Committee report on changes recommended, summary, London *Times*, Oct. 23, p. 9.

GERMANY-RUSSIAN SOVIET GOVERNMENT — Concession to Germans subsequent to treaty of Rapallo of April 16, New York *Times*, Aug. 22, p. 17.

GERMANY-UNITED STATES—Agreement to establish claims commission. Berlin, Aug. 10, New York *Times*, Aug, 11, p. 1; *Amer. Journ. of Int. Law*, XVI, No. 4, *Sup.*

GREAT BRITAIN — *Coalition Government*—Conference of Conservative M. P.'s deciding to seek re-election separately, proceedings, Carlton Club, Oct. 19, London *Times*, Oct. 20, p. 8.

GREAT BRITAIN-IRAQ — Treaty of alliance, Bagdad, Oct. 10, London *Times*, Oct. 12, p. 14; New York *Times* (A. P.), summary, Oct. 12, p. 3.

FRANCE-TURKEY(Angora)—"Secret" treaty of London, March 9, 1921, *Current History*, XIV, 203.

GREECE—*Deposition of King Constantine*—Statement of king, Sept. 26, New York *Times* (A. P.), Sept. 29, p. 5.

REVOLUTION—Diplomatic and historical reports on events of Sept. 27, New York *Times* (A. P.), Sept. 29, p. 5.

Revolutionary Committee's decree transmitting power to new cabinet, Sept. 30, New York *Times* (A. P.), Oct. 3, p. 2.

See also World War—Turkey.

INDIA—*Army*—Government circular respecting recruiting of natives, May 30, London *Times*, Sept. 4, p. 4.

INTER-ALLIED DEBTS — Note of British Government to other debtor states, Aug. 1, London *Times*, Aug. 2, p. 8; New York *Times*, Aug. 2, p. 1; French text, *Le Temps*, Aug. 3, p. 1.

French reply, Sept. 1, *Le Temps*, Sept. 3, p. 1; London *Times*, Sept. 2, p. 8; *L'Europe nouvelle*, Sept. 9, p. 1145.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Statement of United States Treasury respecting British note to Allies, Aug. 24, New York *Times*, Aug. 25, p. 13.

INTER-ALLIED DEBTS — *History* — Message of President Wilson to Congress transmitting an agreement, dated June 16, 1919, recommending acceptance of special German reparation bonds in satisfaction of Belgium's obligations, Feb. 18, 1921, *Amer. Journ. of Int. Law*, XVI, No. 4, *Sup.*, p. 190.

INTER-ALLIED DEBTS—*United States* —Resolution of American Bankers Association, New York *Times*, Oct. 6, p. 8.
Address of Herbert Hoover, Secretary of Commerce, asserting that Europe can pay, Toledo, O., Oct 16, New York *Times*, Oct. 17, p. 1.

INTERNATIONAL MARITIME CONFERENCE—13th meeting, London, Oct. 9–11, London *Times* (summary), Oct. 10, p. 7; Oct. 11, p. 7; Oct. 12, p. 18.

ITALY-RUSSIA—Agreement concluded at Racconigi, Oct. 24, 1909, "Un livre noir," I, p. 357 (Paris, 1922).

ITALY-TURKEY (Angora) — "Secret" treaty of London, March 12, 1921, *Current History*, XIV, 204.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS—*Third Assembly*—Resolutions, *Monthly Summary of the League of Nations*, II, 226–244; partial, *Current History*, Nov., 1922, p. 194–201.

COUNCIL — Minutes of 19th session, July 17–24, *Official Journal*, III, No. 8, part II.

LITTLE ENTENTE — *Conference of foreign ministers at Prague*—Statement of Czechoslovakia, Aug. 29, 1922, *Le Temps*, Aug. 30, p. 2.

MANDATES — A and B mandates for African and Asia Minor territories (except Mesopotamia, now the Kingdom of Iraq), approved July 24, League of Nations, *Official Journal*, III, p. 862–891, 1007–1017.
A MANDATE for Palestine, *ibid.*, p. 1007; *Current History*, Nov., 1922, p. 271; London *Times*, July 26, p. 9.

MARITIME LAW — *Three-mile limit* — Ruling of United States Attorney General on jurisdiction, Oct. 16, New York *Times*, Oct. 17, p. 2.
See also Spirituous Liquors.

PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE—Rules of Court, March 24, 1922, *Amer. Journ. of Int. Law*, XVI, No. 4, *Sup.*, p. 173.

PHILIPPINES — Appeal of Parliamentary Mission to President, *The Nation*, Sept. 13, p. 260.
Reply of President, *ibid.*, p. 262.

POLAND—*Constitution*, March 17, 1921, *Current History*, XIV, 358.

RAILROADS — *International Conference* —Paris, Oct. 18–20, *Le Temps*, Oct. 18, p. 3, 6; Oct. 20, p. 5; Oct. 22, p. 4 (In fulfilment of Genoa Conference resolutions.)

REPARATION—All essential documents are printed in World Peace Foundation, *League of Nations*, V, Nos. 1–3.

REPARATION—*Allied powers*—Agreement respecting distribution, Spa, July 16, 1920, *Amer. Journ. of Int. Law*, XVI, No. 4, *Sup.*, p. 197.
Agreement among allied powers as to amount, Jan. 29, 1921, *Amer. Journ. of Int. Law*, XVI, No. 4, *Sup.*
Ultimatum in re same, March 3, 1921, *ibid.*
Agreement of financial ministers, March 11, 1922, *Amer. Journ. of Int. Law*, XVI, No. 4, *Sup.*
CONFERENCE OF LONDON, Aug. 7–14— British communiqué, Aug. 14, *Le Temps*, Aug. 16, p. 1.
French résumé of negotiations, Aug. 14, New York *Times*, Aug. 16, p. 7; *Le Temps*, Aug. 16, p. 1.
Belgian declaration, Aug. 14, *Le Temps*, Aug. 16, p. 2.
Report of committee of experts on "productive guaranties" proposed by France, Aug. 9, *L'Europe nouvelle*, Aug. 19, p. 1046.
Memorandum of British Government on reforms, *ibid.*, Aug. 19, p. 1048.

REPARATION—*Coal*—Spa agreement, July 16, 1920, *Amer. Journ. of Int. Law*, XVI, No. 4, *Sup.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Declaration of F. Schroeder, German minister, on coal deliveries, Aug. 30, *L'Europe nouvelle*, Sept. 9, p. 1144.

REPARATION—*Great Britain*—German Reparation (Recovery) Act, March 24, 1921, *Amer. Journ. of Int. Law*, XVI, No. 4, *Sup.*

REPARATION—*Schedule of Payments*—Notification by commission to Germany of total obligation, April 28, 1921, *Amer. Journ. of Int. Law*, XVI, No. 4, *Sup.*

SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS, May 5, 1921, *Amer. Journ. of Int. Law*, XVI, No. 4, *Sup.*

SUPREME COUNCIL—Ultimatum, London, May 5, 1921, *Amer. Journ. of Int. Law*, XVI, No. 4, *Sup.*

REPARATION COMMISSION — *Deliveries in kind*—Franco-German agreement, Wiesbaden, Oct. 6, 1921, *Amer. Journ. of Int. Law*, XVI, No. 4, *Sup.*
Decision of commission respecting, Oct. 20, 1921, *ibid.*
French instructions for executing Wiesbaden agreement, *Le Temps*, Aug. 11, p. 4.
Commission's action on French program of waterway development by German labor, *Le Temps*, Aug. 6, p. 1.

REPARATION COMMISSION — *Germany*—FINANCIAL CONTROL—Organization of financial control, exchange of notes between Committee of Guaranties and Germany, July 18–21, 1922, *Le Temps*, July 23, p. 6.
Annexes, *ibid.*, July 24, p. 1.
French (Barthou) proposal for control of German finances, Oct. 20, *Le Temps*, Oct. 22, p. 1.
British (Bradbury) proposal, Oct. 6, summary, *Le Temps*, Oct. 23, p. 1.

REPARATION COMMISSION — *Germany*—MORATORIUM ON CASH PAYMENTS—Decision according provisional delay, Jan. 13, *Amer. Journ. of Int. Law*, XVI, No. 4, *Sup.*
Decision for 1922 and reforms to be effected by Germany, March 21, *Amer. Journ. of Int. Law*, XVI, No. 4, *Sup.*
German note of July 12, 1922, requesting suspension for 1922–24, *Le Temps*, July 14, p. 2; *L'Europe nouvelle*, Aug. 12, p. 1006.
Reply of commission to request for reduction of July 15 payment, July 13, *L'Europe nouvelle*, Aug. 12, p. 1007; *Le Temps*, July 15–16, p. 1.
Decision of the commission relative to 1922 payments, Aug. 31, *ibid.*, p. 1145; *Le Temps*, Sept. 2, p. 1.
Belgian note to Germany relative to delivery of bonds covering current payments due, Sept. 13, *Le Temps*, Sept. 15, p. 1.

RUSSIAN SOVIET GOVERNMENT—*Property rights*—Law of May 22, 1922, *The Nation*, Aug. 2, p. 132.
Decision of Central Executive Committee, June 18, 1922, *Journal du droit international*, XLIX, 501.

RUSSIAN SOVIET GOVERNMENT—TURKEY — Treaty defining mutual policies, boundaries, etc., Moscow, March 16, 1921, *Current History*, Nov., 1922, p. 277.

RUSSIAN SOVIET GOVERNMENT—UKRAINIAN SOVIET GOVERNMENT—Alliance, Moscow, Dec. 28, 1920, *Current History*, Oct., 1922, p. 107.

SPIRITUOUS LIQUORS—*United States*—Exchange of notes with British Government respecting importation from British possessions, June 26, Oct. 13, New York *Times*, Oct. 17, p. 3.

TURKEY—Nationalist Pact, basis of Angora Government, Jan. 28, 1920, New York *Times*, Oct. 1, p. 3; *The Nation*, Oct. 25, p. 447; *Current History*, Nov., 1922, p. 280.
Assumption of national de jure control—Statement of Premier Lloyd George respecting Kemalist policy, Sept. 23, 1922, New York *Times*, Sept. 23, p. 1.
DEPOSITION OF SULTAN—Decision of Grand National Assembly (Angora); law of deposition as from March 16, 1920, Angora, Nov. 2, New York *Times* (A. P.), Nov. 4, p. 1, 4.
Diplomatic note notifying powers that Grand National Assembly considers all treaties of Constantinople régime since March 16, 1920, null and void, Nov. 3, New York *Times*, Nov. 4, p. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC DEBT—Note of National Government to Ottoman Public Debt Administration declaring all engagements since March 16, 1920, null and void, Oct. 8, London *Times*, Oct. 21, p. 10.
See World War—Turkey.

VERSAILLES — *Treaty* — PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INTERESTS—French note refusing Germany reduction of monthly compensation payments, July 26, 1922, *Le Temps*, Aug. 2, p. 1.
German reply, Aug. 1, and French ultimatum, Aug. 1, *ibid.*, Aug. 3, p. 1.
German reply to French ultimatum, Aug. 5, *Le Temps*, Aug. 6, p. 4.
"Sanctions" of French Government, *Le Temps*, Aug. 6, p. 4.
German memorandum on legality of French sanctions, *Le Temps*, Aug. 9, p. 4.
German protest on French "measures of retortion," *Le Temps*, Aug. 14, p. 2.
German note on turning over £500,000, Aug. 15, *Le Temps*, Aug. 17, p. 2.

VERSAILLES — *Treaty* — "WAR CRIMINALS"—Protocol signed on behalf of Germany at deposit of ratifications, Jan. 10, 1920, *Amer. Journ. of Int. Law*, XVI, No. 4, *Sup.*
Note of allied powers, May 7, 1920, *Amer. Journ. of Int. Law*, XVI, No. 4, *Sup.*
Note of Conference of Ambassadors to Germany reclaiming rights under Part VII of treaty, *Le Temps*, Aug. 30, p. 1.

WORLD WAR—*Turkey*—Proposed revision of treaty of Sèvres, London, March 12, 1921, *Current History*, XIV, 347. (Accepted by both Turkish factions; rejected by Greece.)

WORLD WAR—*Allied powers*—ARMISTICE — Angora Government's armistice conditions to Greece, Sept. 15, *Le Temps*, Sept. 17, p. 1.
Appeal of Allies to Angora Government to accept cessation of hostilities, Sept. 23, New York *Times* (A. P.), Sept. 24, p. 1; *Current History*, Nov., 1922, p. 187.
Interim reply of Angora Government, Sept. 29, New York *Times* (A. P.), Sept. 30, p. 2, and Oct. 2, p. 1; London *Times*, Oct. 2, p. 12.
Reply of Angora to note of Sept. 23, Oct. 4, London *Times*, Oct. 9, p. 11; *Le Temps*, Oct. 7, p. 1, and Oct. 9, p. 1; New York *Times* (A. P.), Oct. 6, p. 3.
Armistice, text, Oct. 11 (effective Oct. 14–15 midnight), *Le Temps*, Oct. 13, p. 6; London *Times*, Oct. 14, p. 9.
CONFERENCE OF ALLIES, Paris, Sept. 20–25, communiqués, *L'Europe nouvelle*, Sept. 30, p. 1241.
British semi-official (Reuter) statements of policy, Sept. 17–22, *L'Europe nouvelle*, Sept. 30, p. 1239; *Le Temps*, Sept. 18, p. 1.
Italian policy, communiqué, Sept. 17, London *Times*, Sept. 18, p. 10.
Bulgarian policy, Sofia Oct. 8, New York *Times* (A. P.), Oct. 19, p. 3.
RUSSIA—Note to Great Britain, Sept. 22, *L'Europe nouvelle*, Sept. 30, p. 1240; *Le Temps*, Sept. 24, p. 2.
Note to Great Britain on Near East, Sept. 27, *L'Europe nouvelle*, Oct. 7, p. 1271.
Protest against blocking of Straits by British action, Oct. 2, *Le Temps*, Oct. 4, p. 1; *L'Europe nouvelle*, Oct. 7, p. 1271.
Note demanding seat in peace conference, New York *Times* (A. P.), Oct. 21, p. 4.

SMYRNA—Statement of Ferid Bey, Angora minister at Paris, denying charges of massacre, Oct. 16, New York, *Times*, Oct. 17, p. 4; *Le Temps*, Oct. 17, p. 1.

THRACE—Allied decision respecting Greek evacuation, Oct. 7, London *Times*, Oct. 9, p. 12, col. 3; *Le Temps*, Oct. 9, p. 1.

TRANS-CAUCASIA—Protest on exclusion of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia from peace conference, Sept. 27, London *Times*, Oct. 4, p. 12.

UNITED STATES—Invitation of Great Britain, France and Italy to United States to be represented at Lausanne conference, Oct. 28, New York *Times*, Oct. 29, p. 1.
Aide-mémoire of United States, defining American interests and stating intention to send observer, Washington, Oct. 31, New York *Times* (A. P.), Nov. 1, p. 6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

MARCH 15, 1923

Two Years of American Foreign Policy	*A*	1
The Tariff as a Factor in American Trade	*Oscar W. Underwood*	25
The United States and Reparations	*Allyn A. Young*	35
Islam and Britain	*Sir Valentine Chirol*	48
German Public Opinion Today	*Richard Edwards*	59
Mr. Lloyd George's Foreign Policy	*Herbert A. L. Fisher*	69
Ethics and International Relations	*John Dewey*	85
The World Oil Situation	*A. C. Bedford*	96
Canada and Foreign Policy	*J. A. Stevenson*	108
Mexican Problems	*T. Esquivel Obregon*	121
Islam in 1923, Map and Statistics	*Lawrence Martin*	138
The New Russian Economic Policy	*Arthur Bullard*	140
Some Recent Books on International Affairs	*Harry E. Barnes*	147
Source Material	*Denys P. Myers*	155

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE
Editor

HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG
Managing Editor

HARRY ELMER BARNES
Bibliographical Editor

DENYS P. MYERS
Source Material Editor

Editorial Advisory Board

ISAIAH BOWMAN
GEORGE H. BLAKESLEE
STEPHEN P. DUGGAN
JOHN W. DAVIS
HARRY A. GARFIELD
EDWIN F. GAY
ALEXANDER LEGGE
LEO S. ROWE
GEORGE W. WICKERSHAM

Published quarterly by Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Subscription, $5.00 a year, post-free to any address in the world. Subscriptions, and inquiries regarding advertising, should be addressed to the Business Manager, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 25 West 43rd Street, New York, N. Y.

The Editors will be glad to consider manuscripts offered for publication, but no manuscript will be returned unless it is accompanied by a stamped and addressed envelope, and the Editors will take no responsibility for manuscripts that may be lost.

Entered as second-class matter September 12, 1922, at the post-office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879

VOL. I., NO. 3.

Copyright, 1923, by FOREIGN AFFAIRS. *Printed in U. S. A.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

A, Anonymous * * * *OSCAR W. UNDERWOOD*, United States Senator from Alabama, Democratic leader in the Senate from 1920 to 1923 * * * *ALLYN A. YOUNG*, Professor of Economics, Harvard, Director of the Bureau of Research of the War Trade Board, 1917–1918, Chief of the Division of Economics and Statistics on the American Delegation at the Paris Conference * * * *SIR VALENTINE CHIROL*, for fourteen years director of the foreign department of the London *Times*, author of "Indian Unrest", "The Egyptian Problem," etc. * * * *RICHARD EDWARDS*, recently returned from a visit to Europe * * * *HERBERT A. L. FISHER*, President of the Board of Education in Mr. Lloyd George's Cabinet, 1916–1922, former Vice-Chancellor of Sheffield University * * * *JOHN DEWEY*, Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University since 1904, author of many books on philosophy, politics and education * * * *A. C. BEDFORD*, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Standard Oil Company, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the New York Chamber of Commerce * * * *J. A. STEVENSON*, Canadian correspondent of the Manchester *Guardian* and Parliamentary correspondent of the Toronto *Star* * * * *T. ESQUIVEL OBREGON*, formerly Minister of Finance of Mexico, author of several volumes on the foreign affairs and finance of Mexico, now practicing law in New York * * * *LAWRENCE MARTIN*, drafting officer of the Department of State, formerly geographical expert attached to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace * * * *ARTHUR BULLARD*, Director of the American Government's Public Information Service in Russia during the war, Chief of the Russian Division, Department of State, 1919–1921.

The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.*

The Editors.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED